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IN'1'RODUCTION

David Urquhart was one of the most vooiferous and. despised radicals
of mid-Viotorian Bngla.nd.

For two deoades before the Crimean ',"lar he had

been a leading advocate in

F~gland

of taking a favorable attitude toward

Turkey, and a persiatent advooate of
of RUBsia to that ocuntr.r.

o~sing

the ever-inoreasing menaoe

Urquhart, little written about in modern his-

tor" or briefly dismis.ed as a monomaniac or fanatio, Was gifted with rare
enthusiasm and per.iat.nee.

He wae a prominent E.nglisb personality, the

leader of a vooiferous minori ty, and oertainly one of the few oontem»Orary
English experts on the Near East.
of his most int'luential works t

iJh! lAJU. 3 gave

1

The publication in the thirties of two

'rMUW.AWl!!r

Rifmuroe,2 and

~

3pipt

RZ..

him a reputa.tion as an autbor! ty on tbe Near F.a.st.And the

former was later to become

9.

source for Karl Marx· s wr! tin:?,!! on the Eastern

Not only did Urquha.rt Bee Turkey in a. favorable light and ElIBsian 91»-

pansion a8 a menaoe to Europe a.nd Western Civilization, but he a100 deepieec

free trade, industrialiSDl, the Whigs, the Church of England, and above all

lOertrude Robinson, D.l1d[r~1£l (Oxford, 1920), pp. 44-47.
2Dav1d Urquhart, ll!mR
3Da,Vid Urquhart,

lW4 hI nlIPR£9!1

lh.t SliV.t.9l...a.]Y!,
1

(Lcmdon, 1831).

2 vols. (London, 1838).

2
Lord Pa,lmerston.

For him, Palmerston was

nothin~

more than a. hired arrent

of the Czar, helping to bring a.bout the 0011aps8 of the moral order in

!~ot even Palmerston's attitude during the

I'}urope in the Czar's interest. 4

Crimean ;'jar ohanged his mind.

Tbe Crimean oampaign, Urquhart thought, was

deliberately sabotaged in an attempt to p:re...ent the Turks trom defeating
the Russiana. 5

Lord Palmeraton had for

a long time

1n the internal affaire of other oountries.

alao been interfering

Suoh actions were contrar.y to

the law of nations, a principle whlohUrquhart found inoreasingly violated
in the nineteenth oentur.v.
Karl

Interestingly enough, he became assooiated with

Marx in hi. oppoeition to

Palmers ton and the gavernment'. polioi •• in

the Crimean. War, and Urquhart'. influenoe ie unmi.takabl. 1n Man'. wr1 t-

inga on Palm.raton and the 1&8".rn Queation.

6

Not only did Urquhart pI",

an important rele in arousing the English publio ap:a:!rlst Russia through

many speeches, newspaper artioles,
influenced publio opinion

throu~

~mphlete,

and beoks, but he indirectly

other writers and speakers Who acoepted

his prinoiples and faots either in whole or :In part.

His vi.&..,8 were read

directly or indirectly on the continent and even as far away as the United
States, through the perl or Karl i&arx in

4Isa1a.h Berlin,

1ll! 1!.a.!.2m 'rribun,.7

lfJu:l!la (London, 1948),

P. 189.

5.jW. , p. 190.
6
E ..

n.

Carr,

!t.tl!Au

(London, 1934), pp. lal-127.

7Charles A. Dana. the foreign e41 tor of 1h.t lrtlmne, had asked Marx
to wr1 t. aome artioles on the Eastern Qu•• tion. lJa TrJ.bup.I at the ti.e
was eomewhat radical, being founded by a group of Amerioan followers of
Fourier. The paper had a circulation of' two hundred tbOU8&"ld oopi •• ,
probably the greatest of any newspaper 1n the world.

3
Despite e. ofl'ntu17 of historiographT on the Crimean War there st111 18
8
muoh oon1;,1'o"e1'8)" concerning the origins and conduot of the war. Urquhart ' .
ideas on these

S'Ub~ect.

are of 1mport&n08 not only becauGe they give us a.

better understa'1ding of the radical opposi tlon to the government's of Lord
Aosrdeen and Lo!"d Palmereton, but also because they give us another intetpretat10n of the events.
judge the war.

His opinions reveal another framework in whioh to

Meat historians have not ccnsidered this framework. or for

that matter his views, as respectable or supportable.

On the other hand the

prinoiples on whioh he believed sooiety should be founded. remind us of
ideals more widely held in former ages.

For him Justice and law were e....

tremeJ¥ iIlportant, and the evils of his day he largely attributed to their

violation.

And when he spoke of diplomacy and public opin1on people must

have shuddered to hear their popularly held conoeptions b.sieged by the
power of his keen intellect.
~ust

views.

prior to the Crimean War publio opinion great17 reflected hi.

In 1851 he published a p_phlet, The Ul,!tll'Z

.Rt.!U

l>ama,bl,9 fol-

lowed in 1853 by a book, .!Ill P19G:II'.2!. RY'li, J.n.iU.::!u1. l~Rrtb, ..awl
SoSlb. lO Besides constantly writing tor periodioals and newspapere, he
greeted the outbreak. of' the war with the pamphlet,

.!!!!'

1h!

'.va;: s!. IG9rlD9f_

8Brison D. Gooch, "A Ceutu17 ot Historiography on the Crimea.n ':I;l r, U
a
JJXI! (October, l-;~'), .13-'58.

9Da,vid Urquhart, ~ M~lt~n'Z s!. .l!\J. Danube (London, 1851).
10

Da.vid Urquhart,
(London, 1953).

1h.!

Ptegreg§

.£t

NH§'~i

..in

~

West. t1orth,

J.W.i1 South

4
Collusion.

11

The 1a.... tha.t were stirring English public opinion into • •

pi t_ent on the

S::~8t.rn

Question and oonditioned them for their reception of

ithe new. of the ma••flOra at Sinope were good evidenoe of the efficacy of his

article ••

12

t1rqubart was alao influentia.! in developing among

~fI}ngli.h

large number of inve.tigating oommittees of foreign affairs.
inS' the vi .... of Dand Urquhart and his coterie we will get

workingmen a

In underataniIt.

cl.arer con-

~eption

of the ideas of. these opposition ~UPB Who, with Cobden and Bright,

~el'e

VOCiferous in d.Emouncing the purpose and oonduot of the Crimean Wa.t'.

til(')

And e'YWI. though Urquhart's explanations ms;r nnt be true in the final anal,....

ef the oontemporary

En~lish

It wl11 then be the

BOone.

~lrpose o~

Urquhart oonoerni,"lg England's
Crimean War.

this paper to

forei~

stud~

the views of DaVid

pn110y during, and her oonduot of the

Even though hie extensive activ! Ues and wr! tinge a.nd. the

groups he inapired were not very' suoceesf'ul in undemj,ning the populari 117 of
PalJaerston in

~gl&n4

among the respeotable olaEuMs, or in oonvincing the

English ;people of the corruption of England or her collusion with Russia fen:
the destruotion of T.lrkeJ't the7 certain17 were as unique and a. aignif'loant

aa th87 were vociferous.
Two books directly and iruUl'ect17 conoerned with UrqUhart are Gertmde

llD• vid Urquh.art,
Resul t. (London, 1854.

.!ht

WIT!2l. ,Im9tanC! and

12B• Kingsley Ma.rtin, 1b.! T;lWJllD

p. 189.

st. ~

CQ~l;11119nt ltD

Prsntp,_

Pe6miitstoP (London, 1942),

5
llobin.on '. Dand

14
UrqUhW. 13 ani Maria. C. Bishop' n ..:.,fY'J,c il~ sG.!D.a. UrgHSN':t-

Neither of theft treat uten.ivaly, or for that matter adequately, "his views

IOn EngliSh polloy, Palmerston, arId Russia cturing the Crimean War.

Robin-

sen's work is ma.1nq Gonc.rned wi th a genere.l &lls.lysis ot his views through-

out lite, the event. of

h~.

earlier life, the formation and direction of the

foreian affair. cOWIi tt•••• and hi. interest in the Vatioan Oounoil. Biahop,

on the otber hand, gives U8 IIOme 010.8 and a;rarpathetlo g11mp.e. of Mr••
UJ>quhart's h1lsna.."ld, and a good aurve;r of their actione du.ring the war.
authon tativ. biography haa been published on David Urquhart.

No

However, the

information (!ontatned in Robinson and Bishop and other souroes does give us

a decent aooount of his act10ns &lring the period of the war.
Urquha.rt, as Robinson points o'U.t, fits into a school of historical in-

There

terpretation diametricall,. opposed to the tradi tiona! !,nlSlish one.
still

a.r~

tfro diametrioally opposed views oonoerning the period of the Co&-

gressea, the period of reaction following the Congress of Vienna.

English

wri tel'S have oommonq acoepted Metternioh aa the soul of a aystem of

tion.

Hac-

The rival theo17 aakes Russia the inaugurator and motivator of lnt.....

ventlon in order that ahe might oreate dlstrust and oonfliot aaong the
We.tern nations and profit by the ensuing oonfusion.

The writers of the

latter school are prepared to prove th,.t Russian agents helped foment the
revolutions in Sp&1n and Italy.
exponents,

S'k&t88

Sorel,

one of this sohool's more prominent

that the 1dealistioi,lexander wu both the hidden god of

130ertrude Robinson, Divi\d Urg111UU;:$ (Oxford, 1900).

l~a

C. Btshop,

~emo1r JJ.:! 1fr!h

UrguPltt (I.ondcm, 1897).

the revolutionaries and the pub110god of the conse:t"Va.tlves.
tially what

nand

This is essen-

l.frqubart said ot Russian po1iey throughout his 11fe.

15

But even after a hundred years of research on the policies and diplolD3O)"

of Russilll.t l!1ngland, and Franae the origins of the Crim.an War are not

yet fully olear.

Certainly that tangled web of dip1otaatio events whioh pre-

ceded 1 t has not been entirely unravelled.

Gavin:8. Henderson aummed it up

and. explained -8:9' this viper t s tangle bY' atatlng that "The Crimean War was
the reen1 t of diplc:mllltic d.rift and ministerial inoompetence. ,,16

As '8.

K.ingaley Martin deecribe. the drift toward war the 3Ot'1&1 villain appeal"S
to be publio opinion. 17

For roughly two decades atter the Treat,. of U'nkiar

Skelle8si of 1833, a flood. of anti-Russian 11tern~\re--partially, it not

mainly, inspired l'y

18 until

n~w1.d

Urquhart a.nd tol"d Ponsonby-had been steadily

mounting

it oarried, as Aberdeen described. it, a. drifting cabinet

into the war.19

Henderson is oonvinced. that the events a.nd 1"$Bt21t8 of the

war were more shrewdly and impartially anal;r-zed by con'tempora.ries than by
later hifltoria.nejO Such a maxim, then, makes the views of Urquhart of' pri-

ma.r.r importanoe.

A1 though Henderson dces an e:x:oellent job of analysing the

diplomac7 and character of leading figure. during the war in his

Cmun

15Jlobin80n, PP. 5-7.
U Gavin B. Henderson, CSIIAn!al Dt»12112% ( Glasgow, 1947), p. 199.

17Martin, pp. 215-224.

18
bridge,

J. H. Gleason,

Ma••• , 1950),

.!hi

GaUIIl'6..st RUIGp\lobla
JJl QUit t1;t\$ii\n
.

pp. 25-2

19Martin, p. 217.
2OHenaeraon, p. 243.

(Cam-

1

i!s

Dj.p1 2JIHWZ. he de... not mention Urquhar't.

On the other hand he does not

take sueh a fawrable vi_ of' Lord Palmeraton a8 doea Seton-Watson and

TelDpe:r.1ey.

He thol'Cllghly analy ••• Palmeraton t 8 oharSDter, oalling him

little 1e88 than a tanatic in hi. attempts to enhanoe Britain's PrGstlge.2l
If Urquhart oan be 8Oou••d of being addicted to Russophobia. perhaps Palmel'stan, his arch Emfll37t oan be accused of Anglophobia.

In

d18CufH'in~

oommentaries on the views of' DaVid 'Urquhart, there is a

strong temptation to include material not directly concerned with the subjeot under sorutiny.

This would lead to a. discussion a.s exterud ve as is

Brison D. Gooch's article, "A. Century of Historiography on the CrtmeM
Wa1".,,22

It i8 interesting to note that the olosot he ever comes to DaVid

UrqUhart (and Urquhart had decided Views on all phaGeS of the war) is in
hi. d1aou••ion of the views of Karl Man and Vernon L. Pu:ryear.
atate., viewed the Criaean War

&8

\\farx, he

an att_pt on the part of Ruseia to r ...

atrict English COIID.rota! ooapetltion in the lV-ear But.

"In hi. 4q, Man

waa "f'1rtually Alone," Qoocb tells us, and "No TOioe added doeUllanted auppeJr'
to hie anal,.m.s, n until Vernon L. Pu17eal' published in 1931 the firat docum.ntfld proof in hi. book, }\uclan4, Rugia,

22. 23

.aw!.!W!

Suoh a atat_ent ignores the wri tin. .

ot

.~:ttS:), 9tlft!t1e.rt,

Urquhart in general, and.

eapecially his book-length work whicb preceded the war, jla
lffilli•• .1!l..t!:w~, t1Q£:lh,
a

k ¥J

211.1?J.!l. J p.

a") 3.

22,...~I")Ch, pp. 33-58 ..

23.!.i.U.,

p. 49.

..m1!1

sO!,lth.

184!:

Prom".Sl.!

8

sider controveraial, in addition to the above mentioned book has made a
~ompTehensive

analysis of +.he relation ot economics to diplomacy in his

lnterr.a.tional iegAA!!igl.lWl Dijl19l119Y ill jU 1!ut mlt.24
inoludes

Ii.

lengthy tl'4Hltment of the diplomacy of the Crimean

l i t.tle 1nfonnation on tJrquha.rt· 8 views of the war.
~el1

'i'he fo:rmer, whioh
~a.r,

gives

The latter treats quite

his Infhu.!!'ooe and activi Ues in the thirties, &..I'\d is exeuBahle for lack

book.
Paul ;"1. Bla<:kstook and 'Bert 1". Ho eeli ts in their oommendable 1'eIlUl"reotion of Marx's writings on the Eastern Question whioh aooording to them are
praotieally unavailable, have in their beok 11w

&!.ul~an .!nao,.12

EUl"S!R,25

g1 ven quite a fair appraisal of the importance of the wr! tings of Karl

em the . .tern Question.

Marx

Marx was ahownto f1 t the description of the group

that Gavin B. Hel'.uieraon d.escribed

808

dependable observars who "gave 'V8J!T

aatisf'actory ja4£pents on the oau••• of the war and the :respective re8pons1bili Ues of the states conoerned ...
nifled the vi tal

U$C88Si ty

26

Although 1 t is true that Man :Neoga

for modern refol"lls in 'lilrkey. he did not 'adopt the

extreme pro-Turkish posi ti<)n ofauoh "propagandists" aa David Urquhart. 27

24Gooo'h refers to A. J. P. Taylor who found these ideas "]lovel, it unt"eliable," and E.!.. Woodward who thought them "interesting materia.l, thou~
ltbe oonclusions d.ra.wn are often oontl"'OvGrsial. tt p .. 511 Vernon L. Pur.yEu~.rt
ntomatinna.l !9911RWCS ~ Piplameex.in.iU]ur F.a@t (Stanford. 1935).
25Paul w. Blackstock and. Bert F. Hoe4.tli tz,
Glencoe, 1952)"

26Henderson, p. 243.
27Blackstook and HORelitz, p. 262.

..!hi

FflHu3 irw "'IUfige J2 ~U'0R'

Howevel', the a.ut.hors f&11 to see tha.t many of the other viewa of Marx on
Pa.L~erston

and the

~aetern

held .:and ,rropacrated.

Question express the views that David Urquhart

'!ven though Marx ridiollled him a.t certain times thi.t\I

dces not give a. oomprehendve pioture of the nature of' their relatione, let
alone "«ants in.debtedness to him.

Somewhat permissively and eert,3inly apologetica.lly Seton-Watson an ....

lyzee 'Jrquhart' s post tio1'l. on. the mid- Victorian

I.in

inter~la.tlonal

eoene. !3ri,aiu

E.Pt2TC' oontains sever&! pages informing the reader of the influence of

Urquhart. 28

In doing

indulgence in

80

di8c~8.ing

Seton-Watson apologizes, asking for the reader'.
What some might not consider aerioue hletor,y. but

which to him ....ed "of som. valu., as revealing the levity with whioh un-

prov.d chargee could b. bandl.4 about in the Viotorian era, d••pi t. our
strict law of 11'0.1."29
been bribed in
that

8.

Concerning Urquhart'. oharges that Pallterston had

1825 s.ton-watson atat.a tbat "It ..... alao.t inoredibl.

man of' l'1rql.lhart' If high character,

lmcwl~,

and experienoe should.

have believed. tr.leh rubbish' 1 t oer1tain17 helps to explain why he _4. nc
lIlark in polities, despite bis remarkable &Ohlevesant in rousing the

or work1ngoo-ela.se 01110. 1'1'1 fertli gn pol icy'... 30

1nt.1'O.~

It seems that 3e"ton-Watllon

aceel'tfJ the allegations that Urquhart'. opi't'1ione and attitudes were not

founded en facts, and that his attacks On Lord Palmerston were really the
•

10
~n1te8tation.

of a teud whIch began in the thirties over acme Ru ••ian docu-

ment. printed in Urquhart·. !9rtf91~, the Vixen affair,31 and f1n&117 hie

removal troa the ..baaa" in Conetantinople. 12 Urquha~, however, aen1 ••
that this oppoeition was due to h1e 41aappo1ntlt.,t in being 41_1 ...4 t1"Ml

the foreign e.rwios.]) The contributions of Seton-Wateoft to our general
knowledge of Urquhart are -.ll, he mak•• no oontribution cOl'lOern1n« Urqu-

hart during the Cr1-.,. War.
Dand Urquhart·. Vi ... ot hlstol';.V' was quite int.r•• tln~n 1 t certaill17

. . . . some l1ght

Oft wh,y

England's action..

he wa..a unauapiciou. of ,",1 t8r8 Who . . no wrong in

Hi8t~ries

compoeed .specially for sohonls, and the

'!!leJlC)1rs ot .t.t. . .n h8 be11.11e4

to be quit.

perverted.

Lie., h. thought,

were more the rule than the exception 1n th ••• composition..
were not supposed to olasb with national •• If-love.

School bocks

The editor. of memoirs

of course had to ••1nta1n the oredit ot a grandfather, a tather, or a

brotller.

In tile•• IDUlt1f'ar1ou.a wqs new generat10n. inherited the "il11b.oil-

1t7 and perversion" of the old, and children were enoouraged to oontinu.
the errors of their father •• )4

Thi. ,Nba'bly wae quit. true in mid-

311n 18)6 a London .erchant named Bell fitted out the sloop, Vixen,
wi th a oarp fit . .1t _A ran the lu.sian ..,lookacl. to the ooast 0'1 Cirea_ia.
Th. au ••lan. alleged that the ......1 contain.d gunpowA.r .s ••11 •• aale,
ana oeJd'll1Oakd hn. It wa_ allea;14 that tfJtquha1"t an .. PonllOnbT enoourage4
Bell and Wiehe4 to .broil the In~llah .",.maent 1n the _tter.

320 • I. Bolaov.r, "David Urquhart and the E.stern Que.tion, 18))-1837'
A Stuq ln Pu'bl10i V and 'lpl-..o7." i~N .sl. -gdlD ,Iil:bl£t. VItI (»ec_ber. 19)6), 444-467, C. K. Web.ter,\!quha.rt, Pon.onb7. and Palm.raton, t1
~. LXII (lul" 1947), 327-351, Ol,aeon, 01D.,1 ••
33Davtd Ul'iluha:rt, ItR_iniac.noe. of Willin IV," !?iilo.Us R,nn
(London,

IS?,).

141)avt4 UJ'4,uhart,

1874), p. 41.

lU!.mu:..!IEI.at..at 'renoD

Rm1utl9Jl (London,

11

Victorian !lngland. &net oertainly 4448 ",eight to S. Macoob7-. cUotum that the
eerioue etudents of hiator" had of neo•••ity to de1Y. well past the

ard hi.tory" written fol" their oon.umpUon. 3'
Vaeoob,. 'W'al"na that the "standard bistory"

sou:rc ••

ta..Til

:r~UI

Scunding lauoh like 'r1rquhart

"&8

too otten contine. in ita

edl torio.l oftice and Downin.g 3treet.

are no more than a aere "ti2A.99DXIQU •• "l6

".tan~

Suoh hi.tori ••

Realizing thie, it 1a quite

surprising that in hi. e:nellent stua,-, Engll. !a41S!ll.h1lt ~§5l:&5, he add.
little to our knowledge of Urquhart'. views and aotions oonoerning and durin~

the Crimean War.
So Urquhart was to a great degree re8po.,.1b1e for the knowledge that

many Eng11ahlllen had of the lear la8t.37 1>18rae1i hiltaelt owed te him all hie
knowledge on the subject.

f1rtuhart.

At one Uu he had been instructea d&117 by

D1araeli waa one of the

fflll Ul"S

who accused the govena..t ot

"oonnl'f'anOe. ,,38 l'urthel'lllOre, the vi_ be UP" ••"
.iailar to that of Urquhart.

or hititory w•• ra'ther

Be onee wrote about the "standul111.to17" of

hi. 4.,. . . being that in which "Oerurra117 .peaking all the great eYent. haTt

'been dt.tort.d, _at or the 1apol"tant oau ... oonoealea,
ple oharactera never appear. and all Who figure are

aianpreetmted that the re8Ult 1s
I

d

til

80

80M

or

the prl!lOl-

Mieunhntoo4 and

ooraplete-.;retiflcat1on.,,39 t1:rquhart UJ

"I

358 •

Vaoooby.

¥Pello &4191\i.,

\8'U=168;.> (London. 1938). lIt 7 ..

3t).liJj.
3710b1n80J'l, Pp. 44--47, !tol.o....rt PP. 444-457.
38alehOP, PP. 128-129.
3's. Maooob7' p. 7.

12
certainly- be seen a. one of thoae prinoipal oharacters who ••140m appear,

and Lord Palmers ton .a one of these who appear, but are misunderstood.

Professor ilarold Temperley in his detailed and scholar17 work, E;cliR4

iJm4 Jh.! l!.t.II .!Hi' JllI

Crim,a. describes David Urquhart as one of those

protessional ag.I. tater. who was "strange, brilliant and restless • • • • " and
who "had spread the d.octrine tbat Russia was an a:ble, treacheroua, oorrupt,

aabi ti ou a, anet extrMrdinar1ly dangerous power. • • • ,,40 The Dri Usb public
atter all liked 8eneatlon8 and oertainly enjoyed dramatio epi8Ode. replete
with villains and hero e..

So Taaperle7 explains . .. , tl.ir acoaptance of

Urquhart'_ 14ea_ on iu_Ida

&II

and 'i'urke;r a. the I_b. 41

Lord Palmsraton i_ not tcmnd to ba a

a "diplomatio fable" With au.sia &s the wolf'.

prinoiple and ..atem, nor a traitor
opportunl_t."42

&8

Il&n

of

U1'\1.uhlU"'t . . him, but onl¥ a "nperb

GenerallJ, Lord Pala.raton gete off rather .all under the

pan of Teraperley, anet David Urquhart rather poor17.43

In any evant, T__¥)U"'I

187 aleo end.. hi. book With the baginnin.g of the war, and therefora doe. noi

oovar the period with which this paper i8 oonoerned.
The treatment ot Urquhart at the handa ot this respected 1ng1i.h hie.

4°Harold TEftperley,
1936), p. 18.

!n&lWld.IDS th, N'"l'.!ul l !llI Crimi. (London,

4lllii.
42~., p. 60.
43Temper1ey states that "All that oan be said in derence (If Urquhart
(and a SOOd d.al more than I oan personally endorse) is in Puryea.r, Ennol,l.l,cL
Ru.sia and the Stre.iu QJ,.leatlon, ohapter II. Urquhart's IIOlIIt elaborate 4....
ren •• anel. arra1gmaeli to of Palmer.ton i . in .. privately printed work, .!lu!
. .~ AttAla J4. Grut BrisAig.u A"'nlI1,"4 ~.!s.d Pal.rllon,
(l841}." T_perley teel. certain that Urquhart is the author. p. 409.

13
torian 1Il8lt•• 1 t quit. evident that l101'e _st be kn.own about hie method. of

speaking and wri til\Bt what he said., and how and 'Why he impres.ed people the
~~

he dld.

Urquhart for a long tlme before the war had aroueed a

offi01al and unofficial enelliett_

:a.

~arm

of

offended !U.111' people by telling them

what t.hey did not like to hear or want to believe.

It was therefore 1nevit-

able that 80me would seek relief in oalling hlm an eooentrio, and insinuate
that he euft'eHd

fro.

delusions_ 44

If hie allegatlon. were true, in whole

or in part, 1 t octainly would have been in the inter•• t of tho.e accu ••d t4.l
••ek to diaor¥! t lWI.

!llhat ade utters wone was that in t1".Ying to 1...

pr••• people he would .xa«serat. what wa. . . . .nt1ally a fact. 45 Hia wnth
against the crim•• of'

un~st

and illegal wartue did not s.rioueq JIlOva 11081

Man7 t1. . . it ~. . . . that hi_ 'b.llet in the power of
.,..
b. right 1Ia4e hill intolerant of wrong, ant ang.!'l at the doer. 41

ot hi_ oount17••n. 46
sen to

Soa.t1Jles he purpoH1y acted a. though he wu tierce17
or4er to provoke antagen1.-

80

~

that indifferenoe would be ahatt.re4. 48

other t1M. he would speak in paradoxes to arou •• tnteHst. 49
8ai4, "The" 1. no &ri I have ~&Ct1.ed

44B1ehoP, PP. 47-48.

45l..1:dJ. J P. 129.

46~., PP. 129-131.
47 lob in eont PP. 172-173.
48

llzU. t

P. II:; t 13lshop, pp. 40-41.

"BishoP, p. 133.

at a pereon in

80

Urquhart

a.siduously •• the faoulty of

At

making men. hate me.

'!'hat removes apathy.

You oan Ret them into speech. "50

JIowever, Robinson bel1eve8 that at timea he was na.turally passionate and
intolerant. and destructive of all that opposed him.

This may bave been

brouRht about by the intenSE! pain he sutfered more than occasionally. for

whioh he round relief only in his Turkish bath.

On the other hand he was

alllO able to act wi til gentleness, patience, and. self-reetraint.

51

Be had

good. rea.son to act the wIllY he tidt because he believll!td that the age in Wb.1ot
he lived. was corrupt.
perverted. 07 self-love.

not on17 ""as 1 te speech insincere, but i te reaeoft

Wat

Urquhart attespte4 to lift a man out of hie age,

his in.sinceri tJ". 8.1'1.4 his ..If-lov..

Ke would ahem a man that he 414 not

poss.se real kncwle4g.t but was blin4lJ' following public opinion.
also ahow hi. that hi. theorie. were ba••a. on falHhood, that

Be would

auft~

..u

but a mirage, and that the road to the pr01l1 ••d la.nc1 was up the roolq path.

of self-dime!plin. and knowledge.52
'9. Klngslq

~t1nln .!i.I Tr1uma .Jt.!:ad Pt111IDl29~B g1 ves

of' an outstanding piece of l'e..a.:rch whioh has profoundly

the relation ot publjo opinion to Fmgll.h polleT.

ev14enoe

enli~ten.4 tiS 01'l

He conolude. that the

English entranee int.o the Crimean War was mail'll,. due to the influenoe of
public opinion..

Urquhart Dlade significant oontributions to that public tm-

cltement whIch orescendo.a. atter Sinope into England's entrance into the

50RobinsOftt p. 133.
51
., PP. 175-176.

ibiA

5~.,
53.&.

PP. 127. 129.

K:tngsl~

Martin,

1AI

T'i.s JJ.l.l£d PNilmion

(Lon40n, ]924).
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!war.

If' this be tru.., then the p!'Oper and

hart's view. becomes quite important, the)"

ext~m81 Vet
lIU8t

understanding ot Urqu-

not be relegated to the

fringes of h1st017, even though most historians would disagree with his interpretation ot the war and of the per8Cna.11t1ea involved.

Martin, more

than an)" other author, properly disouseee the Views of Urquhart on the eve
of the war. 54

But

this book ends at the beginning of the war, and certain13

does not tocus ita attention on Urquhart's opinions and influence.

On. 40 •• not pt a olear pia turo of Dav14 vrquhart during the Cri. . .
War unl ... h. is ...n in the context of the rampant radioalism and woit.,.....
ous public opinion that eo stirred F.illgland at tb,is t1...

A. J. P. Tqlor

plao.. hi. 1n this .etting in h1s short histor" ot Engiiah radioal1.. enti'Ued,

lU !J:JIll" !M.a. 55

Hi. tJ'eataent i8 brier, ooncis., not Z'.a11y

d'1"OgatoZ7, but a44ing nothing new nor real17 ort 1010al17 worthwhil..

UntU-

hart 'Was the 1.&41'Og ad:'9ooa1oe of taking a ta'fOrable att1 tude toward. Tu.rk.,
and "the strangest dissenter of the nlneteenth cerrtttr"• .,56

Thou~ UJ'quhart

was a radioal, '1:'",101' do •• not think that h. start(td that way. Others a ...IJ1,""DU.....
ently started with general radical prinCiples and extended the. to foreign
affairs.

:But UrqUhart, 80 T",lor would have 1 t, devi ••d

&

his own and later found that only radicals supported it. 57

foreign pollcy
Tqlor

Dm.8t

haVE

used his imagination a little too much in this description of Urquhart's

54~., PP. 53, 146-147, 151, 185, 189, 194.
55 A• J. P. Tqlol', 1Jl.I,T.D;y.ble !MaD (London. 1957).
56l.,W., p. 46.
57l.ll,ij.

o~

16
mental prooe.ees.

It is an oversimplifioationl it Beams tbat he developed

his views from prioo1ple. of la'v,

tiL

deep understanding of eooie'1', and an

intimate assooiation with Turkish life, and the manifestations of Russian
diplomacy in. the

accepted his

l~e&r Ea.st.

vi~

It is true by 1653 that mainly the radicals

but then he had alreaAT become oonvinced in the late

thirties and early f01"t1e8 tha.t the future of Enffland 1" with the oppre...d
working man. 58 Be took re8ponBlb11i~ for having diverted the Chartist
leaders from v1014mt r8'9'Olu'Uol1, and therefore ohecked the IDOveaent which he
thought was being intluenced b1' foreign &gents. 59
David Urquhart .pent _oll of his lif. r.indtng hi- countr,sen that

au.aia . . . gratuallJ und.:raininlJ the lapl ancl moral order of Europe. Th...
obael"'¥'atlona retlecte' .. conception of hlato17 that . . . . incredible to

ImOst of hia ocmt_porane..

A -30r1ty of th_ . . M.• ooneept of Ru ••ta ..

the -.nit..tation. of a di.torted 8in4.

Urquhart perceived the .tfect. of

the 'eliberate 1Ieperial pollcT ot Ru.sia where moat re.peotable E!lgll8llaen
thought th.., ssw the .anit•• tationa of popular

or of me" ohance.

H.

8U1

hea1a

a8

1ft8U~tion.f

of nationall..

a gig_tic oountJ7 that was essentially

weak, but through the intelligence of her lIint.te:ra, the rejeotion of eacru-

ple, and the uee of diplomacy, revolution, and war, Rhe had been able to
follow a policT of uninterrupted conquest .a
ais knowledge of the politioal testament of

5SRoblnaon, p. 82.

59~.t pp. 84-89.
60.!.ll1A., p. 2.

d.ei~at.d by
Pete~

6:)

Peter the Or.at.

the Great further strength

17
enad. hia vi" that &n••ia was dedioated to a m1.81en'} of imperial expansion.
Even though that te.t.ent is !BOat prebab17 a forg817 intende4 to bias
pearl opinion apinet lueeia,

(,1

.ro-

the fact remain. that most f4 what it atated

had been and wae being- acoOtDpliahe' in the .,... of l>avi.tt Urquhart. 62

In hie thinking

U~uhart

olo ••lf a .... iat~ prinoiple and fact.

felt that Auring his 11tetime great moral iaaue• •ere at stake.

He

au ••ia

was

att"ptlng to ezolu4e international aftaire from the doaaiu of moral law.

Before this 0010. . . . of the north bee... important On the international

eo._, other cOl.udri•• and sov.relps h.a acte4 unJuat17,
acted b7 the prino1ple ot 1nt1uet1oe.

but Rue.ta ha4

To atta1n 1". en4. Ru"ia work. . b.,.

hin4 the _ene. 1ntlue_1nl' in4i'ri4ua1 etat. . .n and. n_apapeHt anA toaent1ng Z'eVOlution..

all1

JIarq- ti. . . 1. t !la4 aa4e ... of . .n and.

oppoM4 to it.

llO. . . .nt.

intention-

But the deterul... ot the PJ'inoiple .t 3tlBtioe in publl0

polic:r were he81 tant becau•• of uncertain al.at and in.fteeti.... beoan.. th.,.

did not und.eratanA the nature of national

~.t1ce.

'PurtheJ.'B)re. th-.r used.

as 41d flOat other Era/JUehdlen, hoh phra..s .e d_ocrat1c gove1'ftlM1'l't, 1111'11....
tertal reapcnalbil1t7 an4 national1t,v without understanding th ... 6 ) Thi.
led. Ul"Cluhart to oenoln4. that the oppoa1 tion tbat Ing1and had given to

~,

61 LaU l'$ue Lookhart, "The

XIV (19)6).

t

lolitioal T•• tament' of Pat or the Ore.t, 't

62S11\oe the t188 of p.ter the Great. Iu••ia had acquired Eatonia,
Ingria. Livonia, St. 'star_burg, aevel, Cronstadt, part of Poland. the Sea
of .Asott, part ot 'furkey, Oldenburg, the O1'1lle., Od~s.at Courland, Georgia,

h(1n~liaf

part ot leHia. the Ca.pian S.... and the fortr. . . . of laaail,
Anapa, .aretia, ami Pote on the ... tern. oout of the 111ack Sea.
6)
Robin80I1, Pf.

a-l.
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Russian pretensions wa.. moet i.neffeotual.
A.lthough every European state was threatened, Russia'. main viotim in
the nineteenth oGnttl1'7 was the Turkish empire.

i4~en

in oontrol of this

strategioally s1 tuatea empire he tel t that Russi& could oontrol Southeaaterr
furope and the :!fear :mut, approaoh the West through the Med1 terranean, and
th~aten England t 8 In41an .plre.

Oppose4 to iustJia'. plana were the Tu*81

a people with great mil1tar,r characteristios and a sen•• of righteouan... ir
publio aoUcn.

U:rquhart

W&S

sure that the West had forgotten about the

laticn between religion a.nd poll tios, but the Tum. had not.

~

Ue aaw '1'u"key

ae an able opponent to the qat_tic injustice of' Ru.sia, an opponent Who,

if lett to hereelf would have been able to stave ott any Ru.sian attack or
att_pt. at whYereion.

'But '!\n.'kel'

..,.&. not

being left to her.elt.

Too

lIlallT power. were lnter:f'enn« with her government, SOCiety, and mil! ta17

forces.

Oould:1 t not be that throu.gb diplomacy Ruesia was securing the

help ot the power. in au)ver't:1ng Turkish etrength?· Urquhart constantly
maintained that the Western Powers had

f~uentl7

while making overtures of friendship to 'l'nrke7.

helped Russia in this w&1

64

Russia was inherently weakt of this Urquhart waa oonvinoed.
~leso-Turki.h

War of

1828-29.

In the

Ruesta maneuvered heraelf into a position to

attack Tttrke,. b:r gettinfot the auppoaed allies of Turke7, England and Pranoe.

to 3011'1 her in destroying the Turkish fl.et at Navarino.
had not even bothered to declare war.

England and

'ranc4

Even with this advantage the Russ1an

forc •• under Dlebitch might have been deleated had not the Sultan been

19
pe~.laded
~ign,

'01 his mln1sters and the repre.entatives of England and France to

in a panic, the Peace of

Ioitch's

&rIq'

AdriL~opl..

It the Sultan bad waited, ».1-

would inevitably have been d••trole4.

Slmilarq, in 18)0 the

Poliah armle. wen able to wI thatan! the Car'. al'lll.s for ten months.

ract,

In

a Turk1ah victor" the lear bet ore might haTe meant the eaanoipat1on

of Poland. 65

:But the danger fro8 'Ruafda wae not deer.asing, 1 t wae becoming

more aerlou.1)r .enacing.

Urquhart

ftW

R.n.aia· a atate.en n.e the r1.e of'

Mehemet Ali in Egypt to aecure in 1833 what waa

ate of Turkey.

equal to

a protector-

\!;inen the W•• tern Powers grn hoatile to what they

h,W

hap-'

pening, Ru ••ia, through d.ipl01llaCY, Stm.ght in 1840 to break up with the help

of Lord Palmeraton the Anglo-French mntente of 1830.
without war between England and France.

This erisis pas.ed

Mehemet Ali wae then mad. an

her.di ta17 Paeha of Egypt throuRb the help of the W.etern PowaH.

The .....

tablishment of a qnaety in Egypt .as a atep toward the perma."lent 10 •• of
that eapire, and .eriouely weak.ned the Turkish EnaPire.

66

By the .i4dle of the nineteenth oentur.J the relatione between Ru ••ia
and England had been alaoat pel'!llat1ently amioable for three hundred yeare.
England had b.en at war and peace with other oountrle. throughout tho.e
centurie., but wi th Rue.ia, which wu her arch enetlQ', England. h&4 never

real17 been at war. It therefore ....ed to Urquhart that RUBeia had been
helped in one • ., or another, either intentionally or unintentionally b.f

6 5~
ft
I 'h'u., P.7.

66'1"'4"...
~ • pp • lAll
..,.. .•

20

~g11.h
~&r1

polioi •••

67

Lord Ponaonbl. Who .... Urquhart'. snperior while MOre-

at Oonstantinople. briefly ~4 up 1n 1854 England'. role in Ruse1.'_

t;ggnr.ndi_.ent durin« the nineteenth centur.y 1n a .ort work ent! tle4 .!iQ.U.
Pnnl ."T'ltMUS. 68 !.orll Pon80nby in the thirUe. hact al.read7 Wf)sed

t.

bloa.l3t with ff'rqll'tua.rt.

Around 18-'4 1t •••_ both hat! a...,.loped fixed .,.1..".

bn the ?.a.8tern Queat1on..
favorable to 'rurkey and.

Together the7 launched a pre ... oampaiffl'l which
lL~1n.t

?fu •• ia..

PO!1eo~b,.

.

Wall

",en oOJ"T'4Ctef ana. au'btll-

dised Urquhart t II famous pamphlei;, ,~!ltlliJ~t "l!lng,. J,'PGA. _

TartR,

6

9

and informea him or event. at the Porta while Urquhart was in In.gland.. 70
!1evfttthele•• t !Jrtuhart was

&'fIaH

tha:t !eJlgl1"h ainiatera hal hel,ed Ru•• ia

to espand te the we.t a.nd south.

In 4!fJCu ••ing Bu •• la t • •%parution to the

south he oonfinea

~\ ••• 1t

to oommercial expansion in the ottoman !ap1re,

the l!:uxlnet the Oa.plan, L'1d the Catlca.a.

Ire•• Jit.

!u"l. In ..1hI.!u.;it

l12it\Qt _

ae exhibited 1n hi, beok.

!lullb

b!JJI-

the ate,. ""'lob. Rupia h&4

SIlec••aivel,. _cte in stoppin« up the .atel'-Wq' an4. euppreaatng the pro4uotlon or the ad301ning countrie..

n.

k:nowl~

of' the.e ccnmtri•• ...

d.r1'9'M troll vistting tll_ and working an4 talktn&, with the ... tnyol....,.

In hl. obael"f'atlons he .... a practical connection between the w.lfare ot

kl1'1g4oaa and the ObMl'T&nce ot the _ral 1....

Thi. oonneot1on alone ""d

67t1rqnhart, !X9£lu, 'P. lXT.

68r.. Tucker, !lwW*. Pgl'1i'el~ ~!!hn'!tl (London, 185S).
69ll&vid Urquhart,

!ns:lltldt ".DJlI.t, !!lIm, .ID4 hmu (Lon91'l, l8:W).

7°0. 8. BolllOnr, "Lord Pon_nb,. and the Eastern Question, 1833-l9t"
~, XIII (1934). 106.

21
).fen nd.pt change and

pel"llUl.nent.

tions, but the poaitlon of

8.

80

would the oircurratancea of -their ac-

nation with rererenoe to others waa fixed by

its acta; theee acta would alao detenaine its character.

Urquhart knew

that he was dealing with histor,y in the making, and describes hie position
in society as the ohorus 0'1" a Greek stage which annOllnoes the actors and
foretells the events, but laments in 'Y8.in.

71

Urquhart f'irat became aware of Ruseia' e secret intereets and aubvexsive work after he had arrived at Oonstantinople from Oreece, just in tim.

to be present at a celebration in commemoration of the Peaoe of Adrianople.
Ha.ving been sin.gled out by a Russian d.iplomat who had l'fl'lCently been on a
missiC'n to' Greece, he was p,i ven 80me information conoern:lnrr liu8so-Q.reek re-

lations.

Being perplexed, he asked one of the

P~lasian

secretaries of

legation the meaning ot the comments he had heard, and if RU8sia had any

object in injuring Oreeoe.

.

ish revolt,

L~d

He was told that Russia had fomented the Span-

that this was an example of her work

ever~~here.

72

The close oonnection of Russia with the Greek revolt is of primar,y
importance in David Urquhart' '" life.

Not only did it oonvince him of the

ignorance that prevailed in the West about mastem affairs, but presented

him with his first great lesBon in the power of diplomacy.
the Greeks, he ODe to know their hatred for Russia.

While 1iv1ng wi th the

Turks he realized that they had great military abilities.
inquiry into the

diplo.~LiC ~ethods

Fighting with

~.ginning

an

of Russia atter the de.truction of the

n:l.lrkleh fleet at!aT&l"ino and the peace of Aarianople, he wall ai4ea by the

racta rev.aled in 41»loeatlc documents found in Warsaw during the Polish
~(!.t'b.ll1on

of 18)0.

"'''ttl etu41ed.

The•• secret despatch •• were sent to 1i".ngland, reoeived

1>7 Urquhart, and printea 1.n the

plalmed, the consent of the

~ngli.h

'Portt2~12 wi th,

government.
ltespa:toh •• cUd not oontain great revelations. 1 )

as Urquhart

To the oasual reader, the
Oertain p11:1"&8•• ",.re, ho....

ever, signifioant to a person like Urquhart, who was oonsoioua of the fact.

pertinent to the despatohe..
futssian po1iole•• 74

Nev.rthe1esa, the7 oonfirmed his

Rusela'. diplomatic _thode

'!Jorge had for

SOli.

t1•• b.en one

fa, t1 v•• , and, .trange

&8

a180

or

arou••d hie su.pio1tn'uJ.

~ldgment.

POZBO

on

eli

the abl•• t of Ru ••1an fOl"ei,gn repre.ent-

it IIUI1' ...., 'Was ••1"iousl1 nominat.d at one time

for the position of 'ranoh .inister ot war.

In London Counte.s Lievan, the

wife of the Rue.ian usbanader. wae at c11ff.rent t1••s quite inttmate with

the Duke ot We111nC"On, Lor. OH7, lori ?a.lJHl"ston, and othft" pro.tnent .en.

l'l. ",.re

Th. Lt....

linke.

wi~h

the oluPtge 1n tb..Briti.h ,01107 of illOlatin

oonoenitlff the Gre.k que.tioD.

e...ntln~ on the failure of th. Ruasian

tOTOe. to d.ereat tb.e Turks In the winte of 1828 ahe WMte to her brother'
"Defeat the TurD, tor love ot Go4:

lurope i . growing innbol'tinate eince

it thinks we oannot 40 ... "15

7~e '9EStq lt9 was a short-lina period10a1 4eYOta. to tiplollati.o atfairs publ1shed by Urquhart and his friends. It was first pu.olished in 1835
and di80ontlnue4 in 18)6 when Urquha?t went to the East, but was revived
froID 184) to 1845.
74noblneon. p. 8.
15~.,

,p.

10-11.

2)
Urquhart went

110

tar /I.e to believe that whoever held the key to the

jseCret of .atlssian power, could not onq 4.a'tl"07 her, but &180 .ploy her.

mis aecret did not lie only in the k."1owletga of historioal and statistioal
~~tail..

It involved 'the study of the tHana by whioh Rusaia oonquered and

"x-tended. her influence in each provl'.lce or oount1"7 over which abe held fIfI83.
Possession of tb1. knowledge would. have enabled governments to understand.
b.ow Ru.sia oould be counteracted.

Suoh knowledge was diffioul t to acquire,

beca.use ot the s.lt-love of e...el'7 minister, people. and soveHign. and b7
their cwn miaconduot whlch frustrated their perception cf the truth.

Sir

!lames Graham appropriat.ly .xpr••••d the thinking of .ve:q l!luropean who waa

tasked to investigate hi. colleague..

Jtyo'll wiah .e to examine a oase wherein

I am to find that I have been a dupe all IQ" life, and this 1. the flOat fa!t'ourabl. ocnatruotion to be put.

I will not do 1t.»76

Urquhart telt that England had been di.eipatlng ita.lf ainoe 1827 b7

conatantl1 intervening in the affairs of other oountriee.

lOst people

thought that it wae England- t • popular oon.8tltution, and the presenoe of pre-

eMinent ••n in po8it10n. ot leaderahip that pre ••n8ct En«land &1'lc1 _de her
great.

To Urq,uhart, ho......r, th.......re on17 111u.10n8.

In bi. mind the

ao1;ion8 of the so-called great .en did not 'bear out the expectat10na of the

English people.

Sinoe the deatb of the

~lke

of Wellln,ton, Engllahmen had

n.ot "en an)" IIlan of extraordina17 abiUt,.- in tbe po at tion of foreign min1e-

ter.
ent

The other llIliniater8, no matter how l!:'1"eat, c0111d not exerci.e inde1M'n&~%dgment

and act10n in foreign matters.

76!at Pre•• , lun. 6 t 1860. p. 55.

n•• id •• ,

their day8 were laden

wi th too lIlan1' other oares to pemi t of laborious investigations into a world

tbat was be;rond the sphere of a debate

01"

division in the Houee ot

COlUlOns.

A large portion of English affairs had then been relegated by oommon consani
to medioore men.

Lord Palmers ion, he thought, was one of theae medioore mer

who had risen to power with the help of Ru.aia.

He more than any other

m~

ister waa guilty of oollusion with Bussia, a fact apparent in most of hia
actions and certa1nl~ in the way that he brought on the Affghan War and
later engineered the Crimean War.

On the other hand Urquhart 8aw Ruaaiat

England' a opponent, a. a oountry that trained an.el disciplined ita lead.ers.
lIe thought that the7 were intelleotual17 wperior, ha.d a sy-st_ ot operation, and pemaneDC7 of purpo . . , and. had a .en •• of confidence in th...
••lv•• , and contempt tor the rest of mankind.

This oontrast plac •• in re-

lief Urquhart t II vi. .s on the relatiTs poai tion ot ingland and

eve ot the Crillean War. 77

au ••ia

on the

CHA.PTER II

Urqllhart believed that Russia'. eOlllBDereial policy was on. of the
moat important phaees of bel" diplomacy.

Her auecess in carrying out this

policy was 1n hie opinion oontributing to the fulfillment of her plan to
dominate Europe.

.11 though oO'llllH!'Oe was one of the lDOst important elementa

of diplomacy, :1 t oertain1y could not be practiced or understood by i tselt.

It was intricately involved in every other element.

Runia had long been

l!IUocetlstul in advancing her ends, because ahe posee.eed the tlknowledge and
talents" to do

80.

Inglish .erehants on the other hand really ltnew veJ7

11 ttl. about the nature
re .. euler.

ot lntemaUonal trade. Thia made

Rusaia' a proft'>

Her pheno.ena! develotaent was aU the IIOre .stouncling, b ..

oause ahe had macte her..lf into a cOl8NJ'Oial nation while hand1oappe4 "'7 a
dearth of oo. .%'Oi&1 retlOu1'O.s.

What waa ".-poneible tor her rapid growth

in ooalercla1 importanoe "aa, aa Urquhart thought, her

"0 apac! 't7

for .......... ~

lIent. ttl
Turkish

tim.

ha4 oontinuall,. increaaed in the tortia. due to saini .....

trative ohanges in England and Turkey, sucb as the abrogation of the Corn
Laws, and the freedom of export of Turkish grain from

~lda.v1a

and Wa.lla.-

chia.

2

The effect. of the first were stated 1n the Bankert. Circular of

J'anuar;y 1854 in the . . words'

":1i1'1oe we haYe opened our perta for the tree

importation ot foreign grains, our trade wi th :Russia has gradually declined,
but from the same period tha.t of Turkey haa gradually inoreased, and while
the tormer has diminished nearly fifty percent, the latter has risen to the
ssme extent. ,,3

Tni. directly affected the prosperity of the Russian la.nd-

lords Who were mainly dependent en

En~land

for sale of wheat and other

They also .trongly influenced the aotions of the gevernrnent. 4

products.

'Ibe .tfect. of' the second were seen in the competition that appea.red after
the treaty of Adrianop1e had freed MoldaVia and {v'allachia from a oompu1so17

fixed-price Cl\Y.tem favorable to the Turks.

By

1840 the Prinoipal! tie. were

exporting wheat on Au.trian and Dri tie carriers to nations that previously
had purchased Ruuian grain u.clusiTely.

By- 1851 the export. of' grain from

Moldavia and Wallaohia had equalled the export of that product from

.au ••ia•Ii
..J

tl'be decline of Rue8ia·. export. by 50 I"'r cent betw.en the 78&rS 1843 and

1853 waa 8een by Urquhart as quite an 1Itportant faotor whioh affected the
oondition and J!l"OlDpted the 1IOY'.ent" of Ruseia.

Ru ••ia had to do something

to eave herselfl not cn17 did the income of the landlords decrease, but
tha t of the

~vernment

also, due to the 15 per cent tax on exports.

~ PW,i!J August 2:;, 1 855, supplement,

6

There-

p .. 2.

3Ibid.
4131"i8On D. Gooch, .tA Century of HistorioE;!'aphy on the Crtmean':ar,"
AJ1R, LXII (Oc tober, 195(,) t 50.. (c i tes Puryear's Str?!ri is .9a-1est!SZ!l, PI'. 7(-

138.)

5l:!Wt.
6

Fr!!

~rll"

August 25, 1855. eupplement, P. 2.

frOH, beca.use of the decline in Russian trade and the oonsequent inorease in
the trade of the :Principalities the emperor of Russia decided to lnva.de
those

prov1noe~.

This extEtl'llld.ve growth of the gra.in trade between

oipali ties

W'.8

En~1and

a.nd the Prin-

not, however, oharacteristic of the rest of Turkey. 7

The

other Turkish provinces in "Europe, Asia, and Afrioa were able to produoe
tour tiMs the a-nount of grain as the Prinoipalities, but they WeI"
strioted by the

Anglo-~lrki.h

re-

commercial treaty of 1841 which imposed a

prohibi tory duty on Ttllitish exports.

8

The differenoe between the Principal..-

i tie. and the.. provine •• was that the duty we.a not applied on the Danube,

becauSe Austria would not sub.it to it. 9

In 1851 the Porte in re:f'ol'lling the

$Yates of taxation had reorganised the collection of int.rnal tax•• , and
Urquhart olatmed that 1n the beginning of 1853 he ureoeived a pre ••ing invi...

tation to SO to Constantinople for the purpoe. of obtaining the abrogation
of the export duty Whioh had been restrioting Turkish commeroe.

Ru.sia was

fully aware of these plans, he ooncluded and recognized their effect on her

export trade when Prince Venaohikott's note was preaented. iO
I t was eYident to Urquhart that by stopping the export of
the Principal! ties, Enl':land was being l'lHlt,de depend.ent On Ruseia.

~a.in

from

She would

7 David Urquhart. Prn"ftI8 .2! Rus,l!, ill t.he j'Lost, north, JWS South,
2nd ed. (London, 1853), p. xli.

8

iJrquhart, Limala!icm. pp. 14-15.

9~., p. 12.

10

Fr,. PrlU,

AUgtlBt

25, 1855, supplement, p. 2.

then have a llIonopoq over 'P,ngland's grain. supplY'.
come more serious
plies.

8.8

'7h10 dependenee would be-

England. beoame increasingly dependent on foreign sup-

Poland was t.he groat supplier of Europe, but was already under

Russian control,

11 largely thl'oup:h Palmerson ta negative attitude.

It wa.s

Urquhart f s opinion that Russia now had her eye on the Danube, and in 1853
threatened the vOr.f existence of England and Turkey.
The 'basin of the Danube produoed the same articles as Russia.

Ships

were EUlu!IIential for the traneport of theee raw materials and the heavy proThe Danube wu the onl;r means of water comnmnication and the on1;1

duee.
by

'VIf8'q

which the metallio ore., rookaalt, timber, hide., wool, tallow, sheep,

goataldnflt grain and hemp oould get to England.

neside., the Principali....

ties were even attempting to rival Egrpt in the produotion ot ootton. 12 For
Bngland it was extr.ely important to have numeroua source. tor the . . . raw
material.,
tries.

ItO

that the 108. of' one 8Ouroe would not jeopardise her 1ndu....

C'onaequentl1', eve1.7 ton of goods exported from the Danube wu a ton

lea8 exported from Odessa or St. Petersburg.

The oompetition whioh

also affected the price of goods and reduoed. Russia's income.

A.

~esulted

reduction

of one shilling on the owt. of tallow or the quarter of grain was enough
net Russia the less of from'" 50,000 to .. 100,000.

t~

Urquhart merely states

that a document published at an earlier date at Odessa by the authorlty of

Count 'Woronsow oonolusively proves these points.I.3

llUrqUhart, Ljmitat!~n, p. 12.
12Ul'quh&rt,

Progress, ~p. 300-301.

13Ibid., p. 301.

-

The na.vi~t1()n
of the Danube river till 1853
had. been interrupted,
.
.
Urquhart thought, in three ways'

by the interference of Russia with the

internal regulatiol"ul of the Turkish provinces of the Danube, by the obstruo-

tion of the river itself, a.nd by direct interference of the Russian government t s eno.ctments.

The first was based on rights wh.ich RUBsia mistakenly

derived from the treaty of Adrianopl., a treaty, however, whioh bound Russie
wi th England and Franoe not to seek, and not to acquire any privileges,

poseeasions, or a4vantages or any kind in Turkey.

In the second Russi& ob-

tained oontrol of the Delta at the mouth of the Danube through the treat;r

of Adrianopl., but she did not fultill her obligations in this regard and
allowed sand to aooumulat. which blocked the river.

Third was the ukase of

Februar,y,18}6 whioh oomma.n4ed all v ••sols tra41ng on the Danube to go to
the port of \,)dust\t one hundred and fift;, mile.

to pertorm quarantine.

_fq

in Rue.ian terr1tol7,

Thill' he realized, was an obvious violation of the

law of nationa whioh had rou.ed mngli8b indignation.

Numerous pet! tiona

were presented to the Bouse of' Commons on the subject and a motion was made
by Patrick Stewart e~uivalent to pledging the government to resist aggres-

sion.

Th.

~Ternment.

however, secured the withdrawl of the motion by

neola-ring itself ready to 00 wha.t it thought necessary.

G.."ld the whole thing was soon fOl'rrotten.

~e

Nothing was done

ukase rema.ined in foroe.

The

Hussian consulate charged as much as '" 80 for vessels of one hundred and
fifty tons lea.ving Liverpool and London for the Da.n1.~be and d.esirlng to paas

without undergoing the quara.ntine at Odessa..

Charges were increa.sed to

diminish the elze of the ships, the difficulties of navigation were increased, even insurance became more oostly.

Urquhart thought that 1 t shoul(

)0
have been obvious ta MY intelligent a.nd int:ereftted obse!'Ver that 'Frngland
was becoming en.tire17 depend.ent on the illegal acts of Russia. whioh actll....
ally were d.1reot.ed against 'F:l1t;land. and not a.gainst '11,urke".f. 14

There wa.s no a.ttempt by the English
oroachme1"l ts of Russia..

~ve:rnment

On the contrary the English

to resist these en~vernment

took the

pos1 t10n o.f Russia. in enforoing the submission of 'Jlurkey and Austria to the
interference resulting 'from the ukase.

The vice-consulate at the mouth of

the Danube was removed from its dependenoe on the Ottoma.1'1 government, and
by moving it to Odesso. was made dependent on the Russian government.

When the Russian troops invaded the Principalities 11'1

15

1853, they not

only cut off the grain supply, but ate the grain intended for export to
England.

The•• actions simply ruined the grain trade 1n these provinces.

The oenter of trade then moved to Odessa where, Urq,uhart notes, the streets
had praotloally

bee~'l

deserted the dtq before.

16

In thi8

wEq

RUBsia depriVe(

the English peepl. of grain except through her sufferanoe, and mad.. oe1"tatn

that they pat.d a. high prioe for i t. 17
plated.

mvary step, he tel t, had been com-

The production and the productive power of the Principalities were

In July of. 1853 Russia had ostensibly entered t.he PrinCipalities to

14Urquhart, L~mitation, pp. 5-7. See a1eo t.he r.cvernment'a ~lbliBhed
:Blue Beok, Cgi£it~i:esmsl2!3ee.in BertraDee.1£ jla ~ravh~tio.n s!! jJl! Dqnube.

15Ibid., Pp. 5-6.
16 Ibid ., PP. 12-13.
17.!hM.

31
secure the demalms of Prince btenshikov for the equali t;r of treatment for
il)reek and Latin Ohristians, and to secure a virtual Russian protectorate of
~ll

Orthodox Christians.

This stemmed from the generally acoepted allega-

tion that the Christian subject. of the Porte were persecuted, a.nd from thEt
antagonism betvreen the Latin and Orthodox chu.rches.

~Jrquhart \'J33

oonvinced.

that the Christian subjects ot the Porte, contrar.1 to popular belief, did
not wish to be flprotected" by the Czar.

numbered as

h1~

a8

twel~e

In faot, most of these Christians

Th~le

or thirteen million subjects.

people actu-

ally were bitterly persecuted for not oonforming to the Russia.n Chul"Oh a:f'1;er

ita break with Constantinople.

'1'11831' even oalled the Czar ttAntiohri.t."

18

The IDOvementa to independence by the Malo-Russians \wno numbered about ten

_111ion Urquhart attributed to this .chism and persecution.

In tact, it

Ru.s.ia had been free to extend her hegeoumy to the Ionian Sea, she would
~ve

been involved in a religious war with about

twen~

million people.

The

Phriatiana ot rruli'te7 actual17 called upon the Turks for the proteoticn ot
their fa! th, and they teared Rus.ian polt tloal oontrol.

l9

If' thie was the true relation between the Ohristiane

or

Turkey and

Russia, then Russian intentltnu!!l in a joint intervention of the Powers be-

oomes evident.

l!'h.re had to be 80me other reasons for her intervention in

invi ted her to irl'tel"V'ene in their beh.'!\lf'.

18Urquhart,

,1.£2"es"

19lhiS., PP. xi-xii.

p. x.

In 182C the Greeks had dec llal'ed.

32

'Phe Western Powers, being utterly terrified, se:rambled 1'.0 yield Russia thai:
support with the pretext of

:re~tra.in1ng

her.

20

Therefore, by calling'

Turlt~

a "sick man, ft tt'Usllltia aoUWtt to esta.blish her Auprema.oy ever the Orienial

down the author! ty of the SuI tan.

Russia.n intervention ha.d alw83s been the

grea.test danger, and Europe coopera.ted with its effectiveness by a.lways
sanctioning it.

21

Tha.t the Chri.tlana of Turkey were Greek. and united against ::lusaulme.n
rule Urquhart saw u
-Europeans.

another one of

t~se

illusions entertainfJd by tIOst

Actually, the Greeks amounted to little more than one aillion

out of thirteen million Christians in Turkey.

Half of the Greeke were no-

macUo, and. well d1apereed throughout the cities o.f the ottoman Qap1re.
Turk. liked them, and even made one of them ambassador to London.
other hand most other :races hated them.

the Mussnlmans were "allied. in blood to the Rusaiaf'ItJ."
~~

On the

A u11no1"1t,., the Greeks 1n European

Turkey, had only that 1mportenee given to them by the Turlts.

t.o

The

One-third of

And, Urquhart goes

0.11

that even three-fourths of the Christians south of the Damll'HlI were

related to the Tu::t"ks by blood. 22

Turks as their l'lIl%.siers.

20

~.,

All (If these popnl9,t.ione a.eoepted the

In faet, none would, aocept the t'm:prsmaey of a.ny

p. x1i.

2l,lW.
22..!W., p. xiii. Urquhart gave no proof fer his statement conoerning
the blood relationship.

33
other people.

And

Be

he conolud.ed that :if the Turks did not erlst they

w(lHld of neoese1tl have to be inv8nted (aft others later were to think of'
iAustria).

It Turkel did not exist. the

vaQUUJI

would create chaos and the

:lear East soon would come und,er the domination of' :;mesh.• 23
Statements from the Greek presll confirmed Urquhart's views regarding
the Greek and Russian Churohes.
indulge in illUSions.

Their ttSmyrna organ" warned Russia not to

The norgan of Helleniam n explained that the C.ar's

(1)jeot in extorting the protectorate of the Oriental Church was to convert

1 t irrto an inatruaent of' hi.s PanslaVic eh.e..

It further d.enied that the

protection which the Powers gave to the SuI tan was, as the journals of
Ruseia pretended, tb. proteotion of
~u

~hammedan1_

against Christianity.

It

rl.othing l •• s than the detens. of the poli tioal inheri tanoe ot the

nellenes against Russian incorporation, in whloh "eve17 Reller'lio spirit

~8h.d them auccee8."24
In reality the native

~lrkS

were the oppressed people of Turkey.

They

exclusi veIl bere the burd.en of consoription. a.nd were therefore the 800ially

d.epres.ed.

Wealth and. induatr.r were oonsfllquentl;y entirely hampered to the

advantage of the Christiana who were rapid1,- inoreasing in rmmbere, in
wealth, and in territorial possessions.

He thought it therefore quite

a.bsurd for the allies during the war to extort from the Su.l ta;..'1 the "privilegen for Christiane to serve in the

~,

and to own property whioh alreadT

34
wa.s chiefly in their hands. 25
In 1867 a signifioant episode of the Crimean War was brought to lir.:;tt
whioh showed. that -the Christian subjects of the Porte were not t(')o dissatisIn the autumn of 1853 all the militar:,y foroes of

fied with their rulers.

8ta1l10118d 1n Thessal7 and l!.'pirus, because of their tranquilli

t,..

But endt-

denly thirty to forty thousand Greeks invaded thls 'I'Ul"killh terri tory.

\~n

they could not inducs, the,. forced the Christian population to join thea.
The Turkish villagers who did not have ti_ to retreat into the towns were
IIl&ssaored, whether thEQr were lIlen, WOIaen or ohildren.

the towns was taken by the Greeks.

~lhen

However, not one of

intelligence reached Constantinople

Fuad ~tf.nd1 was sent as CCIiIDisslone:r-Oeneral with three ste.era and. three

battalions.

With the belp ot people who came fram ever,rwhere exPressing

their loyal V and devotion, and even wi th the ChristIa.ns torming volunteer
bands, the oountry was soon oleared of a gl"eatly superior invading force in
approximately six weeks.

26

In 1853 Urquhart feared the oontinual \_~ie8tertl interferenoe which lout:
had been weakening the legal structure of Turkey.

He envisioned the end of

Jl'.lrkish IPJUb.iasi veness, and the oontentment of the Christiane.

that English troops

~'ould.

soon have to put down insurrections allover

key and that Russia would then oome to support the Christia.ns

25 Dav1d Urquhart,
Pl'. 14-15.

26D1D6QP1'U9

He "believed.

Cb£~ltiMiU'

1ll'H.i.

or'll'-

Mussul-

F!ruJ,'t1cis..ii.lli :llloRd (London, IS55).

Rlview, July 3, 1861, pp. 109-110.
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man~ against the Englleh. 27
En~land

ha.d. long interi"erod in 'l'urkey- wi t11 il'1:tontions o.f reformin,g ito

government.

Although Stratford Canning bad been hopeful fortb.

~re.dual

reform of the rr'u1:'kisb :Empire, i:n 1852 he left Constant.inople believing that
the dissolution of' the Empire wa.s not tar Off.

28

Urquhart, however, did not

share this opinion that the Empire was irremedia.hly CO:rl'Upt and would eventuallY' naturally dissolve.

He was firmly oonvinced that no Englishman wa,s

able to know the tl'Uth about the strength or weakness of Turke,. until he
had comprehended. England's relations to her.29
that

Turk.,-'.

Moat Engliabmen bell....-.d

erlatenoe depende4 upon the violent means empl07ea 07 the

British government to pre•• rve it.

Eng118haen interpreted in this manner

suoh event. as the attempt to bombard Constantinople in 1807, the depri va.tion of nesaarabla 07 the Treaty ot Buoharest in 1812. the destruotion of
the Turkish fleet at iiavarlno i,n 1827, the permiesion gl'anted to Russia in

1829 to reawee belligerent rights in the Medi terra..1']ea.n which. she had r ....
nounced, and the occupation ot Constantinople in 1833. 30 So it appeared to
Urquhart that England had employed violenoe for some time &fl'8.inst Turkey ..
I, refusing to fall and be shattered b.1 the Violent aots of England and the
rest of Europe, Turkey aotually

27Urquhart,

28 El •

.cQ;d§t~'nitlt

L. i'lo(uivlard,

displ~.d

p. 15.

''ll&!.Au J1i. ¥1,oIlB (Oxford, 1954), p. 243.

29!l11 FE.ilt June 1, 1864. p. 52.
30~.

great strength, tenacity, and

36
Russia was so ooneoious of her cwn vulnerability in the Black

~ea

that

she felt compelled oontinually to take measures for her own protec tion.

The

year 1827 had sean her combine wi tb l1in~land and France to destroy the Turkish fleet I!.tN'ave.r1no.

In

obtainint~

Feeling saf'e then, ahe went to war with Turkey.

the I}.'reaty of Unk1ar Skeleaai she further protected herself

from England's and

FrtL~e's

naval power by getting all foreign ehips of war

excluded from the Black Sea. 31
Urquhart ell'eady demonstrated in

1834 in Turlw;l JmS...!.1! Rel£Yl9!1 that

most of the ocmaon 14eas on the subject of Turkey were false.
been able to act upon the deoisione of

m~

great influence in the pre..

way

tion of TurkeY"
nation. 32

In this

Russia had

government. through her unduly
.he was able to urge the d ••true-

and then even protect those government. from popular indig-

Russia therefore used the pre •• to miainform Western nations of

Although many ob.ervers thought that the Turkish militar,r organization
was teo weak to win a war without aid from the Powers, Urq.uhart was thoJ:!ioo'

ough1y conv1noecl that the l)1urkish mill ta:ry organiEe.tif!n, if left a.lone a.nd
not interfered with by the supposed frienda of 1i.l.rkey, was excellent. 33 Its

econoaical looal organization was the source of its excellent 34 and a180

3l.!21i.

32Ibaa •
33 See Urquha.rt's artioles evaluating the milital""J strength of' Turkey,
..!h.t Diplomat,1c Ilme from September 4,

wri tten 111 1852 al'ld reprinted. in
1867 to J'anua.r.Y 6, 1869.

34Urqtthart, .!]:ogress, p. xl.
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the source of i 'fis superiori t;:r in any enp;agement wit'!'! the Russians.

If'urthe:r-

more, the ROldiam of the 'l'urldsh army were not as passively obedient a.s
were the RussiM.

Tlle Turkish army was disciplined, a.s was the Russian

army, but it also had judgment, valour, and pa:triotism--eharacteristics
universally found in the Russian

arm;r.'3-

no1~

,

Furthel'lDOre, the Tul.'ke were irre-

sistlble in an attack, not to be held dawn with impunity, and oertainly
arntf'ieient tel" the protection of Europe against Russia, if only she were
lett alene. 36

In

l8~n

the Turk. under ama amounted to nearly tour hundred thousand

men, one hundred thousand more were in the proce.s of being aBs_bled.
Nearly two hundred and fifty thousand were regularsJ the rest WGre volun-

teers'

all were animated by

lit.

conmon devotion and enthllsiaam, and weH

drawn from and congregated 010.. to the area of operations.

The Ru.sian

&l"IIY em the other hand wall drawn froM allover Russia, and was employed to

protect hostile f'rontiers, or to repress hostile populations.

The Russian

soldiers were net overly enthusiastic and certainl1 did not compare with

th~

TUl'ks. 37
Urquhart

est~ted

that. the torost.hat the

~losian8

the Turks in 1853 was not more than one hundred. and

could bring agains

ei~ty

thouaand men.

35 D&v1d fJrquhart, 'i)'ll& fiusgi£b 19.1 ~Ba1n!t (London, 1855), p. 9.
36.DW\.

37l!!1sl., p. 10.
38Ib1d ., p. 11.

38

38
But this was not a. realistic estimate of the forces that Russia could actuIdly

eng8.?~e

against the Tu.rks, hecause proba.bly close to one-half of the

Russian troops would become sick t"lr die due to the olimate
sector of operations. 39

lir0v~~lfnt

in the

For these reasons the Ttlrlr.:S, he predicted, would

obviously outnumber the Russians.

In any event with equality of numbers

the Turks were oertainly not inferior opponents.

Lnoklng the ooercion of a.

British squadron and the diotation of a British ambasaa40r Turkey could win

any war with nussia.

Not even a single battle

the Haults of a ooutest.

\\'&8

All the Turks had to do

neceaaar.J to deter.ine
W&8

maintain thel r

strong position aouth ot the Danube and watch the Rus.ian armie. di.inte-

grate due to sioknes., diseas., and death. 40
Becaus. of :nuesia t s def101enc;r in ml1i ta17 ~l.r in 185), Urquhart
certain that she could not attack Turke:r.

was

Since 1828 Turkey'. military

torc •• had tremef'1dously increased, and Russia's hs(l actually diminished. In
1828 when T'urk-.y had no regular

8.l"IJIy

in the Provinoes a.nd mad.e no !!\Vstemat.ic

c19:fens. of the P:t'i:noipa.lltiea, Rllssia had. been :forced to retreat. 41

had been preparing for two years for that
mately two hundred thousand men. 42

campai~,

Russia.

&nd employed approxi-

However, 1853 saw Tu.rkey wi th an amy

to defend the Prinoipal1 tie., and the abi11 ty to muster on the theater of

39..!)Jj.

42Ib1j., pp. xlVi-xlvi!.

39
"para-tioris twioe the Russia.n fnrce. 43

Even if Turkey only had the irreg'llo-

1a.rs v/ho 1n 1828 defea.ted tw1ce their number of B.ussilk'1 regulars at Kurt~~
th.e Prinoipal! ties certainly were still in competent hands.

As to their

quali ty the opinion. that General Aupl0 expressed to the SuI tan earlier in

1849, tallied wi th that of the Turkish General

"Your majesty's troops

.Bertll

are able to give a. good account of any enemies that will be opposed to
them ...44

Urquhart further supposed that even it the a:l"ZQ' had to retreat 1 t

would leave the ProVinces devastated and then intrench itself on the Denube.
To equal her relative position of 1828 the ~lsslan troops had to have about
four hundred tbou.sand men.

There was in 1853, however, a serious que.tion

whether she oould support that force even i f she ha.d it. 45

The RuS8isl'u!I,

in any event, would encounter a serious problem of logistically supporting
The eonoluRion logically following from these facts was that

any foroe.

TIusl!ia would I!Lnd 00111d oocupy the Prinoipali ties
to do eo..

O'1ly

it ahe weH allowed

On rlO other g'l"OUnd8 oould .he invade them. 46

On July 7 t

18~)3 the Russian amie. oroa ••d the Pruth into Moldavia. 47

1'he Principalities were again being occupied by the Cur's fonea atter
months of negotiations ostenSibly over the issue of
privileges of the Portela Christian subjects.

t~'lHlra.ntees

for the

Turkey, not declaring war

43~., PP .. xlvii-xlviii.
44:!!zit.,

p. xlviii.

45~.
4 6 Ib1d., p. 1 •

.,47ft.

19551.

».

Vi. Seton-V'latmm,
)10.

Bn teJn l.n

11u£221, Jl§.2 Jst.l.2l4 (Cambridge,

40
mmediatelYt negotiated with Russia throufoSh the Western Powers for some
Inonths over the Vienna tlote in attempti'1(?,' a oompromise.

I.~.Hua

than two weeks

a.fter :'llrkey's ultima.tum to Rueda to evaouate the Prinoipalities, the coun.ri6s found themeel ves at war on the Danube. 48

As :Jrq,t,hart expeo ted t the

l'.1rks were a.ble to take the offensive, and on October 23, (')mer Pasha. dro"e

pack the Rua.ian troopa 49 in two engagements near Isaacea a.nd Oltenita.

On

lovember 30 the Ru.aian fleet attacked a amall 'furklah aql1adron at Sinops
"hich brought allout the famoua "uaaaore ff which

80

arouaed the S!ngl1ah pub-

From thi. time till lfarch 16, 1854 there was a lull in the

!lio f'or war.

!hostilities with attempt. at peaoe amid. the drift to war.
Urquhart writing on January 6, 1854 saw that the Turks, l.ml.ss hyper.d
by the Western Powers, would be able to con'tinn. their offensive when apr1n,.-

arrived. 50

They certainly would have the upper ha.nd, he thoHf'r,ht, because

101' the ea.r1ier thaw
aren sooner.
1'ore Hay.

~nd.

their conseQ.uent aM 11 +.y to move troops tnto the

It was imposs1ble tor Russia to send troops to the Pruth be-

In 'R'ebruary or Warch. however, the Tllrke already could have three

hundred thousand men in

;~ralla.eh1a,

a.nd outflank the Russian t'crcea there •

.'3esides, the peasantry would have been able and willing to rise against the
Russians.

The Russian forces, apPl"Onmating less than forty t,o fifty thou-

sand wi th only hope for reinforcement.s of twenty thciusand meu from Bessa.rabi

would have been uttel'l,y ovel'\Yhelmed. 5l

48:.lliJ.,

p. )12.

49Woodwal'd, p. 252.
5°Dand Urquhart, EpCilP!\·'!t.tl J.!1 Turkel'S.!JUJ (London, 1855), pp.
13-14.

511ill., p. 14.
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~bat

further restrioted the ava11abi1it7 of

t~ssian

troops in the

South was that fifty thousand. men were ocoupied in the area of Georgia
keeping the Clrcass1an tribes in check and attempting to subdue them.
This native opposition and resistanoe to Ru ••ia made these territories

vulnerable to Turkish invasion, the consequence. of whioh could only be
imagined by one 11ke Urquhart who knew the spirit which fermented among

the Malo-Ruasians. and who had studied the revolt at ~lgatoheff.52
It Is obvioue that a. war between Russia a.."ld 'J:urkey in the spring with-

out EnRlisb interference would have been disastrous t.o :Russian interesta.
It would have restored to the Porte all of those territories which h.g,d been
wrested from it by the CZ&rs of liullJsia.

It oertainly 1I10uld have brought

about the defeat of' Fussie. in the Prine! pa11ties.
the Western

POVlel"S

were not

t4

But a.s the intentions of

change boundariest Urquhart concluded that

they were not intent on restoring to ':"urkey her :f'ormer territories.

In his

mind the EastGl"l1 cr1sis in Janu8.l"J of 1854 was a .leoisive oontest through
which either Russia or Turkey would crumble. 53

It was Lord Clarendon's opinion that the nuss1an evacuation of the
Principal! ties was a.!in! JU1A ll$W pl"8liminary to a settlement of the
cr1s1s. 54

This may have been t:rtle, but alone 1 t would not bring about a

oomplete settIfment 'Of the basic issues of the oonfliot.

Urquhart did not

5 2r'pUl.
53!bid.
54 Urquh&rt, Px:sgree"
during the Crimean

','1&1".

p. xv.

Lord. Clarenc!c'1 ria:;; P(,>7'eign Secretary

42
think that a Bettlament would be forthcoming unleela the evacuation would 'be
uncol'ldi tional on the part of HUBsia.

l''u!'thel'more, some provision had to be

made for the injury that occurred and against future aggT'ession.

~Jrquhart

formulated IUlJven requ,1a1 tee for the settl.ent of the criels that threat-

aned the peace of Europe in 1853.

In this enumeration can be Been his

belief that any good settlement meant

&

comprehensive adjustment of past

injuetices whioh violated the la.w of naUonB.
essential to the immediate settlement:

or

the seven points two were

the admiegion

the Black Sen., and the exportation of 'f'urkit!lh r:t'!"a.in.

~f

EngliSh vessels

t~

Urquhart saw great

importa.nce in S1ireseing these terms, because it wa.s precisely on the saIsetio.n ef' terms tha.t Russia had affected her oonquests, and no+ "01' the a.d.-

vance of her a.:rnlies..

i11ven if they would have baEm obta.inable, he was eon-

vinced that a.s long as the RUllsian ambassador still resided in J.I()ndon,
U:ngland would not obtain them. 55

55 Ibid., PP. ::J:'VI-xvi.

CHAPTER II!
TH'E DARDANEI..LES, SIIWPE, AND LORD STRATFORD

!!"he indepenrlo.noe and well-being of the nations of Rurope in the rlil'l9teenth century depended em the freed.cm of the Darda'1ellee and t.he ilosphol"'lUlI

Urquhart realized, ootlId easily be used by a great, power to gain hegemony

the Dnieper, to the east abe had been depT! ved of tho Cauoasus.

For cen-

tur1es she had passionately desired a warm water port on the Black or Ca...
pian Seu.

Imperial expansion was a method that she felt wemld satiBf"y her

needs and feed her glory.

In her quest for power Russia. aimed at the oon-

trol of the lla.nube and its

cont1n~:nt

provinces and the Araxes, and the

exclusion of ell rival naval power from the Black and Caspian Seas.

1

Through the tl'ea:ty ot Unkia.r Skaless! 11'1 1833 anrl the Strai ts Convention of 1841, Bu.ssia had obtained. the exclusion of foreign warships :from th
Strai ts a.s long as th.e Porte was 1'1t. peace.

1htstda

ill

the Stral tA Conveni;ior

had. actually procured as a. pl'l.nei:ple what was in 1833 by the treaty of
Unkiar Skeleasi no more than a temporary Oonoession +'·c.' Russian armed force.

43

44
Since the

gua~tee

o.f her po8i tion expired in 1841; 'Russia. obtained 1". the

Strai ta Convention a new gua.ranteet a oollect1ve tS'lnX-al'1tee, i" whi.ch the
five powers

a~e(l

to maintain the sta+,.us que.

Rl.Hudf.:l after this enjoyed a

special privileged post tion which waf'! ha.llowed and riiSl!uised '.1Y the Conven-

t10n'8 appea.1 to anoient custom.

2

The treaty of 1B41 really tUd

n~t

present an obstacle to the en-

trance of an E!ngli8h fleet :into +,be 8t1'8.i te in 1853,
thought that the cHsis during the spring and
lent opportunity to abrogate it.

SWJmElr

in fact, Urquhart

of 1853 wa.e an excel-

The will to do it, however, was wanting.)

The 'l'urke aotl.ull.ly d.aired the pa.ssage of the English fleet through the
Dardanelle., for th8,1 felt that the fleet altered the balance of power in

their favor. 4
desired the

tTrqllhart waa not belleve4 when he aSMrted that the Porte

pasfJa.~

of an :t:nglish squadron.

His

news,

however, were con-

fiMed by the correspondent of The Timl' 'Rho announced that the inhabitants
of Constantinople "ere so confident that the English and French flags would
float sid.e b7 nide in f'rom of Ccnatantinople that qua.ys were crowded wi tlt
spectators eagerly ft.! ting to bail the first appeal"8.nee of the allies i,n

~lrkiBh water$.5
Ever;.rone in Turkey attributed the absenee of' the Eneliah fleet 1:0 the

2m
.Q.

~~,

'v.

CI

" •
.:)eto'1-,1;'atson,

pp. 219-220.

3Ul'Q.uhart, f.:s::W;:IWb p. xx:x:i.
4:.!.lUJ., P. :x:xvi 1.

5Ibtd .,

p. xxviii.
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objections of RuS81a. 6

Urquhart was firmly convinoed that Lord Palm.reton

a.bove everyone else wa.s the

~;:n!?;1ieh

minister who was preventing 1 to entranoe

His StlspioloTis of Pe.lmerstonts 1-!'lterests in tbie matt.er d!i.ted back to the
time when he was secretary of the embassy at COT1etant.inople.
B

At that time

document in the Ellibasey' e arohivful prevented the pa.esarre of the fleet.

Sinoe six foreign m.inisters ha.d excluded the fleet when t.h.ey oould have
brought about its paseage. Urquhart be11eved that thi8 eeoret dooument was
still to blame in 1853.

H. olearly r _ _b8r84 the words that Palmerllton

spoke to him in 1831 which suggested his intention to exclude the fleet.
Urq,lUlart &leo

was censured

'bY' the government around this t11'1e becau.e h. hael

offered t& obtain a request tor its passage.
wanted the 1'1891:. 1

He was oertain that the Turks

In 1853, Palmeraton, however, was apparent17 not re.pon-

sible for the detention of tbe fleet, beoau •• in & memorandum to Clarendon
before the oa.'bin.et lIeeting of Ootober 7, 1853 he expres.ed a wi em to wppor1
the Turk18b. declaration of war by Bending the fleet to the 'l3laok Sea.

8

On October 22, 1853, the joint li'ranco-Brltiah squa.dron entered the

Da.rdanelles and anchored off the (".JOlden Horn.

j.~d&n~rOU8 lull followed,. 9

during whioh (in the mind of Urquh&l"t) Lord Stra.tford d.e Radoliffe

play the most prom:i.nent and ol"Uoia1 role on the diplomatic

6 Ibid.

1t

8ta~.

WfUI

to

lJOrd

pp. xxvii-xxviii.

7 Ibtd.., Pl'. lCd»-xx.x.
813 • Kingsley
P. 157.

~l:al"t1n, 1h!

9~,·
""eton-liatson, p. 31
. 2.

T,rlU!1M

.2! ~

p"lSUU:ltsm (London. 1924) t

r;tratford stated that the presence of the Anglo-French squadron in the !losphort,s

was inoontestable proof of the pro-Turkish interests and sentiment.

It the

1~ri tish

and French govel'nmenta.

aut now Urquhart, apparently ohanRed

~la

mind.

laS

sure that this interest wa.s neither favorsble to Turkey, nor were tbe

~enUmente

Before, he had wanted a squadron to enter the Straits.

Now he

The support, in his estimation, wa.s only a po11 tical

honorable.

pove and wa. not intended for military or naval purposes.

10

Although Itoet Englishmen reJoiced when the fleet was sent up the Dar-

danelles, Urquhart declared that it was sent to coerce Turkey and over...
~on8tantinople.

~ngli8b
~@ti;er

ae

imbecility_

believed that this reJoicing was a manifestation of
Supporting hie interpretation of the sttuation, a

from a prominent 'Nalla.ohian, whoa he doe. not naG, oontainecl the

pred:f.etlon that nThe Turka will win the battles, but England will then
l~terpo.e with a note.

The RUBeian generale (at Bucharest) do not oonoeal

their utter 1nabi11 t7 to meet the Turks, but at the aaae time t.hey make no

Boruple in avowing their oonfidenoe that the Anglo-?rench aquaa.rcn will oome
to their aid with another Navarino."ll

Urquha.rt olaimed that he oould pro-

~t1ce ma.ny' more statements 11ke th.s. from ':urkish .ubj.ot_F;n~li.hmen,

Perman.,

'Frenchmen, and Chr1atial'ls-whc thou~ tha.t 'l'urkey would win the
~ar only it ehe stood 810n•• 12
Urquhart believed that Russia never could have risked her dangerous

lODaviti Urquhart, Eagled t ,

11~., pp. 7-8.

l2..!W., ,. 8.

lHl JJJ.

?urku;',,!all (London. 1855), p. 4.
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iPOlicies in the Near East during 1853 if ahe had not bee-a oertain that
dtratford de Hedclitfe was to be Bngland'e represel":ta.;t;ive at Constantinople.
!\t the beginning of that year when there was 80me doubt as to his being lIent

iback

again, the Russian l'fIpresentative in London me.de evident his satillfao-

tion with a negative decision.

The Russian government tel t that such a

d1apl83' would oau.e theSnglish government to think that Rtuud.a. did not
appreciate Stra.tford, a.nd he consaquently would be sent to Constantinople te
seoure England' 8 interests against Russia..

'But the English

~vemment

even

went furtherl eV817thing was left to his .1udf1:'!'nent, knowled.ge, and prudenoe.
Russia. knew de Redoliffe's attitudes and that the Porte would probably fol-

yet tremendous power to atop or start war, the moat serious decisions would

a.

hinge on the temperaments of the individuals who occupied the key positions.
As lIrquhart

ticn

it, RUBsia pl8\Yed her game of oonquest through the manipuler

of theae accidents.

But 'lDore than Stratford' s a.ntagoni8lll toward

Russia was needed by Rusaia to lIle.ke the galDe ea:f'e.

It waa eq'lally importan1

to preventM. Von Prokel!lOh from being there as representative of Austria.

He had actually been designated to that poet when nuesia interpoB"openly that

it reached publio notoriety at Vienna and Derlin.

also had to be kept out of office.

80

Riza Pasha

'Russia was equally fortunate in having

Palmeraton and Aberd.en in the same oabinet, neither of them ostensibly
"being foreign minister.
arranged. the

eettin~

In this manner Russia, Urquhart thought, ha.d

ror the ""ar a.nd hacl left noi;h:b:'lt;' to

Ohan(H~:.

13 She

.
13 Urquhtu't , Pmgresp. p'p. xliii-xlv.

,At this time Urq,uhart believed
that Strattordts interest in the welrare of Turkey Was "l'.l"lQ.,HuJtionable."

knew the characters and attitudes of the key figures, arid their reactions
when confronted with given si tus.tlons.

Even

thou~

l{us81a had undertaken iumHm.a preparations, which were al-

ways wri tten and talked about durln~ 1853, she only ha.d. thirt.een line-ofbattle ships in the -alack Sea.

In 1829 she had. the same number.

Hslt the

squadron at the time of 3inope was hardly seaworthy,14 as Laurence Oliphant
in his trovels

i~o

3evastopcl attested. It,;

The native Russians in the crews

had been reoently replaoed by drafted and urmi11iYlI'!;' men from the Baltic.

pa.raging view of the Russian fleet in the

n1a.ck3e:~

was the story oonoern-

ing the \Ilxen affair In 1836 in whiehth.e crew of the Russian ship Ajax •
proposed, to' the gnglish sailors that if they would lead them out of the

Black Sea they could oarry oft their ship.

16

~~~rs.

urquhart did not think.

that Marshall marmont in his book on Southern Russia acourately appraised
the Russian fleet.

Russia could only have aoquired Marmont's estimated

thirty Tessels by un! ting both the 13a1 tic and Black See. fleets, wb.1ch was

rul obvious impossib11ity.17
Both t1rquharts knew that

myth.

~lI,;'hen

RU8S1M

naval strenf'\th was 1i ttle more than a

the Porte declared war against 'Russia, Russia I 9 southern prO?-

14Urquhart, F-q gil!l 9t s!,W., p. 3.

15 l.taurenoe Oliphant, Russ1!!n ~or28.2! JJa 13~ic!s~, 2nd ed. ( London,

1854), PP. 255-259.

16t1rqUhart I England's Part, p. 4.
179:a.rr1et Urquhart, Ston.2!.1Ia war (Londofl, 1851),. p. 10.
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,.noes were thrown into panic, fel\!'in,<; a ':'urkieh na.val at tack
rolt t.heir :fleet offered. 11 tUe pro4:ec1::1on.

f{1l'

which they

'1'he il"lhal:-i tan"ts of the :port

Even published "Ill.seian dOetlmenf:e ~ave eVidenoe of the

Itz-:wne fled inland.

re"ruera.l apprehension. 18

In a fine.l effort for p4!.a.ce the Dri tish oabinet asked Stratford to reRl)Sat a delay of' the Turkish oper!!.tions i.nH1ated by Omar Pasha in the
F>:r.bc 1 pal1 ties.

Stratford sucoessfully persuaded the Porte not to send 1 t8

Pleat into the Black Sea, but he was llnable to prevent the dispatoh of a
ight flotilla to Sinope.

'~ovember 30, 1853

This flotilla was completely destroyed there on

by the Russian fleet.

19

Russia in\ended this vietor,y to oounterbalanoe the defeats that ahe bad
~uffered

a DlOnth ear11er in the Principal1 tie..

alised in England

all

This naval action was visu.-

proof of the weakness of Tllft«q, therefore for Russia

t produoed 1 ts intended effect.

20

Even Seton-Watson states tha.t it was
21
'"the Turkish fleet" that was sent to reoonnoi tre :i.n the 1Jlaok Ssa.
In
~aliVt the whole Rus.ian fleet had engaged only Beven small ':'urkish fri~
~te0.

It waB a fight between line-or-battle ships and frigates, bein",

therefore, an outstanding nava.l enoounter for the Turk'.s.22

The Turks not

0,1y did not st,rike their f.lap;a before suoh obvious 8upftriori ty, but fonght

18Ibid., p. 68.
19m• L. Woodward,

.1lu!.!a..Q! ,Refsa:m

2O!l!a fre'l, ~ 2. 1860, p. 45.
21 8eton-',,&tson,
~
Plt 320.
22!1:u

!):",.

May 2, 1860, P. 45.

(Oxford. 1954), p. 252.
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back so effectively that one of the Russian shipe sank before it was able
to return to Slbaatopol.23
'lIhen the tJmae..,re" occurred a oorr••pondent of an Engliah journal at
Conatantinople reported'

.,,,!

The (h."e•
th their tlwa} malicious f.eling, 8%01&1. that it
is En~~lal,d '~hat hu 'brought about this little fravarino, in order
to obtain peace at an,- prioe. It 18, however. really a question
'What the Rng1il'lh and. Frenoh fleetllt a.rc d.oing hare, the only answer to' Whioh seema to' be, that their 8allors and officers get
drunk in ~he public streets, insult women, a.nt! violate the sanctuary of private hOllses. I!esides this, the fleets serve the
amba.esadoro as a means of. threatening 1',he Turks, so to restrain
them from ma:l'ohlng on 1Juobarest, and forclng them ~~to a.n arrangemttnt such 9.A the ~ Powers may pleaee t,o dicta.te.

of oppoeing Huss:l.a.y,'hat lAd. that rept')rter and many others in Engla.nd to
t.his 0$t1mate cf t.hf'll 81 tllation was that the Engl1s11lnllU'It A.dmiral Slade, 000*

Mander of

the Turkish fleet, was suspected of purposely leaving the small

mente between him, Admiral Dundas, and Lord Stratford de Redoliffe the
crders of the ""ltrk:i. sh

001..1.'1011

to their fleet to oonvoy the detached ves8els

to the 13oaphorlls had been disobeyed.

The whole th.ing had been

80

unlJlueh-

ingly managed., TIrqtlhart stated, that "three days before the newe arrived.
it was reported at Constantinople that the aquad.ron had been d.stroyed at

"'1
.:J nopfl. "25

23 Urquhart , r;m,l"nd' s ~t p.. 10.

2~.,pp. e-9.
25 Ihid.
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Admiral Slade BOomea the oharge of which he probably was not guilty.
~e denied having given anT auch order, flO alBC did Mu..,tata Pasha.
~ew

No one

who gave the order to leave the seven . .all frigates unprotected at

~lnop..

Later the abasaado!'. theselves made 1 t known that thGIT had. inte::p.

posed to prevent the Turkish fle·et from proceeding to oonvey the flotilla
It was their Ittear of the p08sibil1t,. of an enoounter with an enem.y

hOlle.

of auperior foree lt that made them act 1n this manner.
than one hundred and
~ap.,e
~ve

miles to Sebastopol from Sinope, the three weekst

between the arrival of the flotilla and i.t8 destruction oonveniently
the Russians time, a8 Urquhart eaw 1t, to send tor the rest

ra1.ck Sea fleet.
~our

fi~ty

Since it was more

or

the

Initially they had only three 1ine-ot-battle ships and

small frigates near Sinope, and .ith theB.

ithe Turkiah aquatbc>n.

th~

did not dare attack

26

A startling statem81t 1n an article in

lll.t

!1anj,lUi

January, 1854, was read with diab.lisf by the publiC.
was Stratford de a_dc1iff. who had pr.vented the main

A<l!'.rU,'11

during

It alleged that it
bo~

of the Turkish

f"leet coenanded by A4ralral Slade troa entering the Black Sea.

Re did thia

by threatening the Turldah govel'lIIIent that it it sent 1 t8 fleet into the

IBlaok Sea. to meet the Ru •• lana, hs would iDllledlate4r order the F..ngliah tl.et

to l.ave Conat&1\tlnople.

Urquhart regretted, but :reI t compelled to "tOuch

if'or the truth of this allegation, baaed on 80me of hie priVate souroes.

2(~., pp. 9-10.

Sir George Sydenham Clarke in Ru@sia/ P Sma Ppwer
were only six RU8Siar! IIships-o:f'-the-linel!
IIlttaoking, and that they were known to be in the area ten da.Ys before the
laction. The total Bl'.'l.ck Sea squadron he estimates a1; fifteen ttshipa-oi''the-line, II and about the Stl.t"fte number of miscellaneous eh:lps.

~n pa.ge~states that there
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"tad it not been
f~11:.·H'?!+
~}le

1·01'

the interferenoe nond threat of de liadolL'fe: the ':'urkiah

wculd ha.ve met a.nd destroyed the Enssian fleet.

And

$0

the only senel·

oonolusion that Urquhart saTI was that the guilt of the ca..!;a.strophe a.t

finope rested on the head of F.ngland. 27
There was one point that passed unohserved wh10h nevertheless oonoluftively pointed out the purpose of 1:he al11es,

()l'

at least of Bngland, to

Ibetray the vessels •. ~3ince the 7urka certa1n11 posse.sed the Quperior J'leet,

?itratford f S fear of the Turkish fleet e;icolmt.erlng a sup_rior foree was not

gen.t:dne.

On the other hand, if the Russian fleet was superior why, then,

was not the Sinope squa.dron lmmedia.tely ordered to return, instead of being

allowed to re. .ln there for approxi.ately three weeks?
protection. 28

Sinope afforded no

Sinoe no reasonable explanation was offered for thea. &D-

'tiona, no al terna ti ve explana tion to oollullten was poss! bl. in Urquhart' a
estimate.
the Turka.

Lord Stratford was oertainly not acting in the hest interests ot
Yet in the jlUi8DIent of Seton-l'!atsorl.

~tratfo:rd

was acting with

dupliCity in not car17ing Gut the instrnotions of Clarendon. 29

na

private17

urgin~

If Stratford

the Turks to war for the humiliation of Itussia and

.mdermining attnpts to maintain peace, the ql.leatiMI why 5trat"'ord re-

strained the Turkiah :t"l.et.1'1"om aiding the Sinope aquadron arid !'rom pursuing
ths !h8.ia.n fleet 1'IfUat st111 be answered.

27Urquhart, !aUlD!] t §~, Pl'. 10-11.

28lW.,

p. 10.

29Seton-Wataon, PP. 316-318.

His actions certa.inly mlet, have
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appearea quite mysteriou8 to his oontemporariea.
Tha Ports called. on tha ambas8&40r8 or England and France to decian

eight daTa, and

80

pftTented the pureu! t and d.struction of the Russian

In their answer they admitted that they had exercised their in-

squadron.

fluance to arrest the operations of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea.
Tbey explained that It was due to defectIVe 'Purk1sh material and crewa, and

the poselbility of an enCOl.'mter with a superior Huesian force.

This was

astounding, Urquhart thought, since Sinope had clearly shown how much the
Russians feared the 'lUrks.

The Turkish. fiest was s.otually superior.

It

commanded the entrances ot the DanUbe, and bad taken possession of the
Phases, but what wu that, Urquhart thought.
8&d01"81

After all.

.

therefore ah.was.

$. t was

a~a!nst

the word of' the amba..

their Will that Turkey should be weak, and

30

Betore Sinope the Turks did not rear an enoounter with the Rus81an8.

When Lord Stratford stopped their ne.t in the beg1nning ot Nov_ber, their

intention was to aeek out the Russian fleet tor battle.

The result of such

an enpgeent i8 auggested bJ the heroio re.istance the Turk. gave at Sinopt
wi thout their wara.hlpa.

Urquhart was qui ta aura that 1:t the Turkish fleet

had not been hin.dered. it would have entirely an"'lihilated the Ru••ian Black
Sea fleet.
~ea.

A Turkish fl.et then would have been in control of the Dlaok

It Stratford had not hindered. the Turks in the Principal! ties, tll.,-

also would have been in control there.

In ITrquhal't t e mind the words of

54
Count N••••lrede to 811" H. Seymour substantiated this beUer.

"You know

very' well that 'the exi.tenoe of Turke7 had never been in dang.r.

Had Ruaaie

and Turkey been left to themselves, the ~uarrel would have ended long ago. n
The danger here expressed 'by Neel!Je1rod,. was for RuSSia, Urquhart thought,

and through Sinope she had averted her imminent defeat. 31
In the final analysis Urquhart was probably not far frem

~ong.

The

government, if taken &s a whole, had negotiated and maneuvered appa,rently
to prevent war, Or to prevent 100al war from becoming a. European oonflagra-

Y.t the Turks apparently d •• ired war--a war in which they .ere oonfi-

tion.

dent they could win if limgland did not interia?e.

As Clarendon declared,

England and ll'ranoe were not going to allow the peaoe of Ettl"Ope to d.epend. on
the national apiri t of Turkey. which had evidently gotten out of the OOD!""
trol of the Turkish government.

And final17 Lord Clarendon into.ed Turk.

that ahe wall not to be pemi tte4 to attack Rua.ta. in the Black Se.t until
atter tha Porte had &«reed to aubait the operation. of the Turkish fleet to
the oontrol of the Englillh and French &_11"&18.

As Mrs. UrqUhart aptly

stated in her anal7aia of the pertinent diploaatio

",.

oommun1~Ue8t

1t waa the

Sinope affair b7 which England under the pretene. of securing the peace of
Europe protected Ruauda from the naval power of 'l'urkeif.

31

!tu

~D2"

Va,)" 2, 1860, P. 45.

32I~id., p. 46.

32

In his pamphlet,

lDs .:2Il ~

!!yaal'!b

!£! !a&nlt

RysI!a, David Urquha.rt

seriously questioned the nature of that war en whioh England bad embarked in
support of' Turkey.

Russia a.ndEnrrland were virtually invulnerable from a.t-

tack by each other while each remained wi thin i tIS own territory.
not have a large naVYJ England did not have a. la1"f..:':O army.
expoeed i

1;8

Ea.oh, however,

weaknesses when involved in a war wi thin a third at ate.

had 40ne just thts 'When she invaded the Principalities.

aelf at thellero:;y of England's maritime power.
~ngland

Rue.ia did

;,:;'b,4In

Russia

She had placed he:r-

it became evident that

tid not intend to exert that power Urquhart saw the iasuea in que ....

tion being tried on grounds which suooeeatull¥ bluned them.

Therefore,

before the oonflict between Ru ••ia and E:ngland. could be cle.1"17 unclertlwod.,
the apparent cont••t had to b. overlooked.

1

fJrquhart did not think that there had been a lawful declaration of war.
The queen had sent a . .silage to Parliament which did not dare utter the
word, ·'war. n but which d.1d, however, introduce the vJerd. "peace. tI
that C:ngland. was "bound to afford active assista.noe to he!" ally. n
the queen dared only

I'David Ul'q.uhart,

P. 2.

s~

1h!

She stated
Of RuSDitl

tha.t the negotiations to maintain peaoe had been

War

.!2.t RtuU!i~h
55

Npt A£l1tlgt

RlHU2~' (London, 1855),

terminated, and the power and reSOurces of the nation would be _plo,.ed
ural' protecting the dominione of the Sultan against the encroachments of

Bu ••la. 1t

In Urquhart's eyes every man that engaged in woh an action with

the prostituted title of war was

III

bandit or a. pirate.

This was a repeti-

tion of the decla.ration of Simla by which Nnglish troops were sent out in
~the

Affghan War to dethrone a prince who was not subservient to Russia..

Some of the documents conoerning that war had been forged to oover up

~ool-

ltl.lve or treasonable a.cts, and Urquhart waS quite c011f1dent that the
Crimean War would be treated in the same

Wfq.

2

Since the Czar d.1sda.1ned to notice the Incli. ult:1aatWl, En«land
appeared to declare war.

from the government. 3

o~

But a m.ssage instead of a declaration 01 war oam4

Tu., TiBlI!"

whioh Urquhart rel t WilLI. an organ of ausatE

and the ,English oabin.t, intofted the nation that morning "that a declara.tion of the attv•• and objects of th' war, tI it pHsu.ed, would b, pr.pared

for publioation 1n the +sIdOn 01l'lt •• 4 ~~ was it not .tat.d, Urquhart
qu.ried, that

8.

declaration would b. iawed?

lNhat W&8 stat.4 18 that these

fo rmali tie., a l.gal declaration or War, were not atrict17 necesaar.y to

oHate a "state of war. ,,5

That wa.. true, but they certainly were nee.seary

2Ilt• d• t PP. 8-9.

3David Urquhart, C2p"llstionll Rimed,,! (Sheffield, 185S), p. 44. He
sta.tes, "Tou a.re not legally a.t war with Russia. The word.in$7, of the Proal&mation has been a.ltered. Atter 't.ake up aNa' In.tead of 'for the derence
of the honour of the nrftlsh Crown,' it rune, 'for the defence of the ~ultat
of Turkey a.nd his dominions.' There 1s no oommission tc 'kill, sink, 'bum,
nn.d destroy.' ff
4Urquhart,

'lIAr,

1>£1. 8-9.
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to oreate a "state ot war."'
0017 for
~\?ould

B.

"lmvf'nl war,"

&

That was true, but th~y oertainly were nee ...

type, he thought, which

T<ln,~lMd

found repugnant.

it not have been much easier for Ent;la.nd to have placed herself withi7l

the law?

What was the reasen that there

England outside

or

1 t?

W&.tl

so much care taken to place

"Enf{la.?'H1 ha.d assumed a.m the basis of war that Turkey

v.'as in the una.lterable process of decay, a.nd yet she was pl'Oposi!1g to 80 to

wa.r to support l'u,rkey.

Urquhart concluded that England h.a.d not

brou~..nt

(3.bout the Crimean War in a. scramble tor the spoile of a. deoa,.y1ng Turkey, bui
for the destruotion ot Turk.,., and the protection of' 'Russia..

not conducted for the

purpoM8

6

The

1'18.1" W&8

sta.ted, and 80 that no judi01al action could

take place, no specifio declaration was made.
Parliament listened to the message in br.athl.s. silence.

members

& • •4

ent17, no one
of the Crown.

Afterward.,

one another U' 1 t was or was not a d_1aration ot war.
\Va8

ApPlU'-

able to an.er thi8 q,ues1:ion, not wen the legal ad"I ••1'$

Urqnhart was certain that it was

1:10t

a declaration of

war.

Lord Aberdeen, he l"e11NIIIbei"ed, had sald that to defend the OttOllM .p1re

was not to attack :aussia, and ne1 the'%' was it to defend 'l'I,tl"ke,.. 7

Irt th1e

light the message of the Crown certainly d.id net embotfy what tradi t10nally
might be considered a declaration of

wa~.

5The state of war, Urquhart t.hought, was a judioial sentenoe 83Qinst
an enemy by wh.ioh on land or sea his person could 1H~ d.estroyed, or his
properV seized. When war is declared everyone in 'the state making the
declaration. is bound to do his best "to .kl11, take. Md. destroy the enemy
until he tmbmi ts. !l:.u PtJso.P'ebruary 1. 1860, p. 17.

The documents, then, were prepared to render
""fbI..

Vial'

against RuBsia. impo....

';;a1' was pretended. a.nd yet the fields of' operation and the weapons

~va11able

to defeat Russia were rest.rioted.

p('Itleti tuted a state. of war and peaoe.

Suoh n. situation simultaneously

There could "be

1'10

halance in the ef'-

Peets of such a oondi tion, !tussis. was favored, and fl\1l"key harmed..
~re,

it was decided tha.t the state of possession was not to be altered.

attack, then, was planned against Russia.
~t

Further-

If an attack later materialised,

would not be tor the purposes ot regaining Turkeyfs lost territory.
In a letter to the Ciroassian tribes on ~a1'

~hat

there acwall,y was

00

a,

8

1854. Urquhart told them

war between England and nussia.

It was on",. a

preten•• to deceive the English nation and the Ottoman &apire, 1n or4er that
.. treacherous government might use their lIi11 t&r.Y torce. under the guise of
~

ally.

Thi. diabolical soh __ had. been llUooe.aful in regard. to TuJ'kq,

I!J,nd Urquhart expected that 1 t would be used on the elrou.1ana allllO.
Ithou~ IUItTett months had elap.ed s1noe T'Urkey

Enm

had admitted. the Anglo-French

l!Q.uadl'On through the Dardanelles, the Russians were .till in the Princ1pali~ies,

and the Sultan was for all practioal :purposes a prisoner in the

~eraglio.9
The squadron that was admitted. was not even In.tended for action against
~uS8ia, 1. t was far too powerful.

Instead it was intended to ooerce Turkey.

~e English and French controlled Const&ntinople, thr<>ugh their i'leeta, but

a:.DaJ. ,

p. 1).

9Davld tJrq'tl.hart, "Letter to Chiefs and Olans of Circassia., 'fi!ay 8, 1 854, ft
)Pider ~.!:k (London, 18;;), appendix, p. 9.
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Urquhart foresa.w that Russia would soon obtain this control after she had
fomented

a war between England and Franoe.

The plan of serving Russia by

sending armies to fight her, had not commenoed with
10
had alrea~ been made in the Affghan War.

Tl~key.

The experiment

The English people were actually faced with a dilemma when they ooneidared the relatione between England. and Russia.

Either they had to admit

that the Czar was insane. or that there was treason in the British oabinet.
For a long time most Englishmen thought Nicholas was insane, and in this
manner explained aWBJ the mysterious relations between the two oountries.
But upon olose analysis; Urquhart thought, this explanation was fa,l&oious.
Only treason in the British cabinet could adequately explain the inoongruities.

II

It bothered Urquhart that the Russians had not been driven from the

Prinoipalities.

He thought that nothing could have been easier than to out

off the Russian army in the Principalities.
confliot would have

en~ed

then and there.

If that had been done the who14
That Russia's expulsion was not

the intention behind the oonfliot was obvious to Urquhart, since a squadron
was being sent all the way to the Baltic.

Such an action would have been

entirely superfluous had the expulsion been intend.ad.

Also, English troops

were sent to Turkey when the naval squadron actually sufficed to dislodge
the Russians.

And in the end since the Turks aotually sufficed to defeat

10.!J2..!g.., pp. 10-11.
11

Urquhart, Wax, p. 12.

the Russians, the presenoe of the squadron also proveo. that the Pr1noipa.l1Fn~land

ties were not the main reasons for whioh the war was being tought.
had opened the Prinoipal ! ties to the Russia.ns.
If F.:~ngla.nd ha.d

80

<:)he h1),d held back the Turks.

des1red she oonld have immeliiatel,7r moved the Turkish

If, then, instead of using the foroes

forcos to the rear of t·he RusEl1ans.

in the Prinoipali ties whioh she a.lready bad a.vailable, EnQ;h,nd mo"ed forces
and ships of' her

OWn

to other points, it .followed lom-oally for rJrquhart

that r&nglMd had no intentione ('If fitr,hting 8.p:ainst Russia., and was only

masking her purposed inaction by these displacements.

12

A. English troops moved into the war apparently on the s1de of Turkey,
Urquhart beo8.lle sure that the plan of the c . .palgn was not to expel the
Russiana froftl the PrinCipal! Ues.

The l1lnglieh troop. were (a. The '1'118"

stated) to occupy the Thraoian CherllJOne.e, &ftd the extr_i ty of' Thraoe, on
whioh Constantinople stood.

What else than oooupation could it be oalled

wben En!J118h and French troops landed 1n toroe on Turk1sh so11, and instead
of

proce.din~

to attack the enemy, entrenched themselves on lin.s ooYering

and coraanding' Constantinople and tbe Dardanelles.
an insult to the T1ITka to pretend to defend their
against whioh attack was almoat impossible.
ocoupation.

affairs.

It was, Urquhart thoup:ht
8tron~e8t

It wan

n~t

positions,

a defe"ee, it was an

The 'i:urk:s would soon become di800"ltented witb thie state of

IrU.IJunections ,"ould

OOOlU'.

But the A.l1iee were capable

or

re-

preSSing suoh local insurrections, and the ailled na.val squadron was always
~earby

in a channel whioh oommanded

12:.!.!UA., pp. 4-6.

Con8~ant:1nople

and bisected the empire.
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Since the a111es Were in etfect preventing the ';:'urks from fighting the Ruesians, he felt that soon the alBae would prebably ha.ve to fight the Turks
themselves III
Such, then. 1. my answer to the qnest10n often put, to !De w'hen I
speak eof dangers of defensive war, ItHow can an addi +'iona1 force
endanger Turkey'" It will doc eo, beoause Turkey i.s a.lready too
strong, and such is precisely the ar?:mnent lHU,H! 'by Russia. at
V1enne.-"Turkey is toc et.ron,o.: therefore take oare of yours$lves."
And this, be 1 t cbserved, I annmlncen at the very beginning of
this et~lggle. "Yeu are new alarmed at 'urkey's weakness, the
day 1s not far distant when you will be terrified at her
strength. "14
Lord Pon80noy in 1854 even though he was not a. soldier, did believe
that he knew the difference between a defensive

&ld

Th.

aggressive war.

Turks would not be grateful to the &111es for doing what the,. could have
done them.elves, he thought, or for the EngliSh attacks direoted against
strong instead of weak Russian positions.

Ponsanby thought that 1t:ngl18h

intervention was aoeu:rd, 1t d.tenae were the end Bought.

But tor that .a1:-

tel' he thought the government' s policy was imbecile throughout the whole
progress of the Eastern Question. 15

He did indeed think that the best pol-

i01 was one that

~oo~pa8sed

be expelled

every- plaoe whioh she had a0Q.uired by force or fraud fl'08'1

f'l'OID

the Turke or the Persia.ns.

deeisive and extensive action.

~ssia

should

The,se terri tarteR should be T'f.Hlltored te> their

eeour1 ty against future a.tta.cks of any sert by Russia.

It. alee would,

l3~., pp. 11-12.
14Ibid •• PP. 1.3.
1;"Po1'180n'oy to Ur-quhart, Ma.rch 21, 1845." BRigjr
1181)1) ). D.. 11.

~ FIZ (I...ondon,

a.ffor~

n guard against disputes between -the Buropean powers
to be obtained or demanded"

It, was, in fact, the meddlin!~ of the ~llro'pea..u

powers in the a.ffa.1:rs of Turkey that brcugh:t about the
r~a.st.

thu5!I leaving nothing

c0t1fl1ot~1n

the ;Tea;r

It they would have left '''.'urkey a.1one, she could have worked out in a

satista.ctol'1 manner everything that concerned foreigners.

16

Some months atter Maroh,1854, Hrquhart asserted that some of the ml1itary authorities did not share the delusion that Turkey Was weak. and in

Immediately afterwards, l,ord Clarendon stated in the

danger from RUBeia.

!touse of Lords that the n.111 tal"T author! ties" concurred wi th the poll tical
author! ties, and declared tbat the expedi ticn was sent. out not t(l repel
!b

8Bia, or to aave

~'urkey,

but to secure Consta.ntinople. 17

l)nring ~,i!\l"Oh,

1854. however, nrqubart had oonversed with General Hardinge and Colt'll'lel
l!fll+.tein.

Th8 impression left upon him by the oonversation was that t,hase

officers entertained o1"in10na similar in char9.0te:r, it no+ in exte""l+, t("

his.

They a.ccepted the illustrations he offered

fT'01il

the last Rueso-Turkial:

war, and from topographic oonaiderati(H1S, anel. they also aeoept,ed the t88+.;1many he bore as to the oharacter and

feelin~s

of the Turkish army.

felt that these officers olearly understood the

eff'~t

ITrquhar1

that EngliSh troops

would have on the Turkish amy whioh was fnl1 of' oour8.89 and viger and oo.n-

soious of its power to orush the litu.ssians.

fjrquhart thought. that the Turks

could only .reel then tha.t the English troops were sent to restrain them.
Ruoh a f •• ling would soon turn the hatred whioh the Turks
the Ru.siane against the allies.

had for

lIe further fel t that the Turkish nation

16~., DotoDer, 1854, p. 32.
17Ib...1d., P. 26.

initiall~

'la.s much more powerf'ul than 1 ts government

thou~t

it. was, and that the

'l"urks would not be SUbdued even by all three powers.

Lord Clarendon ob-

served that" the na ti onal s pi ri t c f' Turkey wh 10 h miP.il t have been

90

u eetul

a,.q-ainst the aggressor, had new become dangerous to its own ~vemment."

'But

it had become so only because that government, Urquhart oono1uded, had

yielded to foreign oounaels.

18

Sometime before November 10, 1855 Urquhart had an extraordinar,r oonversattan wi th tne Turkish ambassador, Nardo Pa.cha.
Turk~

waa able to d.fend heraelf; the latter maintained that hia countr,rmen

were no match tor the Rua.iana.
lDent

Urquhart maintained that

He therefore implored the 'Sri t1ah govern-

for aid, and Waa quite annoyed at Urquhart' a estimate of Turk1,sb bra...

er,y and power.19

Rusaia, Urquhart

tho~tf

stead of a Turld sh f.L1"II7.
allied to Turke.7. and

would be better able to resist a European in-

Therefore, it made sense that wh.en

Fn~li9h

En~land was

troops composed the greater mas. of the

1ues1a was better able to resist TurkeY'.

a~,

After all, if Pll\gla.nd had reall.y

,;anted to support T'Urkey and to curb Russia, all she had. to !i.o waG employ
the most .f'f'ecttull means whicb was not war, but the reetriotion of RUBsian
trade.

Since England did not use these mea.l'lS she ba.d no intention of be-

befriending Turkey, or of injuring Russia.20

18

"Urquhart to Raglan, March 21, 1854,"~., pp. 28-31.

19r.'ree ?;tils, l'iovember 10, 1855, p. 2.

20 Ibid.

Moot of his ideas on defensive war, statements of fact and predictions,
David Urquhart embodied in a letter t.o Lord Raglan dated tkreh 21, 1854. He

appealed to Lord Raglan to take

nt~ps SB

commander-in-chief to rescue Pong-

land and Turkey from a convulsion that also might lead to war with 'rance.
iVhat was the nature of the Anglo-French allianoe?

part that Russia had plqed 1n bringing Loui s

~~&poleon

Considering; the
to power. Urquhart

wondered how France could really have been hostile to Russia?
of the tuture ma.p of Europe eome months betore he wrote

21

1b.I

In speaking

Si~4!;t

...$ba

_

]lz, he said that ttLouis Napoleon muet .ell the Eng11eh squadron or be
4ri yen 07 an iruliJlu"reo tion fro. Parie. tI

Urquhart was qui te astonished at

what he considered the Imbecillt7 ot the English public in respect to
France.

A thorcugh analTsis of the reasons for the alliance. after all the

enmitl bet.een England and Franee, would in any

0888

have been reasonable.

Yett Englishmen dreaded to look .eriously at the alliance.

Urquhart was

constantly reminded of the words of Prince Lieven when he described the DUI
of Wellington'

"Re dreads and even avoids the examination of his position

and trusts to events the oare of' overooming diffioulties. II

Here, in

single phrase. was explained t.ha.t characteristic of 1<::!ngland

and.

It.

a.ll of

Europe whioh enabled RUSSia to uee other countries for her advantage.22
Considerable eVidence moved Urquhart tc be qvite suspicious of Franoe's

intentione.

The planning of a man-of-war harbor at Boulogne and the sup-

press10n ot the Cllari vari for 1 ts enmity to Russia were two reports that

HU rquhart, 0Qiid,r, pp. 2B-3 1.
22.!UJ., p. 25.

impressed him qllite deeply.

1AOreever, even if the '>'(rinter oamp a.t Eoulogne

was directed at overawing Prussia i+.
Russia..

WI1S

just as muoh in the servioe of

Leuis Uapoleon had. been allowed to fortlty t.he Tl:rraoian Chersoneset

thereby giving him Virtual poses89ion of the D&rdanellea.
control over the :tate of the English squadron.

Bven

~

This gave him
T1!1' Vias encourag-

ing the government to send the whole fleet into that trap in the Dardanelles
Such a Situation should have been enougb to
reflect for a minute on

8.

.ncoura~

the dulleat olti.en

t~

situation whioh was inttmded to shut up in a aea

cOUlDlanded by France the whole available foroe ot England.
done w1 th the avowed purpose of forcing tem. tor

8

A.nd thia was all

settlement between

RUBsia and Turkey, terms which actually violated the aovereignty ot Turkey

which Flngla."1d had undertaken to defend. 23
Others a180 dletrueted the intentions behind. the expedition.
authority of'

1h!

t.ioned, the Turks

Tyges UrqUhart knew that
~ve "si~lfleant,

lllity and contempt."

wh~'t)ever

~1"I~lieb

viewed the expedition to Turkey wi t.h a "profound
~,!'mieB,

the expedition was men-

but inarticulate flJ'~e of their inered-

He a.lao knew that the

to unexperienoed in Rdt1sh

On the

til

('Ifficere in oommand

feelin.~

of diatT".let., hi thel'"

oonvicticf'! of treachery.1t

The senti-

ment was qui to general among the offioers, al thou~ Lord Raglan was an e»-

ception. 24
~'ihen

oonsidering the reasons for the war Urquha.rt thought that onlT th.

preteneions of Russia and her strength were

23 Ib14 ., pp. 25-26.

24 Ibld ., p. 26.

ot essential importanoe.

It

66
Huss1a were the patron of the Christia.ns of Turkey, she would have used that
expen~in~":'l"eat

patronage, instea.d of

efforts in 1'\eaking to obtaIn H.

Russia been flore powerful than r[urkey, EngllaMle!1
conquests before learning of bel' intentions.

en alreadJr' she had been stopped.

Rad

would have heard of her

Russia. ha.d actua.lly been beat-

Urquha.rt then could not see why England

should undertake suoh a gigantio and hazardous expedition. 25

Proponents of the expedition supported it with new argwaents such as
the nee.Bs! tl' of repressing Ru ••1a through European guarant •• s. 'ro Urqu-

hart'. waf of thinking this was only ta.lling back en the original fallacy
that Rusllia
tbis.
Iwhy

waS strong

and Tarkey weak.

mv.uta oertainly had disproved.

If TUl"key was strong, there wa.a no

d.a..~ger

bother with useless treaties as guarantees.

iTIu8sle. in the put.

to Ulurope froID Russia., so
Tl'eat:tea had 1'l.l')t restrained

E1ven ministers thOll,;ht that Ru.sia used treatie. as

stepping stones to conquest.

26

!"; fact, Rustd,a, only URad 'treaties en the

grt:,unds tha.t they should be exeouted in so far as thtry served to expand her

!empire.

In 1815 the treaty of Vienna. gavs her Poland., lmt this did. not pre-

lVent her 1n 1846 from dispoeinl?,' of Craoow.
~ve

her the mouths of tbe Danube.

~ntrance
~ea.r

The .;;reaty of Adrianople in H~29

In 18539 however, Rtuuda blocked the

in Violation of the cond:i.ticns to which ahe had agreed.

she separa1;ely ocoupied the Principalities which violated the treaty of

lRa1 ta timan of' 1849 that provided only for a. join.t ocoupation.
~f

Tha.t name

The treaty

London in 1841 had excluded foreign vessels of war from the Eux1ne on 'tiM

ccmd.1 tic!} the. t Rusaia. l"fUlpeO t the integl"i ty of the (it.t,cman P.mpire, and this

also did not prevent her 1n 1853 from Violating' that integ'r1ty.27

After RUBsia had been beaten
eal purposes was over.

return.
by

by the '""ul"k~, tha contest

for a,llpra.cti-

Russia's a.rmies had been dislcdged, and could not

All Turkey had to do was maintain the state of war, .eal oft trade

keeping the Dardanelle. closed, and Ruasia would have be.n placed between

extinotion and the acoeptance of equitable oonditione of peace.

Urquhart

ooncluded that the allies had relieved Ru.sia. trom euoh a. pr.dJ.camen't by

deliT.ring overth. Danubian Principalities to Au.tria,

by compromising

their own armies in RU.8ian territory, and b,r keeping the Dardanelle. open
for her trade.

28

27David Urquhart, ~rn",u s.!. RU!!iAt,!n
ed. (lendon, 1853), PP. xxxii-xxxiii.

28DaTi d. Ur-quhal't,

..Da

Qu"n

J.h! wU~, Nortb, S

.ID.2...l.U Pam!,£

BORth, 2ru~

(London, 1857) t Pp. 6-1.

CHAPTER V
It. DISHIDIDlTMnlORITY

David Urqubal"t reI t that the war alread;r in 1854 was one fantastic
nightmare.

The eul,. stages of the oUlpa.ign wi th the slaughters of Alma,

Balaclava, and Inkerman red this reeling of horror.
the nation ma.1'Ohed learlessly forward.

Yet the war spirit of

It was with dreariness and great

difficulty that he fought against this seemingly indomitable enthusiasm.

These waves of madness did not extinguish his flame of resistance and critiHe felt t.hat England VIae cOnmlltting a great national or1mft, this in-

oism.

oreased the tenaion in bis mind.

He

~~d

hin tiano's, Harriet

therefore dedioated themselves to preaching againgt the war.
~etters

1

~orteecue,

Volumes of

were written that J"sar. and !Jrquhart even frequently eommunicatEtd.

~ith his Turkish friends at Consta.ntinople. 2 In tr'.Iing topubl1sh their
ideas they found that

1U

MOl'I)ing

Awn1su

and The Mom1ns H!r"d were the

only newspaper. that would print articles wi th weh a radical fla.vor.

1.t&I

Timea would not allow their articles in 1 ts columns. 3 ~~lhene.... r he could
gather a dozen or more workingmen he tried to arouse their interest in

IMana C. 'Bishop, MR9il' J1S.. ~l'•• u.£9:stlu:t (r..o:1do1'1, 1897 " p. 73.
~arr1et Angelina Forteacue was the second 4aughter 01 Lieutenant-Colonel
Ph1ch•• ter Fort.sou. of Dromiak.n, 00. Louth, and sister of Ch1che.ter Sam~el Pa.rkinaon FOl"'tefIC:\lt, f1.rst 1;)aron Carlingtord and second ba1'On Clermont.
2
~.,

3.!W. ,

p.97.

p.

ea.
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foreign affa1J'a. 4

In \b1a way he again undertook tho formation and develop-

ment of h$8 foreign affairs

COUlD 1 ttee ••

5 aut Ylnatever the .ean. hi. effort!

were largel)" di:rectect toward averting further action by English troop. in
the Mlddle Raat.

6

Urquhart t a 1deu were inten.ely opposed to ounent opinions. 7

'llhe

rank. of his followera had oontinuous17 g.rown _ller sinoe the thirti.s•

.A.1"OUnd .M'tq and. June of

1854 on17 a aall number of people adhered to hill

outaide of a o1rcle of friends.

It waa just before his marriage to Mi ••

Fortell!lOua 1n S.pt_ber that William J. Davidson in wr1 tin« to Francia Man:
said, "E! ther 81"eat moral oourage 18 required or great attachment to the

originator of the 'Views held by the tffW. f'I

After all, the •• followers bore

up unaeS' great sOocie1 pressure, or it even might be said that t.hey were persecuted.

It' it had not been for tbis pressure, Davidson e.tll'1l&ted, rJrquhari

would have bad. many supporters.

8

On17 a few people, however. were oapable

of appreciating hi. self-sacrifice, h1e labor, and the
wisdom to whioh he oould attain.

&!'l."ang. .nt

of' IIOral

As one of theta ea1d, he was "one of the

moat profound thinkers of 1I04ern time •• ft
tul in the

hei~t.

BeinB "quick at perception, ald11...

of hi. thoughts, ooherent, oonoentrati ve and logioal

in hia expre••101'1," he fervently and en.ergetical17 taught hi. oountl711Utn

4l!14., p. 13.
'Gertrude Robinson,
6

Biebop, p.

97.

7Ib 1;d., Jh 113.
8

lW.,

PP. 63-84.

Dll1~ UrgMaI£t (Oxford, 1920), p. 120.

10

Hia radical Vi ... at first evan prevented his engagement.

It was

probably quite natural that liti •• lorteacne f • t.U.y hesitate" in adrtalng
her to aarr,r thi8 ....oentric" who oppoaed the opiniorul of almost eve17
portant pereon in the oount17.

:ae

tv. .

u.-

furthemore quite the iccmocla.t

108t, his tinanoialtuture, uncertain, and. above all he len_ of a .,..terloua world of 880ret agents, letter t-.per1ng, plots, tre.eon, 01"10.17 and

other sillilar &ottons.
English oircles?

Wae this a good. prospective relative in respectable

B. offended her brotheNt and bewildered her aunt Who

"&8

Soont however, the family' II resistance b:Nlke down, and they

her guardian.
were engaged. 10

Because Mr. U:rq,uhart waa so in"101ved in proraot1ng oppoai tion to the wru:

he had to travel «Etenslvely.
gl"OW

Consequently. ha mId Mi •• Forte8Cue had to

in love and knowledge of each other throu8h correspondenoe.

b ••n of great value in ua.ssing Ul"Cluhart t • personality.

!hi. haa

In t.ot, both of

their oharaotera are oonv.,... with intimate .i.plici~ in thair letter•• ll

\,ie get the illpreaa10n that he waa not
~U'll . .a

8.

11M overco.e with a great phobia,

he pur,PO••1y suppres.ed 1 ts manit.atationa.

He toea, however, oorae

torth .s a man 1ntenseq d.edioated, and one who was affeotionate, underatand ..
ing, and quite lovable.

Yet

the~.

9:aobineon, pp. 139-140.

10Bi8hop, p. 66.
11

:!:e14.,

P.

65.

qualiti •• were ver,r often oonoe.led

71
beneath an impatient and domlneerl~g manner whieh he assum.d to propagate
his dootrines. 12 Througbout the early part of 1854 it appears that Mls.
Foresteue and Mr.

U~hart

developed an increasing deaire tor oomplete .oral

and intellectual identifioation in their patriotio effort to awaken Engliab1Il«l

to the dangeH that oonfronted thell.

13

lIl.s Forteacue even before she waa engaged to 'M:£o. Urquhart studied his
wr1 tings and appreiated moat of his ldeas.

led under his direction wi tb great zeal.

14

After the engagement she stud.When she started to wr1 te tor

publioation she adopted. the pen name of' nCan taB. ff because the names "lI'ldes fl
and "Spes" had alreaq been actopted by his associa.tes. l5 tind,ar this name
sbe wrote many letters
Vorninbl

tOT

tbe press, most of whioh were publisbed
l6

in~

H.a:t§, and.ll\! .amins AdV't:ti!.:r.

In reorganizing the foreign affaire oomm1 ttees Urquhart began in 58"11casUe with a 8l1l&l1 oomittee of Ita blaoksmith. a Oa.l"lxtl'.l'ter and a blind

beggar. "

Out of' these bumble beginnings committe•• spl'Outed up allover

England 11ke new grass atter a spring rain.

cu ••ion guide for the oo.-itt.e..
to their organ1utlon.

From some ot the 41Sou.81on8

Urqubart devoted almost the whole Tear

For the Most part the,. were tONed ot workingmen,

12Ibicl.t p. 95.

13lbi!. t P. 114.

l~.,

p. 112.

l~lBlsboP. P. 75.
1611188 1I'orteecue to David Urquhart, A.ugust 12, 1854,

~ ••

p. 112.
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~ometime8

fthem.

merchants and shopkeepers joined and worked side by aide with

In each town he gathered a small nucleus of men whom he attraoted by

appealing to their passionst interest, or curiosity.

Then they settled down

to otud¥ Va.tel, or his own or Anstey's pamphlets on English government, the
{ear Eut, or even Russia.

Along with these they would study the Blue Books

and p&rl1amentar,y doouments rela.tin~ to recent h18tory.17
~hioh

Urquhart inapired the groups ware the reatoration ot the Eng11ab con-

~titution

~~

The goala with

with legal sovern.ent and justice, and

among nationa.

r.eatab11~nt

ot publio

Oradnal17 he convinoed the •• workins-en that the evila

th$f BUffered were not going to ba remedied by the franohise, the Rerer.
~111t and the repeal
law and justice.

ot the Corn

18 In

Law.,

but only by the restoration of all

a aen.a he substituted his own panacea for othera, aa

did Ruskin in his socialistic retoms and erten.ion of' education and Carlyle
with great and heroiC deeds and the leadership of strong men.
On 'larch 30 a meeting was held in tll.e Muaic Hall on Store Street which
~e1ped

set the pattern of Inquir;r for t.he committees into the conduot of' the

roreign office, and of the .ending of petitions to Parliament to .et up a
oommi tte. of inquiry to read and puhllah all papers of th.e foreign offiee,
and to 1J't1spend all of' its actions till a report was given.

A sma.ll deputa-

tlon includ.ing Messrs. N"loholtq, Conlngham, Wilson, Collet,

al1d;~11k8

even

filet with Lord Clarendon telling h.im of the views expressed and oonolusions

drawn at this ••• ting.

TheT were quite ai.l1ar to Urquhart'. conoerning

17Ro01n80n, PP. 124-125.

18l.2.,ij.,

p.

141.

1)

~ngli.h dipl0l'lla07 M4 the progreSS of the CrilllN.tl War.

was stupefied, an4 is report.4
r.eolutions

80

to

Of oour ••, Clarendon

hava ..td, PI hesitate to rec.iv. at all

otflnei.e to the Goy.rna.ntt both in matter and .annal', 80

offensiftq reflecting "en on the horle.V and SOod .en•• of' the OOy.r,....
Iment. "19

A_~ ho d801ined to 8XP1ain theae mattere to the deputation aqing

AflU

that be had repeate4ly given such explanation. in Parliament where the Dr! ....
ish people e.xp-GC"occl to reoei YG them. 20
From the published resolutions of anoth.r publio meeting 1n St. MfJ.l"ooo

sion. and oonclusion..

The English nation, most of' them believed, had

allowed the Oabinet to gain too I!Ift¥)h power whioh l"f.uld.ered ! t irr.sponaible,
arb! tra17, and despotio.

ilot only did tbi. affect such great conoerns as

the .pire, but also trade and employment, the prioe of food, the auPPl1 of
ho•• and foreign markets, taxation for deten.e, and the oonduct of war.

Th~

did no'" feel that the nation was being protected. by the intecri t7 of ParIi..
ment aga.1nst the treaohe17 ot the IJOYe1'n1l.ent.

The onq workable 801ut10n

the)" ..... was to &Walten the na.tion to the danger whioh threatened to ove1'-

talte 1t.21
As the WaDltb. of the lJlJfAIaer

a-.v.

abeorbea. the dapo... of the 'Inglish

eountr;yaide l1rquhart intensified his laboH.

hie friends to run for Parl i_ent from Lond.on.

19'8. Tueker,
20

~., pp.

2m!!,.,', PS!li~1etl
xii-xiY.

21 Ib1d • t p. xv.

On June 12 he was urged by

H. was allowed t..o use the

FlY-Shltle (I/ondont 1855), p. xiv.

14
Guildhall tor the all, at which the tlqOl" of Loncllon told hi. there were
thr•• thousand preeent.Al thouBh this and otber meetings must have been
quite a suocesa, he tid. not win the election.

22

Such defeats were not n&11l,

Ibut oertain17 hie lndo1ai ta.ble hopefulness had to seize all available sup~rt.

\(rqbe he depended too muoh on enoouraging voices, but with the 41 ...

appointments and the resultant feeling that he was fighting the caml)aign
singlehandedly he relied upon, and sometim"s demanded, the full oonfidence

of hie friends. 23

Miss ?orteacue oertainq

Ihis frequent letters to her reflect his

~o;r

WS8

a eouroe of strength, and

at her oonfidenoe in him.

By

August he appeared exhaustedt
It baa been the harde.t work I bave eYer had, a.nd I teel it, this
18 the close of three daJ'1I of la.~suor, whioh bas perhaps inte1'o.pted a brnkdown. I II&Wtlaae (atte1'W'arda the Earl of Jfqo.
V108ro.1 of India) to-night, and he told .e that he had co." to be
intoNd.. He is acing to Ireland t()040n'C)W eVelina, and has not
time to oome in the lDOrning, but he haa been reading in the JIorni1'1« A4vertiaer. Q. Baail ton oonpatulated .". I spoke to hill
l1ke Jeremlah, and he turned.
Xlapier I have not epoken to.
Oolonel Ta.ylor (_ember for Oount1 Dublin and OonaerYatift Whip)
Wae here Sa.turdlq, and has proI8ieed, aft"r eQlanatlon, to Wl"i te
to J. Butler (Lord J .... Butl8l!'t .on ot tbe :Marquis of 01'Ut01'14.,
and a broth.~.of Lady Clermont) to help about the Dublin meeting
it req:uir(ld. Z4

pal..

rSeverthel •••, throughout the _ e r he oontinuou.ly wrote letters that ",e"..
published in the

MRmtu

Ad'!,N'ti'll and !owinS

i~m:al4,

and even talked wi tb

th e eM tors. 25

22UrqUha:rt to Fortescue, J'u~"! 12, 1854, 'Bishop, p. 91.

:nr
",bid., Pp. 91-92.
24Urtluha.rt to Fort.acue. August 1), 1854,

,25,!W.., PI'. 115-117.

.!W••

PP. 115-116.
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What must hay. increa•• d the tension of his life that
~8piclona

ponthm.oe

~er

that someone was attempting to peiacn him and that his correabeing watched.

ftS

He wrote to

~iet'J

?ortet'JCue about thhl, her

friends thought 'that 1t all was quite illusive and. mysterious.
F-tuite

were bis

e~r

26

Being

to diapel these doubts he produoed su.ffloient evidence durinA'

~uly to convince them that be wam not he:ving bAllu~ina:tions.

Even her

bl'Othem then thOUght that "there was evidenoe for a Court of Justioe" in

!hi. tawr. 27
Same of the po.tal clerke who opened O':rquhart's mail to14 hi. a.bout it.

Thi. was no surpri.e to h1m, becau.e investigation. of his matl ",ere not nn
He olaime4 that it wu done .e tar back as 18)6 and p8l"iodioally the-eaft.,.

••,801&117 in 1848 after be a1:t.,t.,4 to impeach Lord Pal1H1"8ton.

That his

letters had been stopped and opened was known by hundreds ot peraon", or
he olaimed.

80

He wrote to lnttmate friends for their opinions on the matter.

The tacts trom these l.tter. (_8t of which "'ere written 4urln.r Jul,. of

1854) were 811_1 ttea to the Manchester CfmlBit tee fIOst probably during June

ot 1851, and were later publishea in a npplement of ..'!lI P1R1S!!Mtio
enti tled,

"an

the Opening of' tetteH by the Ooverrmtent. ,,28

bear out hie mapicions.

'1'b~

!lwa

apparently

Som. peepl •• of oourse, :felt that he was putting

26llWl •, PP. 99-100.

27~., p. 111.
28D,»lnISi2 ReyJ11" XV (Deeember, 1867), supplement. On the last pagt
of this supplement are listed additional publications of Urquhart, Tucker.
lJ:u PrU' auppltlMnt., oo_i ttee reports, and wri tinge of William Ca.rgill,
R. Montieth, H. B. Pariah, and G. Stapleton.

itorward thea. aceulllationa talsely to l1lake himself appear important.

Moused him of monOlDanla.

'But in his evidenoe i t

dally opening hie lettera, and thoae ot other men

c&~e 01.1t

1'1180.

Some

that clerk. w.r.

Under Lord Litch-

field's administration of the Post Office i1rquhar+"s letters ceased to be
opened.

Lord Litohfield had found

quently- aade known to Urquha!'t.
administration mentioned to

selt opened.

h~

noth1n~

against him and this was subs..

Howe.".]!', the chief clerk under the next
the number of hie letters that he had him-

In 1857 while visiting the Houae of Common. Mr. OtwaJ tela 1118

that he had heard that the letter. ot the Turkish Aaeooiation were openea
and h. and the chairman of a Bouse Co_itt.e b.gged Urquhart to 1'repue a
c .... tor the Commons.

Ul'Cluhart 4_11nea to 40

80

at that tinle, becauee he

telt that he 414 110t WL'1t 'to ga't mixed up in the matter,

ana becau.e

hi.

lette" were not then being 01'.84. 29
DaY1cl Urquhart'. m&l"riage to Mi•• "ort. .118 took place on Sept_bar

1854.

30

The

hon~n

5.

oenaiated of a ffllfl da.ve at Lord. Clermont'. plaoe in

Ravensdale Parlt. and a shert

toUl:"

11'1 the JUgblanda. 31

At the inat1.tlon of Isaac lrons:1de, an impo:rtant Sheffield 1,,411.tri-

aliet. the mqor of Sheffield convened. a public meetinl." on Sept_bel' 25
whioh beeame the first real17 big Urquhart1 te demonstration.

Austrian

troops had just ocoupied the Province. without a declaration of war in the
estimation of thoae present at the meeting.

29:.!liLid:. , PI>' 1-1.
30 Btahop, p. 118.

31 Ib1c\., p. 120.

Ironside stated that no hope

77
oould be expected, 11'OIa Au.tria as an ally 1n View of its ba.d record and the
fact that the empi" wa. obliging
of' 1848 to HapeburfJ justice.

Om'll'

Pasha. to BUl'T€mder Hungarian refugees

I t, was obviou.s that Ironside was just aa "Vig-

orous a speaker ae Urquhart, for he declared that such demands by the Hapeburp made his blood boil and hiu hair stand on end.

it wet have clone numerou. till...

Ironside then alluded acousingly to Sr.

Charl •• Napier'. capture of Jemer.and, and asked
capture Riga.

The crowd cheerea., aa

w~

he had not proceeded to

Bomu8Md, after all, was nothing more than a "barrera anel

abandoned tortna•• II

Obvioue17, the••••eUnp were not subdued aftaire.

The . .aUng .-Yen ItOved to petition the Queen to eupport their position.

Yo_ift,.

~Iwjt

~

a TO!7 newspaper, looked with ROh favel!' on this . . .tirtg

that it oalled on other towns to tollow Sheffield •• exaaple. 32
Then in October the two Urquhart. began worldng in the other manutaoturin. centers. 33
that

'Ph. lI.etings which they held in tewns tbraugheut InfJ1an4

aut~ were attended

by

between tittJ to sixteen hundred people. 34 BV

Noyaber or December he had •• tabliab.' a tore1,ttn affairs COnllit"" 1n ~

tical17 all the chief t-c:nrns.

Some of the ohairmen elected by the worldn~

ebowed esceptional acuten ••• and readine.s to examine and to dispute national and international topi08 w1 tb "r. Ul'Q.uha!"t. 35

lie had alw1q8 el1Coura.ged

32W. H. (I. Al"Q'ta.ge. nSh.ttiel' aD.4 the Crimean. Wa!", Politice and Indu.try, 1852-67. If !!il!tga 1'.2411' III (London, 1955), p. 476.
3la18hOP, p. 120.

34Robinaon, p. 125.
35Il18hoPt p. 120.

questions as the best
nist8. 36

Ih&IlS

to arouse attention and to oonfound

hiB

antago-

About thi. U.me he seleoted sixty of these exceptional men to

undergo a three montha' special oourse ot study 11'1 Manohester.

They were

diVided 1nto 8ect1ons each of which was directed by a. person who had alrea4

worked with tlrquhal't.

Their da..Y lasted tro. nine in the IlOrn1ng to late at

night with on17 ttlae out tor meals.

Th.... heard lecture. on the law of n....

tions and the aonati\ut1on of England.
sub3eota, BUoh as the t:reat7 of

Then they would stud3' parts of these

Ka..Y, 1852, tile

Chine•• and .,ipan wars,

lD&1'i ti.l8. law, the o. .a:roi&1 treat7 with Turkey, England'. oom 8U.pply, the

HolT Allianoe. and Poland.

Urquhart said of the. . . .n that th.,- .ere

ngl"ave. cUllgent, enthusiastio, and a aigllt worth •••ina'. It

(It .at bs

J:'GMo

m_bered. that th18 took place in En,lan4 at a ti. . when the majority of the
people and ••pecialll' the industrial labonna
the barest essentials of an education.)

01aU8S waN

not evem ,.t'1116

At the end of this three month

period, amaeti.e early 1n 1855. a public meeting was held to which prominent
stateamen, 1&\"1'1'81"8, and ecole.ill-stics were inv1 ted.
judge the performanoe of theee men.
by

one.

Some ot them were to

All of the students were questioned on.

The best of the sixty were ohosen to torm a deputation to

l~dbn to

d1aoU8. with the members of both house. of Parliament the trea.ty of nenaark
and the rigb t of 8Rl'Ch. 37

ao..

of the .... men who had he1pea Urquhart 1n 1839 to organise the

foreign attaira oODai ttHS from the ranks of the Chartiets helped in the

36..!!&!., pp.. lao, 133-135.

37RoblnBOn, liP. 125-126.

79
foraatlon of the •• new oommittees.

Some ot the •• men were Ross of Bladen..

burg, Monteith of Carstairs,and Charle. Attwood.

Others who later joined

the organisers were lla30r Poore, Major Relland, Frances Marx, and Charles

Dobaon Collet, who was well known as the 88Cretar,y for "The Association for
the R.peal of' the 'l'az on N....papors and the Exc1 •• on Paper."

B1' 11.11' helll

and that of other .,.pa.thizera in various town. 145 oouaitt.es were tol'lUd

throughout Eng-lana in the next a.ve1'&1 7.a.ra.

38

Urquhart a.n4 his wite had. little rest that autwan.

She tollow.a. hill

wherever he went, and plqed an illpCrtant role by aoothing over eo•• 01' the
inevitable personalit7ol&8h••• 39

She also bad to look up quotationa, k.ep

up a voluminous and lJOUIetilles pub11shed. correspondenoe, and anner the ob-

jections of thon not oonvinoed by her husband'. argumcmta.
must have imbibed his

w~

She certainly-

of thinking tor ahe al80 oorrected the fal••

menta and illogioal conolusions of their allle..

the oo.-itte. me.tinge whioh

the~

ar~

It i. in the reporta of

attended that are found part of the record

ot hia extenat ve knowledge, hi. readine.a to enter into a disoua.ion of an.v
topio, hia atartling paradoxe., and his skillful appeal to the iatellect and

consci.noe ot his liateners.

At a meeting 1n Newcas%le on November 21 the

dieousaion revolved around international oommel'Ce about which h. was able tt::
produce an astounding

an.., of faot8 and figure•• 40

At another ••• ting on

NOV_bel' 30 the sub3eot was the conan tu t1cm, and. how the law waa d.signed

38~., pp. 135-136.
19fb14 •• p. 120.

4Oll!! PillS,

Nov. 10,

1855,

p. 2.

to control the acta of the government. 41

Both were quite extraordinary

tIIeetinga and the evidence that he suomi tted at them was later incorporated
into a oombined paphlet with sections respectively entitled, "L1mit.ation of
the Supply of (]rain'· and "Conett tution&1 R...d1ea. n

1I&n7 of Urquhart' a predictions concerning the war were aleo published
during A.pril of 1854 in lESt !xJm~!.in.lA!.!AI.:\, a pamphlet which wae a

collection of lettef>ll that 1n effect toreteld lIOIte 0'£ the eventa wh10h

curred du.ring the war. 42

In London that "ear were aI_ publiahea

.!2l. IenAmo, d. C9&lu,~on

and The Oecu;mU2tl!Jl...ilI

Om',.

0c-

lhI.!K

The Duke of

Cambridge was one of those persons whom Urquhart had warned of the danger
that lurked in the Crimea.
turbed when he

!!m.VI

The 'Duke was report.ate have been qui te dis-

thoee predioUoruJ realized dttrin.g the expedi tioD. 43

The last ~ of 1854 i8 illustrative of the extensive oorrespondenee
\'Ihieh the Urqu...\arts conducted during that and the following year.

On that

dq twenty-one private letters, f'i.ve lette", for t.he press, and twentJ"'"nine

newspapers and parcels were mailed.

Such a daJ W&8 probably exceptional.

but the usual c.t.q's outgoing Ila1l al",,,,. had from. eight to 'twelve l.tters.
And they were not on17 ..dAre•••4 to friends, but alao to 1"01'&1 ty, £Overoo-

fDent miniaten, politicians. editor., OOll'llOn operatives, and wo.en of all
age- anA rank. 44
I

U

One of the letter. mailed that last ~ of December was

lJ

41B18hOP, pp. 120-122.
4!E. Tucker, p. vi.

41~b·..
44..!!?Jj.

{lrq'Uart to Miss Curti.s, January 9, 1855, Bishop, p. 124.

81
addressed to the SultM warning him of the dangers that were involved in hi.
continued friendShip with the allie ••

45

With the roar of the terrible winter wind. and the freezing cold the
aoldie1"8 and. hora•• wf'f.red and died 1n the Crimea for lack of flUpp11e••

The report. of the _18.17 touched man:;y Engli8h heartel they certainly
stirred the Urquhart. to greater exertions in their ml11 tant campaign

agains the oonduct of the war.

Literally volume. of letters and article.

were WTl 'lten, and through the continuous reception of foreign and domestic
newspapers46 the,. tDuet have been two of t,be best-informed
Mr. t1rq,uhart' 8

unrel.ntin~

cr1 tici BIlS

a:Tld

WOMS,

in England.

acousations of oolhudon must haVE

irritated many important people beyond endurance.
share of this war of

:p8... ple

nut he also received his

for oahmtniee virtually l!\1fI'a.rmed a.bout bis nartle

p..nd destroyed much of his influence..

The detractors were people of

hi~

poBition and consequently were ready to believe tha.t Urquhart was actuated
by Bpi te because of his earlier dismissal from the Foreign Office.

some -thought, he was mentall,. deranged.

Ilaybe.

All of this is understandable tor

he 41d not reed the English pride with the milk and honey of their greatne.a
H. did the unpopular thing of unsparingly lashing their respectable phrae••
and national complaoeno,y.47

45!I11

Pre",

November 10,

1855, p. t.

46'B1ahop, p. 124. "or insta.nce, on Janua,17 9, 1855 twenty-one letter.
lWere sent out, two for The R'Wd a.nd.!!l..! Advlrti§lr for the following dqt s
edition. Two articles were sketohed in preparation for the next ~t. work.
~ent~f1ve newspapers were mailed. ~ifty newspapers had been ordered, but
!had not arr:1 ved.
47.!9JJ., p. 126.

82
Mrs. Urquhartwaa one person who sustained her husband during the •• "r,,ing times 0;' her absolute trust in and l07alt1' to his ideas.

Her confidenoe

in the cOl'rectn." of her husba.nd t S poei tic%). was not without support.

H.

was becoming increas1ng17 suocessful among the workingmen to Wh10h his 8\10-

aesaiul oommitt ••• and the large attendanoe at publio me.tings attest.

or

a

epeech which h. 1164. at Newoutle on June 8, 1855, a friend reported to her

that "the Whole bod;y of workingmen were breathless for thre. hours and un.derstood every point, jumping down from seats and benches at the end to

forowd round the tnan they tel t

'WaS

the only one to save and rule them. ,,48

~o8suth, however, claimed that not even Mr. Urquhart could olaim to be more

sinoerely and resolutely hostile to the ambitions of Russia than he was.
~.lt

H@

that he could say to the 'Englieh people, ItUp, and on, in agitation.

~ear Mr. Urquhart, profit by his knowledp, learn from him

facts, he can

teach you INch, and you can learn much. fJ.'Om hill, but giTe not your judgraent
~nto

his hands."

Mazzini thought quite .. bit le.s of Urquhart.

In a lett.r

",ritten durinc Sept_ber, 1855 to the Sheffield Committee on Foreign Affaire
~e

statea tllat he alwqa thought it

un~uat,

unwise, and unatateau.nlike of

~. Urquhart to oppose the rising of nationallti.s in the hope of finding a

p••ful

ally in the Austrian impire aca1nst

Rue.la. 49

Meanwhile during that winter Ieaao 11'Onai4e had kept in touoh With J. A
~.buOk who was the lU.ber 11'1 Pa,rli_ent for Sheffield.

The viewe ot hie

ponetltuenta oertainly affected his actions, and with all the meetinge and

8
4 lR!J., pp. 126-127.

49rtse Press, December 29. 1855.
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oommitte.s and the resulting olamor he dec14ed on Januar,y

26, 1855

to place

a motion before the Hou •• of CotmJlOns lito inquire into the condition of the
~

before Sevaatopel and the oonduot of those department. of the severn-

!Dent no.e dut,. it haa been to minister to the wants of that arroy."

This

vote of oensure on the government passed in an uproar with a majority of

157.

Lord Aberde.n' 8 govemmeTit fell because of this inqui17' and Lord

PalmBrston became Prime Minister.

50

A vast mass of evidence concerning the

oonduct of the war was oollected frotl eye-witnesses, ranging from the Duke

of Newcastle downwards.

The oauses of' the oonfusion, the lack of supplies,

and the general mismanagement of the war were, however, diff'toul t to diso over.

Of this inabili ty to get at the root of things Roebuok Said, I felt

oorruption round about me, but I oould not lay my hand upon it."Sl

tirs.

Urquhart in anal1z1ng the government report of this investigation in
StO£[

.!t1I

JIt. .Jii!.!:B thought that almost every answer was evaai ve, ulbisuoue,

or oontradiotor,y.

She saw that the oommitte. found it impossible to extrao i

a a1ngle 4irect answer aa to what was the 80urce of the Crlmean 8.xpedit1on.
In exuperatlon ahe atated that "we oannot even get the

t

opinions' of poli 1'1"

10al author! t1e., re.pecting the 'opinion' of the mill tary authori t1e., Il"01I

the verr head of the Go'Yernaent itself, or so lIPJoh a. a statement of their

own. »52
the war

But no matter how muoh historians pass over the mi_anag_ent of'
&f'

oondonable because of prevalent condi tiot'l.s in the al"lflY or part1

50A:rm.ytap.

p. 447.

51.1. A. Roebuok, Life ~ tett!r!.st.l2lm..it. Rcebuok (London. 1(91),
P. 260.

52Mrs• Urquhart, Thr Stoa Jl!.!b.! \,'/91'" (Landcl'lt 1(57), pp. 51-52.

polltlc8, tbe oritioi._ of these radioal. W8t be eeen a8 W&l"l'anted, right,
and Just when we ••• tbe war as 1 t was apparently oonducted.

lroneid.'e Munioipal Aesooiation, or the Sh.ffield Inquir,y Committee ..
it called it.elt, waa deeply stirred b7 the revelations of the parliamentar,y
investigating co. .1ttee.

On Zuly

4 another .aas .eeting wae convened

to

oon81der tb. propriety of petitioning Parliament to discus. another motion
of Mr. Roebuck.

'!'his motion

W9.S

intended to censure 8ve17 member of the

cabinet who had advleedthe Crimean expedition which led to the militar.r
Armo!lnoed by placa.rds inscrlb.d "?len ot Sheffield be Men, n

disasters.

several thousands attended to hear

~~

others that eooentrio oharaoter,

G. S. Phillips, wbo was better known as ltJ'anuary S.arle, It roard.ef':lance at

Lord Pelmel"fJton.

Available evidence does not suggest Urquhart's presenoe. 53

During August, Harriet Urquhart, little more than a mcnth betore tbe
birth of her 8On, joined David. at 13imln.gham.

Atter Bil'lllinlJh_ theT attend!-

ed ...tinge at Worc •• ter, B.th, Bristol, Olouo ••ter, and Stroud.

Iaoh •••t-

ing was euooeaef'ul, and in each town theT found a oOllllli tte. f'0-.4 atAd.
woJking.

Stroud., however, proved. to be a greater fJUCoe •• than the others.

The large hall wu d.n.e17 ol"OWded. Wi th men on the main floor and women in

the aaller,r.

All .....d e&ger, enthusiastic and excited..

EVen a

~up

ot

Rueselli tes were there who at the beginning aneered and acofted at TJrquhart's statementa about Lord 30hn, but later slipped
ba.rra.ssment.

The cbei man

?/fEU'

a

wo:rkln~an.

aw~

with apparent em-

The people flocked 1n from the

neit?:llbcl"ing villages, and it was repol""ted tha.t in every hamlet Mr. Urquhart'a

also a stronghold of' "Urquhartism, fI as the 01'1 tic. tel"ll.d hi. id.s.

But

h.re, ~r. Cowan, their r.presentative in Parliament, was conalderabl1 influenoed by the.e Urquharti tea al!l must have been the oase elsewhere. 55

Harriet Urquhart bore David's first son on September 11, 1855 in CastlE
'Brormdeb neu ~i1'lllingb.amt which presently served as his headquarters.
was with the birtb of his son that he really began his family' 11:£'..

It
U."

opportunities opened to him in whioh he became a builder rather than a reformer.

He 'fIas resolved to rear "a. man" after his own idea, and to set an

example for all Englishmen.

As the head of a family his enthuBiasa for goo(

hygiene developed. a.nd he evan made up his mind to teach pjngl1shmen the us.
of' the Turkish bath. 56
An increas. b\ the price of brea.d was b'JlOUght about by the
brougbt untold hardships to the lower 01a8888.

Wal"

whioh

Following other monDter

meetings a meeting was held in Hyde Park en Sun4qt NOT_bel' .4. to~ the pu.rpose "of getting the prioe of brud

~lcutd."

A.nother publiO meeting was

announoed for NOT_bel" 1, without Urquhart's permiasion, although 1t ....

&'ll'lounoed that he would &4,4"111. it. 57

This meeting and another on the fol-

lOWing night were held in the Town Ball.,8

54Hiahcp, p. 133.

55~., p.. 127.

56~., pp. 1)6-137.

57Fae Pn!., November 10, 1855. p. 4.

S8~.,

November 4. 18559 p. 4.

Chargee were . .de against the

English !u..v,- which, ! t was said, had recentl)' captured
vessels leav1nrr the Danube a.nd ":for ought:
instead haCt, not Russian
chf.'lers greeted him.

e~tlntl"Y'

~tdn-8hipfJ

8.8 prlZtUI

w. know" ooming to

been captured?

Turkiflh

'Wb.:r

J'1ngland.

When fJrquha:rt 1'Ose loud

R. told the meeting that the com1 ttees hAd the whole

in an uproar beoalllJ. of the

hi"~

prices

c,t bread. 59 And t. s.

Phillips asserted that England had, paid. 17,000,000 in gold to Russia to
help alit the thTOats ,,1' 3Y1 TJ ish heroes at 'aala.clava and Inkermann.
tellitlg' still was his allegation that Palmermton

amounting to .. 20,000.

~ad

More

received lliJ.8siM gold,

'i'his money was supposedly won around. 1826 from a

Mr. Hart, who had been working under the orders of Prino.ss de Lieven.
Palmerston was also &Oentsld of embezzling ~ 353,652-6....od of the Greek loan

in 1836.

60

VJhethel' Phillips got this intola!Lt1on from UrClub.a:rt 18 not oleal

but the general accusations, not the specU'iC8, !11"'quhart did make againat

Palmerston.

On

Saturd~ ~ovember

17 an article appeared in the LII4iJ which

oritlci.zed Urquhart's and the oommittee·s view that England was controlled.
by

:Rtumia..

Its anthor claimed that t.ho major! ty of in telligent. persona, no1

en.l1' In ghe:ff'leld, but in r;i1'l1li*lgham, WevtCastle, and other northern and Midland towns, ha.d long been aware tMt the st.atements were not true, because

the promised evidence was never f'orthcomiru;r.

S'till, the article read, a

section of men wi tb vulgar appeti t8 for violenoe and mystery,. met 1n the
Town Hall.

59p.re.
60

The great crowds at these meetings came not because they

'al.. November 10, 1855. p. 4.

Army tage , p. 478.

b.lieve~

"1'. Urquhart

the 1deas. but on17 out of' curios1 +,y.

views were regarded aa

'0

the Hhallucinat10na of' a half-wi tted myste17-monl~'er", he wu looked upon as
an "egregioue e6Ot1l1t", and hill followers were viewed as "the actors of' hie
eompany.,lI

.1l.l.t lHm1nglla

I'vapid, ravings" of

Jl!.t

Jpurnl11 it was declared, had discredited the

Fr.! £):,!!§..

r:'h.e only 1mportaJ"loe of the sheffield

agi ta ti on oons1st.d in that there was a sign of pol! tical life amol'lp; the

~orking

01a88.
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Even while conatently atta.cking t.he conduct of Lord i'u1.· .:1'\)ton and
~ingl18b foreign policy as trea.aona.b1e. Urq.uhart found time in

etU. t hi. e ••a;rs on t_11lar wcrds.
A. ~.

..er nine years earlier.

?iatlT of' the. had appea.n4 in

to re-

liI

'.1Its W9~.

En~ish

in 1855.
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B. attacked

phra.eet and ahowed the real

()f' worete whioh had been mad. ,-b1guou8 by their varie-d

UN

mean1n~

itl English apeeob ~

This 8ea.. to have been the t1ret attempt to. examine popular belier.
h.eld by lIOSt of the people.

UoPl'l.inll!

To the.e a second .er1ea wu add.d and then

published in a au.ll .."lu•• anti tlecl
in the .. page. the time-honored

1855

dear~

Be choee hie points of hieto17 quite shrewdly

tc support his political contentions. but it is quite clear that most of hi.
readers probably had never heard. of them before.
Q.lld

Hi. remarks were beth witt'

paradoxioal, and. ncrt ph ilologic:.tl. 6)

In a letter to Lord Panmttre on t,he emploY'tent

.of

Turkish troops by the

Rnglish government, Urquhart referred to Russian mili ttU")" wri tere, especiall,

61lxs1 '£11" ~ovember 24, 1855. p. 2.
62s0me of the ••say. in this collection are entitled I'twar and Peace,"
"Religion and Poll tics, II "Standard; of Value, tt and "Public Opinion."
6)n18bop, p. 123.
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Valentine, who thought that the abi11 ty of tbe Turks as sold.1ers could not
be properly asee••ed by European standard!..

In fact, soldiers prominent 11'1.

European wars had failed 11'1. their operations 11'1. Turkey.

reminded Parmrure, the Turkish
lic offioers.

o~ntinp,ent

'But as usual, he

in the war wa.s rated lowly by F4'lg-

Bowever, it had. to be remembered that this was based lugal;

on one retreat, a retreat

trom an atiTa1'lced untenable position near Balakla;Yl

where they had nO support and little protection.

This was immediately represented a8

before twenty thousand Russian troops.
oowal"dice bY' the lIrtg11sh offioers.

After all, they retreated

Only four thousand remained f'rom the

fourteen thou8and., an" when th ••• last returned Urquhart toresaw thatth.

would spread their hatred for the Inglish and soon the Turkish

~

beli. . . that the Inglish government had. planne4 its d.estruction.

On Decaaber 22

new edition

U~uhart ~ve

Bi1~lnn!8

would
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netice of the third edition of hia book,

believed that although he had tor maw :r_:re ben

atiB,'lDati!&e4 a RullJeophobe, the pre.ent

COU1"M

of events, which had ma4e hi ....

tory of his predictions, could. now also make him juetly proud. 0'1 his nick-

n8mt'-

no

om., it oontinued, who watohed a.ttentively, oould. ignore the

aggreesive policy of Russia in the weet, rtorth t

L~d

atones of her oonquest of Englat'ui t • !astern empire.
~ ~612~io

south ae the stepping
It was 1:1". Urquhart,

stated, who had taken the trouble to oollect the evidenoe of

Russian ora,!t from the diploma.tic history of the last thirf.y
the readers of

1h!

Manch)atet AAv!£t1§2E

y~ars.

Ana

were reminded that David Urquhart

wa. one of the moat reaarltable Men in the oountry, who had given his 11fe,

energ, and talents te> the Ea.stern Question.

Most professional poli iiaian.

ha.d avoided the Ia.tern Question ae nru:ch 8.8 possible.

Urquhar't, on the

other hand, had studied it in the European press, and had ta.lked with almos

eTe17 1mportan't publio person.

He had, heen closely associa.ted with every

phase and oriela of the question.

Re had been in Greece, oonfered Wi th the

ohief's of the Albanians, been secretary at the embassy a.t Constantinople,
held o<msul'tailous with William IV, and had koown the leaders of the eireu
sians in 'the Cauoa.8, who called hi. "Darld Pasha. If

\1hether hia opin10ns

were oo:noeot Or not, he wae the onl¥

in~l1ahman

who h&4 the detail. of the

Eaat.,:m Qu. .tion on hi. finpr tipa.

And . .at

likel,. the future, the autha

thousht, would diacover that Urquhart's dr_d of Rusei. and admiration of
Turkey were more 801idly founded on taet than had been In«land's toleration

ot Ru_ian aggrandie_ent and her cont_pt for th.• character of the Turks.~

In late 1853 or early 1854 a Mr. Tucker began publishing some small
paI'Iphlets known as Tacker', PiU t15UWr

Ek=:!Q"t,. 66

Being di agueted, wi t.h

the unreasoned support many people gave to the ac tiona of Lord Pa.lMraton

and noticing an article by Dr. Karl Man reprinted from fhe1!.a...!2.rk
in

1U GlUG- SCtin.l,

!Hs~1.67 He relt that

Tri'bull~

h.e reprinted it as the pamphlet p&WtatsHl..l:IVl
it appropriately expressed his own views.

Shortly

aft€'lr'llarda he met lIarx, who wpplled !lore material whioh formed the second

65ll!!

?tIl" nec~b.r

22, 1855,

P.

66 Th• bound oollection i . entitled

2.

~.£t! Pol&11ItlF&z:§iII$f, but

the paaphlsta w.re read and known under their own titl •••
67
...
Carr, p. 124.

PlJaea:¥2Dt ..!aI!

pamphlet,

Hes

.ful ~.

At that time Tucker wu a1eo a.o-

qu.a1nted wi th Urquhart, beinR employed to reprint Urquhart's P:£'£!(its,ut,.£t

!Mea.
80

Tucker thought that Urquhart better understood oontemporary eventsf

he continued to reprint se1ectio1'1s of his letters, whiohwere appearing

d&i17 in the pre...

&vIS" J.J3

J.U. !H.1 was the first reprint in putph1et

printed in
1854.

With this material he oontinued his f'17-sheets.

1U !!o:znaVC MutUalr during 1853,

t01"lll

.::.;R~~

of hie letters

and it Wae published in Ap

It incluAea Ul'lluhart'a letter to the Clmas.ian., and a aeleetion of'

reaolu'tclons of publio lDeetings whioh weft specimen. of what wu di.cu ••et 1
. .e tlf'V or sixty meetings throughout England_

poasib17 even helped compose it.
i deu were Egdend' ,

Other publioations bv Tuoker of nrquhart t

llu:! .1!! ,:I'm"' I !Ill, 1b.Il!.u

~&I\UI.' 1h.! SE~4Ir.lD!.lb.!
C1fOl'!~IU

Tuoker also print.4li1

lU

FIX'

Inn!!o):!

1llt

W9mS

to r l'M!.iA, No t .JOiIu!t

Jl! »'lm'J'!~qn,69 !sul,

!4. ~ CD!!'"

ti'rg:uhart f'Qr

N'l?9 1!OG,

Prai.r, and T

By l85;pamphlete became one of the prinCipal

eana that Urquhart

~ployed

to pleae his protests on record, and bring his

knowledge within the reach ot ever.yone. 70
68 E• Tucker, Au0ttr', Pg~atlcil Flx:ShJ,t! (London. 1855), pp. v1i-1x.
eN Pon80nb7 we. the bl"Oth'Jll-in-law of Lord Or.y and the ambassador of the
'Retom and VtlUg governm.nt at Bl"tuisela, Napl . ., Constantinople, and Vienna.

69Ra.rri.t Urquhart i8 the auther of

lh! WOr4!!..st

Lord Palalatop-

10en pagea f1 ve and 81x o~ 'fhl ST4"~ _ JhJ l).l) Urquhart aa1d ihat
n acme of the l.tt.rs h. had written at the end of S.ptaab.r of 1854 h. had
8en eoourat. in hi. prediotion ot event.. After he had wr1 tten the lett.rs
the jeul"'r.ale th ..t w.r. accustOlHd to publiahing th_ would not longer de 80,
d h. was forc.d to publish them in
hlet torm.
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A~ter the war an artiole in

1h!

~n9h"tlr 0Yl1'd119 expressed interest

and praise of the efforts that were made to inspire the middle 01a80es to
take a.n aotive interest in foreif!1l affairs.

The a.uthor regretted that this

enthusiasm wa.s involved with l)avid Urquhart· a '\dId fanCies a.nd personal
resentments,,"

In order that. the movement should have any lasting suooess,

these organizations had to free themselves from the ta.int of their association wi ih Urquhart and pursue lines of independent inquiry with the help
tried, true, and respected representatives of their oause.

Eighteen

fit~

six had not found lIany of the.e organizations pursuing truth and working
out their own oonclusion., but acting blindly in the s8rv10e of foregone
oonolusions imposed upon th_ from a person
had judged

8,8

18&1evolent

01"

insane.

these organizations entertained would

minds of the members.

WhOUl

moat signifioant per80ne

None of the ideas and notions that
(La;'!'?

a.risen independ.~mtl7 in the

Only a "mcunteha..'1k tl like Da.vid. Urquhart oould have

inspired them to conoeive of treason in the cabinet and collusion in the

war, of a

paralYB~d

spiracy to hand

Parliament, of a

~lrope over to

oor~lp~ed

t.he Czars.

71

0

press. and of a vast con-

tARL MARX, DAVID URQUARDT AND

It .e.a il'loongl'tloua at first aight tha.t two lIlen a.s different

0.8

Iarl

Marx and David Urquardt should have had any ground for oOllllllon thought or

action.

Sinoe the points of oontrast were raore numerous than the points of'

a.greement, 1t 18 paradoxical that )fan should have even temporarily a.nd in a
11mt ted. field sought the inspiration and guidance of Urquhart.

tested Pa1merston and the English bourgeoisie.

l

"Seth de-

That a na:ti-ve Englishman

would acouse an English statesman of venality and treason gave Tlarx great
sa.tisfaction. 2

~lan in a.pparent

Both detested Russia.

ha.rt thought tha.t

~18li1iats

8.y"(l'fUHllent

with Urqu-

traditional policy of aggression had to be op-

posed, and she definitely had to be kept out of ~~key.3
hand he differed with Urquhart a.s to the state of Turkey.

But on the other
To UrqUhart

Tur-

key wou1d.have been able to resist Rusaia if she had only been left alone,
but Marx thought that the Ottoman Empire had to be reconstructed and the
lMarx wu not the on17 aerman of importance who acknowledged hie indebtedn••• to Urquhart. Lothair Bucher, a friend ot La8alle and Biemarok,
thought highl7 of Urquhart and profited by Urquhart'. knowledge of DiploGertrude Robinson, Dalid U£9Shl£l (Oxford, 1920), pp. 130-133.

macy.

2Fbard II. Carr,

:.u.s.n,

!W!la

(Loudon, 1934), p. 122.

3]Jm..!m Tribune, June, July, August, 1853; Karl 'Marx. EI!~Jm..9a1u
a4. 'Eleanor 1Ia:rx Aveling' (Londolt, 1897), pp. 31-91.
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ernmente were a.lmost as reactionary as Russia and. certa.inly were too impo-

tent and timid to bring into existence a Greek empire or federal republic of
Slavonic atates. 4
Marx like Urquhart thought that the objects of Ruasia t a foreign po1107
and her lIanner of pUrS1lfl.t1Ce could be determined from the _pl. teatimol"ll'
recorded in the page. of history.

In relation to the Eastern Question Marx

felt that there wae uno traneaotioll, no otfiolal note, whioh doe. not bear
the stamp of quotation from known pages of h1atol"1_"5

H. traced Russian

polioy back to that of Peter the Great and thought that the undeniable suooese of thia announced and hereditary policy proved tbe weakness of the
Western powers and Bussin's inherent barbariem.

6

As the basic motive for

Russian expansion southwa.rd he saw bel" economio ann milita.ry need for access
to the Mediterranean.

Therefore the Ozarta pcli.oy toward Turkey was one of

separating .tone a.fter Mother, the r«notest members of the Ottoman FADpire

from its main body, till a.t last Constantinople the heart, must cease to
beat. n

But in the years just prior to 1853 these Russian

des:1l~s

dangered by the appa.rent 1mprovenlent of Turkish government.

were en-

So the Czar

ttcounti.ns on tbe cowardioe and apprehensions of the lIeatern Powers,

.. .

bulB.•• 'Europe, and pushes hi.s demands as far as possible, in order to ap.
pear magnanimous afterwa.rds, by contenting himeelf with what he immediat.ll'

4.!a liD TJiitm"

August 5, 1853; Man, pp. 71-75.

5.!a'!.kti Tnkl.me,

August 14,1853, Marx, p.

78.

August 12,1853, Mars, p.

80.

tS

!!!: !.2m. Trtbun"
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wanted."?
In the 8pr1n« of lS53 Charl•• Dana, the foreign .dl tor of'

1kI !J,w.!sa

'l'r.ilmn.e, asked Karl Man to wri te DOme article. on the Eutern ~•• t1on.

!Man

oonf •••• ct to En«els that h. k!'lew little about the problem. 8ince it .....

essentially geographical and militar.r.

At this t1me he did not think that

the }!;aatern Qu.stion would ever be the starting point of' a Eluropean war, an
idea, that he aeon 'Would oha"88.

But would not Engels help him produce

Mcr";ber article for..Th.t '?nlU!1l"

En~ls

apparently had aleo been concerned

about the prob1 ... in the 11.ar East, and having r ...d seme of' Urquhart '.
IWri tinge, hinted that Marx do 11kewise.

Iof UrqUhart, J4arx

In studying the voluminous wri tinga

realized that far more could be l1&de of the Eastern

11001'1

Qne.tion than h. had first perceiTed.

8 Mean.hile Engels, who had reoent17

perfected his knowledge of Slavl0 language and m11itary sOience,9 prepared
five article. for Marx, in whioh he reviewed the antecedents of the que ..
tion.

10

Att.pt1ng to be non-oot'llllitta.l Engels oriticized.nua Till..

1Jt1pportin« Ru ••ia. and

!hi. big: .!III

for • .!pporting Turkey. 11

that th.y were quite excellent a.nd fo:rwarded the. to

own.

.Dl! Tt.i:2nn'

for

Marx though t
.s his

12

7,!!e lm TtikllR'.

Augu.t

5, 1853, Man,

p. 74.

8Carr• PP. 120-121.

9En~ls

1953, Karl Marx and Friederioh Engels,
'BJ:ilAin (Me.cow, 1953).

to Weydeseyer, April 12,

~ !ID.AWl Jl'ri,dtEi0l}

Ena".sm

lOearr, P. 121.
11la!ui T£illume, April 19, 1853, Van, p. 24.
12C&1'r,p. 121. Acoording to p. W. 'B1ackstook and !. F. goselitz, the ,
editors of ..!h.t RYI.ito -eniSle i2 Eumll', Marx'. first artiole was published

"

From lune, 1853 onwards Marx began to write the articles on tbe Eastern
Question himself.

Throughout the summer '.I'urke;y and Russia f,u-.emed to be in-

en tably atub11ng toward. war.

':'he influence of Urquhart became increasing-

ly' ."pparent a.s Marx sent article after art.iole to The

cut a.gainst

%, 'filii'

'h'illlU. 13 He lashed

oowardly advoc8Cy of El'lgland beoo.'1ling a defensive

ally of Turkey, but let not a belligerent ae'8.inet Russia.
this was a "tortuous and oowardly qat.sm tt of

.!Ja

He thought 'l.hs-\;

Till!h and nothing l.ss

tha...'1 nan incredible oombination of all ~e contradictions, wbterfuges,

fa.lse pretenses, an:deties and

1~"'"'.

of Lord Aberdeen t 8 polieT. ,.14

And

Aberdeents policy was nothing les8 than one of oonnivance, and it was this

policy that allowed Ru.sia to be

80

bold. IS

More than once Marx mentioned Urquhart's ruute resP*'U'ully.
;Jrguhart

t.

Re praiseA

role in lambasting the reputation of Lo,d Palm.raton and

dieted that Urquhart'. opinion would be

confi~.d

in the future.

said that he perf.,tl;y agreed wi th Ul"qUhart f s poet tion on
or the Eastern Question. 16

E~gle.nd,

~

But he nevtr

nu••ia

In faot. in response to a cholera. soare whioh

in..!AI Ttf.1Wn. on April 7, 1853.

The author, howeyer, was not Marx but
r;"tgel..
ikew1.e, with the arUcle of April 19 ot whioh the editors state
Man ridiouled Urquhart·. position on Ttlrke,-•• e Must oonclude that s1nce
~ngel. was the author that it Was 8.,Sen:tia.l17 he who ridiculed rirquhart 'a
views. Also after the middle of 1853~ Tt1iYnI took the liberty of tAking
seotions ot Marx's artic1.s and printinf, them anonymously as leaders with
or w1 thout his permission (Can, P. 130). :Sluk.took and BOsel! tz were
apparently unaware of this.

1)Cal"1", p. 12).

14.!a lW Tl:1ltUSh

Ju17 8, 18S),

15Na .l.9J:l

July 1, 1853, Marx, pp. 40-47.

m

16

InlmD••

.lui T.111UU.

~rx.

pp. 44-45.

J'anu&17 10, 1854 f Marx, p. 21).

brought about the E:pld.arll1o Di eease Act, lfa.ft atated that "1~ I ahared the
opinions of Mr. Urquhart I ahould

It...,.

that the Ozar had d••patched. the

cholera IlOrbue to England wi th the 'Seer-et mission' to break do'ml the last
l"tIflln&nt

ot what is oalled the Anglo-Saxon spirit. ,.17

And h. oriticized

Urquhart' 8 atatement that the penal lawa of Rngland had to be aer<d,..ed

80

that the Engliah traitors (Abel'tieen, Cla.rend.on, Pa1merston, and RuBsell)
could be prosecuted aft flgood for nothing. ft

For who would jud?:1'8 theae Eng-

111th atatEu.en, but "the stockjobbera tt and tlpeao ....mongering bourgeoisie, It

those "intamoue adorers of the .,14.n oalf," .hOll they repre.ented, and Who
$lao were surrendering Europe to Russia. lS
!hat autumn Mal'S co.pc.ed hi. &rt101•• on the oareer ot Lord. Palraeratoll

whloh were later printea by Tuoter. 19 ThaT appeared, at tlret. both in !ht
Tribune and in 1b.! Pnpl,',1
U"luhart '.. pamphl.,..

Pan"

and were almoat _.lusiT.J.:v d.rtTe4 frotll

In w1"i t1ng to Engel s en Nov_bel' 2. 1853 we tin4

KarK tellin« h1a that after tollowing the Qareel' of PalMeraton through
tWhty' 78&1'8 he had 00.. to the . . .

conclusion a. that

"lIlO110maniac

hart" that Palmersten had been 801d to iufJfJia tor .everal decad••• 20

Urqutater,

h• •act. the 41800.81"1 that the word "honour" 41d not enst in the Rue.ian
17l!a.!.m TrtbldtUb October 7, 1853, Marx, P. 140 •.

l8!e.!.irk TUbu3Uh October 4. 1853, Marx, p. 132.
l'Tuoker was so pleased wi tb his weoe ••tul fly-sheets that. he advertised the publioation of .The Pel! tical ~tQb19it"ptq s.! Lord PIAUt!rtgp b7
Karl Marx. It was to be printed. only if tiYe hundreri aubsoribers;lt the
price of a shilling oould. be signed up in advanoe. It proved impossible to
find this number.

2O~arx ,te Engels, t;ove:f,t,~r 2, 1853, J2.u 'Stiefw,,,._!l ;'tEam Frl.lU..rJ.sll ,)lJlJa~!f" !M1.!BJ, true. A. :Belle1 aa4 E. Bern.tein Stuttgart,
fji9J, It 443.
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vooahu.laJ7. and in. thie aame article he acknowledged hie indebtedness to
"This is a fitt1n~ occasion to gi..,.. bis due to Mr. DavId Urquhart

TJrquhart'

the lndefatigib1e an.tagonist for twenty yeaN of Lord Pa1Ml"Ston, to whom he

proved a real antagoniat--one not to be intImIdated into silenoe, bribed

into connivanoe, charmed into

~litor.hip,

whilet What with oajoleries, what

with seductions, ,Pa1merston contrived to change all other foes into

friends. ,,21

Man never gave another Englishman a finer tribute, and oer-

tain17 to only a fe.", other Europeans. 22

The

tI~at

artic1. that JI.arx '#1'Ote en Palmeraton ",u anti tIed

stem and. Runta, It and the seoortd, I'Palmeraton, What Haa 11. Done. tt

ttPalme~

In the.e

and. other artiel . . on Leri Pal. .raton Marx did not 8C' ae tar aa Urquhart and

chuge that Pal.eraten ..atI in the pq of Ru ••ta.

But probably equally"

4aaging.&8 ht. atat_ent that PalMl'tlton bad. been the w111in~ tocl of

rfioholaa I tor twenv years.

'Phia was the on17 tim. in his ca:reel' ilUrlng

whioh Marx took pa1:'t in a major contl'OTel"tly a:tteeting English 4omestio poliDuring this period only thee. articles of all hi. writings weft read.

tics.

1n oontempcra:r:r 'England. 23 . ~!Jhen lfarx leveled his ~n8 at the '8r1ti8h go...
&rnJDent he was not only aFt!'eeing with Urq,uhartt but must also have spoken
the language that Horace Greeley liked to hear.
scribed

I,('!rd John BU88ell he d.....

&. "that diminutive earthman. lI24 Palmer8ton was that

21Carr, p. 123.

2~.b.4.
23.!!tJ,A., p. 124.

24l'!ew YO£k

Ti£~'bWlfh Sept_ber 2, 1853, Man, p. 103.

"Qu.i:x:ote of

'fT.e institution.· and that Plndar of the -glories' of the oonstitutional
ThE!\ Prince Consort had "d.evoted his tim~ partly to fattenl.ng

system. ,,25

piga, to inventing ridioulous hats for the al'11J,Y', to planlling modal lodginghouses of ~ peculiarly transpa,rent l\tnd unoomfortable kind, 'I a.rHl besides
hav1n~

a beloy.' a.vera.ge intel1i,rJ,'ence, wa.s alAo

obsequious husba.nd.

He,

prolific !'9.ther, and an

,126

Ir1 tbe beginning ot 1851 Th! Shettield.!.tu Press waR established. 21
It apparently was Qot until the ,"'inter of 1854 that Urquha.rt actively jo1ne~

Is&30 11'on81de 28 and the group publishing tbe pa.per to spread his view8. 29
lronsi4e and Urquhart must haTe worked rather well together, tor in their
8im11ar interest. they eager17 crusaded aga1nst Palaerston, Clarendon, and
other prominent CNhlg state amen a.s agents in tbe pq of Ru.aia.

30

The paper

oalllpa.igned for the reform of looal government, regional government along the

l1nea advooated by Toulain Sm1th,3l and the abolit10n of the newspaper tax
or, aa they oalled itt "t.axes on knowledge."

'\'he very people who were aOlDe

of the chief contrlbutcra to the columns of The Free Preaa--Rolyoake,

25,Iiu..!s:.tk Tribun"

OtltcbeT'

19, 1853; !$arx and F.ngelt'l, 'Brit,~n, p. 396.

2b;ie'illI York Tribune, "'ebrunry 11,
1

H~54J

)farx, 'llp9Stion,

,.p.

228-229.

21Free Press, September 6, lo5fi, p. 32.
28

Il"c.nside was a 3het'fielfl induatl.'lalist who was nvlinly responsible
the f'l"ganieation of the Central Democratic Part~' i.n that 01 ty.

29,

".

T.r

[;1.

0,_

Armyta,~e,

duetry, 1852-~7, n Rister;'{

"Sheffield and the Crimea,n
III (Londen, 1955),

TCQAl'

30Ib,! d. t p. 476.
31Toulmin Smith is not listed in the

-D~rn.

~"ar:

475.
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Poll tics t"..nd In-
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Collet, and lronslde--were a1sn the leaders of a
th e Tl~epea1

0f

I>'!

l'~eA

Association for

on 1)'l",nc:)'wle/:!,<:r:e. .3 ?

One of the most import.ant (Hmtr1butors to
Marx. 33

Nati~nal

TAl

J!~ree

Freel was Ka,rl

Some of' his articles on Palmers ton were reprinted in it.

read, them and was apparently qui'te

pl~(18ed.

Urquha.rt

As a tf,ken of' his appreoiation

Urquhart sent to Marx in Janua.ry of' 1854 one of hie speeches.

tilth the

addition of an introduction and a oonolusion Marx sent it as one of his own
artiol •• to The Tribuog.34
In Februar7 of 1854. Marx and Urquhart met for the first time.

Urq.u-

hart made the mistake of trying to impre•• Marx wi th the saDIe methods that
h. us.d on others.

Marx.

The meeting certainly did not have a favorable effeot or

In fact, as a result of this meeting Marx loet his enthu.iasm for

Urquhart.

ston. 35

Marx told h118 that the;r agreed only on the aub.1ect of Pall8eI'Continuing in this soeptio1_ he later oo. .ented in

Tb,§

'rr1bun, on.

June 24, 1854 that slnoe "Urquhart 1s striotly opposed to the only party

prepared to overthrow the rotten Parliamontar,y basis on which the Coalition
his speeches are as much to the ~lr36
pose &8 if' they were addressed to the cloud.s. I I . ' 'Ma.rx in writing to LaBsalE
Government of the oligarchy rests,

~ll

32Armytage, p. 479':
33At tbis tilDe rJarx was thirty-six years old, and living in a.ppalling
poverty on Dean Street, Scho.

34Carr, p. 1 24.

l5 Ibid .,

pp. 125-126.

36Marx ,ggell1on, p. 373.
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~l'OUl1d

February, 1854 desorj. b~~ rrrquhart as a kind C':lf

It

romantio rea.ction-

~ • 37
a_V"

The GIgh, launched a vigorous attack against Urquhart in April of 1854,
sootting at the short fidelity of his adherents.

This attack was promptly

rebutted in Th, Mo£plMAdvlrt~s!r bY' an Urquhart! te who used. Ill'. lIlarx

ezaaple of a faithful and energetio supporter.

&B

an

But Karl Marx found it dit-

fioul t to public17 di.a.-ow Urquhart, because Urquhart had another tollower
named li"ranoist.fan who, if' there were 8Uen a di8Claimer, would claim to be

the one mentioned in Th, Morning Adytrli8lr.

Marx kept quiet, but mainlY'

because he found that it would be fj nanciall1' !nool1venient to Bever hi. con-

neotiona wi th Urquhart.
limited.

Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the war and Urquhartta ambae-

foreign affaire
inclined

"But tTrquhal't' s finanoial help did prove to be quite

1;(1,

e~m.m1tteee

with the help of pl'(!'m:inent Chart! ats. Marx was

oontinue hi!ll suppert of t1rquhart t s work.

The!.w Pres.

brou~t

38

muoh attention to Urquhart's attacks against

secret diplomacy and Marx's rs:ther

lon~

Md. detailed articles.

In fact,

Ironside, the London e41 tor dllring 1854, thcmgbt that Marx was bury-ing the

paper beneath mas.es of inf'cl'ID8.tion.

Since he was cotlllllotted to the succ •••

of' the newspaper, he complained to William Cyp1est the Sheffield editor and

aecretar,r ot the Sheffield foreign affairs committee.

cally oonv81'8d Ironside'. thoughts to Marx.

Cyple. undiplomati-

At thia Marx became greatly
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irritated with both Ironside's observations and Cyples' taotlessn.ss, and
replied to Oyple., s",lng, 111 positively decline to make myself guilty of
manslaughter by administering another 'do •• ' to .Mr. Isaao Ironside and
t

entombing' hill in the sheets of his own paper. ,.

As the prosp.ot of losing

the powsrful pen of Karl Marx alumed Urquhart, he sent
paoify Marx b7 pro.1s1ng more regular ,.,.ents for his

o.

D. Collet to

~iole.

that Th,!J:.u !'):tIS would seon become a London publioation.

and stating

Marx retracted

his refuaal, but soothed his wounded pride by telling Engels that nMon.,. is
the only interesting point for me in Dr3 intercourse with these oaliban•• ,,39

Owing to the repeal of the newspaper stftmp duties on June 15, 1855,

1Il.t

§l:Ultfi!ld.!I.!! PreIs was first issued. as a national publioa.tion on 0c-

tober

13. 1855.

From t.his time until 1866 the looal part of the title was

dropped and it wa.s called Th,

.!ut

Pt!!,!.40

This did not prevent it :from

giving a oertain amount of local new., espectally the weekly reportin& of
Tueadq lIeetings of the Sheffield for.1gn &tfairs cOl1lDlttee.

was now m&inly intended to spread Mr. Urquhart' 8 idea.s.
wife wrote lUol1Y of the articles.

41

The paper

Urquhart and hi.

It o erta1n13 was not diffioult to gather

material for the initial iaaue8, tor there were store. of acoumulated art1-

01 ••

r.a~ for

printing.

Fro. 1855 to 1871 both Urquhart and hi. wife wrot4

39Ibid., A~tage, p. 476.

40

.

There ia a slight disorepancy between Bishop and Anaytage. Bishop
states that this national publioation was founded in September of 1855. In
1866 the title was changed to 1h! DiR1P!ltic RlIiew.

41 Armytage, p. 475.

lO~

the greater part of the leaders and summarie. of events.

42

Other familiar

figures, such was Vi. Cyple., C. D. Collet, G. J. Holyoake, and Ka.rl alan,
also wrote for 1 t. columns.:iany times the articles that Engels wrote tor

!iarx were simply reprinted from

Thg!IE~ .~ribuQg.

Marx's artioles on

the tall of lara were reprinted in .'lmmary form and oreated a sena.tion.

A.

special vote of thanks was A'iven to r.!arx by the Sheffield foreign affairs

oommi ttee for nthe great publio service" he had rendered "by suoh a remarkable expoee. ,,43

Bishop feels that thepa.per wa.s caviar for the ~neral

public, and that While influencing a obosen few who read. i t

ir1telli~ently

and wi t.bout prejudice, tt probably was too serious to ha.ve bad an extensive
ciroulation.

But it is an

intereetin,~

fact that the pape!' bad. ma.ny renders

a.broad. 44
On December 22, 1855lli, !....ret;J Pr!?!1! annonnoed tha. t. it was going to d ....

vote a considerable portion of 1 ts

pa~a

to subjects of permanent interest.

These articles, it stated would later he reprinted in serials DO a8 to torm
in time a diplomatio librar,y tor publio instruotion.
ously not intended as merely a new ••heet.

1be paper was obvi-

On the contrary, it was to pro-

vide explanations of the causes of' events and an exposition of the princi-

pIes that guided the actions of' the partieipants.

Some of the ser1als or

supplements that wsre ready for publication and others that were in preparation were tiThe Nation Cheated Cut of Its I"ood, n "The Prinoipal! tie. of th
At

42~ria C. 'Bishop, M,!o:lr s! ura, ~r;£9\lhl:rt (Lendon. 1897). p. 73.
43 Ar=ytage , p. 476.
441Hshop, pp. 13 P,..139.
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'Danube. 't 't'l'he fitor.,r of' the Life cf Lord Pal••raton, n "Mr. Urquhart' II Vis! t

to lutayah, tt "Prince Albert and the

~,f.onarch3'," nTh.e

Curren.cy, tI "(",u.stavus III

on the Danger of' Europe, U "Secret Russian Despatohes," "The Ottoman Empire

Disorganized by illngland on the P.vldence of ner Diplomatists," NThe Proprletorship of Oldenburg, tt and ttThe Contradictions Clf the Earl of Clarendon in
Referenoe to the People's fl'ood.,,45
The publioation of T("he "1'§e Presl was co_encE'lu in London on August 16,

135(.

This move was made to

racilit~te

circulation and diatribution, and

also to lower the pril'J@ so th'J,t the WClrkers for who\'!! i t was d.esiP,"ned could.

better affom 1 t. 4(;

!t seems that wi 1::h 1;he l!love to tondon IronSide ha.d (')on-

sldera.bly less, if any, influence over the paper.
essentially under the direotion of' fJrquhart.

It was by this fl,ne

!h!fI'X:6! Press now olaimed to

It intended to judge public aots

favor no politicians, c.lass, or interest.

acoording to the law o.f the land and of nature, a.nd wi th a perfect knowledgE

of the oiroumstanoes.

It was to address a nation that had forgotten i t .

I t did not propose to teach anything new, but only what had been tor-

laws.

gotten by the nation.

Publio opinion was to be

1~ored,

to appeal to private judgment, so as ,to restore the
whioh would be 1'equ1 red to remeue
her decaying institutions.
of' the

~:roWI1'. prero~a.t1vell

~ngland

ri~t

the paper intended
use of reason,

from immediate crises and to save

It was +'herefore dedioated to the restoration
in appnintinp: the 1mporta"t officers of atate;

the rsstoration to the Privy Ccml'lcil of tbe f'unctione {If government; the

4'5~ Pril" Deee.'ftner 22, 1855,p. 1.
46Ibid.t Au~st 16, lA55, p. 4.
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restoration of solemnity to international intercourse by the abolition of
permanent embassies; the restoration of impeachment; and the restoration ot

the power ot' the purae to the people in their separat(l!l c{'Iunties and bol"C'lugha. 47

It was also with the first J.ond,on i89Ue th$J.t the senea of art1-

eles oomprieing tarl Marx' 'S "'fiavelations nt the 'Of !)It:''matic HiBt.ory of the

On September 27, 1856, t.her€> be'r&"l in thE'! eupplem<!'l!nt.s of The
:(rs. UrtJuhart' s analysi l'J of the

inV'est:4~e,t:ion oondr;ctsd by

Ftee Pr~LE)lJi1

Roehuck t 9 commi,t-

1855 arld of passages :from thl!t corres.pendents e,!' .!.ll! T:1A!!S and Tn;
r;lorn~ns a,rlJ.d. It was anti tIed The Stgll" .sf.! .1b..f;War by Carita-e. 48 Later
tee 11'1

in lS'}7 it was published in pamphlet form.
ohief facts and mysteries ot the

Cl"1m~~

8asentially, it su.ms up the

expedition.

Mrs. Jrqubart claimed

that the mass of detail. shrouding the testimony gathered by the Roebuck
OODi ttee, clouded

the publIc t s underst,anding.

the oomm! ttee t s findings a.s news and

d18O\18884

'.fost people probablY' read.
them as gossip.

Few shortly

a:ttel"\ll1'ards recollected what had happened, or were able tn perceive the ends

which were intended. 49
Mrs. Urquhart protested tc C. D. Collet, the edi tel" of

.:!l:m

1i'l'ee PnS!.

when he teok upon himself thE' liberty of making soma cha.nlS'ee in her first

inete.llment of "The St<:-Y'Y of the War. ft

!Jhe waSIl rl,fra,1d the.t his unci ted

47 Ib1d •
48'!l;>
p rem!b
~

sept;em1:H!n' 27.

n t'.
18):),

t:I~)p1?lement.

49Ral"rlet Urquhart, The 3t91'Y £:1. ~ ~ (1.on<1('n, 1857), p. 1.

105
additions would destroy the reader's confidenoe in her.

In dealing with

such a subject, ahe thou8ht it was of supreme importarlce that the reader
have complete confidence 11'1 the calmness, deliberation, and accuracy of the
author.

She even threatened to stop future installments if he would not

print her protest, and stop interrJ()laUl"lg a.nd

arran~ng

her material into

chapters. 5O
C1'le month later David. Urquhart wrote e. lett.!!}!' tc the editor expressing

En~~lisb

people could. be made coneciotts of wba t ht'Lppened in the Crimfllml

so that they could avoid its conssquences.

~~art

51

After the spring of 1857 the signature of Karl r4arx never again ap-

peared on the pa.gea of

.:!l1!!l:!.!

I'D'S.

':'hough he kept up intemi ttent r ...

lations with Urquhart, the end of the war I:Lnd the resultant hollow ring ot"
their attacks on Palm.raton for all practical purposes put an end to their

aaaooiation. 52

Although twenty T8ars later when any relationbetween. them

had ouoed Marx still oould be tound denouncing the supineness of EngliSh
policy toward Russia in the tradition he had learned from Urquhart. 53

5Ofl't!e Prl's, October 11, 1856, P. (,8. Gertrude Robinson in !lvid
7rsUbst on page 319 states that Collet 'Dobson Collet was the edt tor of
..2lu! '!VI'" Pre$§ from 1856 to 1866.

51 pree PIeilt Nov~mber St lA56, P. 100.
p. 127.

53 rb1r1 ., p. 123.

As the war ga.thered momentum and.

1l.\sl

Time!,!! olamored for the siege of!

SeballJtopol, Urquha.rt thought that neither a campai.", in -the Crimea. nor the
destruction of the Russian fleet would have a.ny real effect np<m the result
of

the war.

~'he ocurlJe of t.he Wfl.l' had

actually spared the Russians lnthe

Danube and the ?haeie from any hostile action by the allies.

Urquhart

thought that by bringing the forces of the allie8 to bear on the

Cr1me~

Russia would be relieved of their employment against her in the Prinoipalities.

A. 800n as the English troops entered and secured possession

exposed province, the.r would be plaoed on the defensive, because
hold the g.round against Russia.

ot

th~

that

must

The fifty thousand men of the al11.d arm1.

would then be absolutely iaolated; cut of'f' by the marshes of the Asof and
the steppes of the Black Sea from the Ciroaseians to their left, the
sacks in the rear, and the Poles and

HlJn~ria.ns

to their right.

diffioulties wonld just begin once she had captured the Crimea.

CO~

England's
1

Urquhart had never claimed the ira! ts of the practical gog-lien pcli tieian in being able t,o secure votes in Parliament.
know t.he countries in whioh the

~n,,:1iah

were fi<r:htinrr mucb

0,( the men in the ?,Cvernment Yl11('1 had never v9!ltured

lDavld Urquhart, Spid.er _

He d.1d, howevl:r,

J.h.!!li£
106

~rrom

"be~ter

Rn[,da.x'1d f

cla1~ ~

than most
l"lI

(London. 1855), pp. 22-23.

shores.
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~ot only' had Urquhart travelled through these areas, but he felt that he

aloo had mastered the same process
~f

throu~

knowled~.

Russia acquired their

whioh the servants of theF.mperor

ffin~lish mini~+'ers mi~t

perceive +'heir

errors of judgment after the event had occurred, but Urquhart felt that enly
~

person 1n his poa! ticn could tell 1n advance what t.he servants of Rusda.

~ntended

to do.

And in

t~is context

he olaimed that. it was the servants of

~uss1a

who had planned the invasion of the Crimea, over which Rus.ia was
~u!te 3u.bl1ant. 2
Urquhart had complained since th.e beginning of the war that the oonditions laid down by the al11e. for its oonduct were utterly absurd,
the oond.1 tion that prohibited any oonquest.
~e

a Crimean expedition at all?

.8pecial~

Why then, he asked, should the%'4

That it was for the defense of Constanti-

Inople or '1'urkey was absurd, because the Turks had already defeated the RueIsians in the Prinoipal! ties, which left the 'Russians unable to attack ConIStantinople by land.

"~'hy

should not tho expedi tion to the Crimea. be justi-

~ied with the object of diminishing,' Ruesia' B aggress1vepower, h0r Blaok Sea

~leett which she might use a~inst Turkey at l'ome future date?

prquhart was ooncerned such

I!l

nut the

n8. tioo

and "{yurope had

wadna,lly been brought to believe tha.'t Constantinople we,s in
~eba.stopol in that ita fortress protected the fleet.
~88ued a statesent explaining 1 ts

dan~er

from

The government even

reaeone for the expedition, and therein

to the nation only the naval implications of tho operations.

2Ibid., PP. 6, 1.

a8

view of the Russian fleet was quite erroneous,

ibecause the fleet he knew to be decrep1 tor

ponv~ed

Asf'ar

Tht.
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f1rst ministerial announcement of the expedition
PreBid.ent of the Coun.eil. a.t a Staffordt!lhire

l'Jr\S

yeom~nry

made by I.eI'd. Oranville,
clinner v(here he ex-

pressed. himself in these terms:
ffhe Government does not oonceal from th.uJlelvse the great respen810111 ty of their urging on th';; .:>"'mmanders of both servioes tbe
a.ttack on Seba.stopol. They a.re Oi)t ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguiahed officars of every country of Burope,
that, it not i.practicable, the atteapt ia of a very diffioult
nature. But they feel that the integrity and independence of
Turkey 18 a tllere joke so long u that fortress 18 deemed imprer
nable s1 tuated as :1 t itt in the ver.y centre of the Black Sea (!
as the only point frOll whioh vesaels oan come in and go out 1Vi th
ea£' etl ( :) they felt. it was the very key of the position. 3
nut if it waD the intention of the 13r1 tieh Government 1:,0 diminish the e.g-

greBs!ve mean. of RUSSia, Urquhart thought, it never 'Would have eonRidered
the venels lying in

~ebastopol,

because they were l'1ot a source of danger.

If' the govElrnmel1.t did not intend. to destroy th., aggressive mOMS of Russia,
then the instruoticns to Lc:.rd,

concluded, only pretexts to

Ra,~la.n

~t

arJi:1 the articles of The Tlme! weT"', he

the Zn&.liBh

a~'

into the Crimea. 4

In an

honest war the invasion would have been sheer folly, and only senei, 10 in
collusive wa.r, because it was not a peed ticn from which
ate against the interlor of miseia..

':;!1i~,:land

1:1

could opel"-

He :pointed out that while invading the

Crimea England neglected attacks on more vulnera.ble points as Odessa where

~., pp. 65-61. The supplement of

August 25, 1855 expreesed 80me ot

the same views that were later expressed in the StolZ..2! tpt "~tar. Mr. Urquhart allude. to the :report ot the Sebastopol Committee, and knMV that infor-

mation ourrent in the newspapers. :Recause of this it is assumed that the
opinions expressed. by his wite in the Stsu were already in existence in
1855. Beoause he undoubtedly- helped her prepare this pamphlet, bel" views
will be oonsid.ered &s reflections of his.
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line oould hal'a fatall)" injured Ih.JF.lSi.A.. 5

Since the exped1 tion was undertaken

f1ei ther for the purpose of breaking np JluJf51a I II power a. t home nor of reduoing her to a political nullity in international altairs, but rather was
:'lr'Uiertaken wi th a Vi_ to negotiation., Urquhart thought i t wa.s launched

V:1.der pretense.
but

0('1

Not only did these military &.Otions manifest oollusion,

dld the reason8 &sl!IU.J'Iled tor the operation, namely, that the ':tturks

flere unable to cope with the Russians at hODle, and that the Cri.aa was or
Gonta-inea the oenter of' Rus8ian power.

("al.e preai8e..

Urquhart considered theN to be

And 80 he conoluded that sinoe the expedi tiOll was launch.d

[on fal •• praisell, it therefore wu incapable of being sucoessful.
~nvas1on
~nd

6

The

tested the einoerit)" of the government's prosecution of the war,

the government was theref'ore found, in his judgment, to be g'dlty of

p<'Jl1usion.
In the pamphlet,

,sRaA!t.1n.4 .lhll:l¥, he predicted that the

war would be

proved a. collusive O.ne, if what wael gained in the Crime& was aftsrNarde
:t'sndered, and no 1nd8mn1 ty wan required of Russia.

7

BUr-

This Bu.rrender iron1-

pa.lly took plaoe. because shortly after the war the torts d.estroyed by the
iaJ,lles were repaired and soon oocupied by the Russ1a."lAI.
~ndemni ty was required from Russia.'?'i thout

:ti'urthermo re, no

d.oubt thin proved to UrqUhart

tha.t the English govornlHnt was insin.09re in its prosecution of the CriMean
;~a.r.

The invasion of the Crimea was net dangerou.s to Quss1a" a.n.d oertainly

5Urqubart, Spider, pP.
t:.

')l~b:t.d., p. 3.

1~., pp.

4, 5.

4, 5.
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was detrimental to Turkey.

8

If, ... popular opinion believed, the Crimea meMaced the Ottoman .Empire

th.. t menace he thought ended when the allied fleets entered into the Euxine.

This eliminated anT pos.ible danger to Turk87, and also enabled the allies
to attack the Russian amies trom the rear.
port, becauae it ....

tl'OtII

Ode._ was the mont important

thie port and not fJ'Oll Sebastopol tha.t the Ru ••lan

toroelll in all fomer warlll had been delilpatohed.

England should thfJretore

have attacked Ode.8" to capture the RUfHJ1an armiee, Urquhart believed, and
then impo.ed penaltiee on Rus.ia.

Once Odessa was taleen, the trade of 1IlUoh

of Russia would have been stra:ngled, an.d through the oonsequnt preS8tl'1'e
which would have been imposed upon Russian landlords, merehants, a.nd finally

the Csar the war 'WOuld have ended quiokly and inexpensively. 9
'.Phe fact of the matter was that i\l8Sian commerce was not bein'5 d ....

stroyed by the war, and walil aotutt.lly pro teo ted.
Maroh, 1854.

by

the Order-1n-Council of'

The Russian ports of the 'Alack nea and the Sea of' Aeef as late

as August of 1855 were net blookaded, while the Bosphorus and the Danube
were 0108ed by this legal lIeane.

In this wq, Urquhart reaIK'H'1ed, the EnS""

lish govermasnt was furnishing Rusai& with the pttOunia17 raeana to oar17 on

the war.

The blockade of the Danube was therefore intended to impoverish

the Principali tie. and to re.trict E.ngland· s supply of grain trom them while
the porta in the Black Sea and the Sea of

Aeot were left free to furnish

reinforcements, a.unitlon, and

to the Rus.ian troops 1n the

8.!lt14.
9Ibld., p. ).

pro~.1ons

III

Priraea. 10

1
Ablocltad.e of the Black SM, however, had a.otuall7 beEm ordered,

but poli tical oirowaatano.e were g1 ven by the Duke of Newoaetle as the princi]jHlLl reason.. wh;r i t was not being enforeed.

TA. government

and !'lot the

adDliral. was oh1eflT r ••ponsible for the order not being fulfilled.

The

Duke ot li8'llfCastle te.tified that ttd1ff'icu1 tie. arose at the seat of the war

of a politioal oharacter, not connected With &n7 disobedience on the part of
the admiral of our fleet. ,,12

Al though Admiral Dundas was ordered to block.-

ad. the Russian porta, they were st!ll open to merchantmen.
groups of the Russ1an fl.et went in a.,>;d out of Sebastopol.
waft

"surprised that more did not comee

E~n

small

Admiral Dundas

it they had been an enterprising

en_v they would have come out. ,,13
Shortly after the allies

ell.!De

pea.rance of a blockade, was raised.

t.o Varna, a blockade, or rather the a1>But beyond

han ng a war-stea.mer pass

Sebastopol once a week or so, the English lett the Russians to

lO}l~t.!e !Z.a!" Auguat 25. 1855, Supplement,

th"8elves.1~

p. 2.

llIn oommenting on the testimony of Sir J.m.s Graham and Aa.iral Dun~
betore the Sebastopol Comml tt . . IIarriet UrqUhart thought it possible that
A_ira]. 'Dundas waa never reall1' ordered to blockade, and in the coDll'lli ttee
hear:i:ng8 was made the "scap.... goat" of the miniutr;y. 31;2r:.ffl.l£! WIl' PP.

35-:17 •
12Barriet Urquhart, p. 31.

Ij~., p. 32.
14Ibid. The !groin, Hlrgld's correspondsnt reported that three tranaports .ent from Sebastopol to Niohola!.rf tor timber arrived safely. The
Vladamir made .even voyages in the Black Sea atter the declaration of war,
and oaptured _all 'l'urk1eh veasels on the ooast of Asia Minor. He continuec,
"11"\ the beginning of July four sa.il of the line, with two or three fri.l'1!s:tea
~."ld steamers, quitted the ha.rDor, and cruised tor two or three days oft
Sebastopol, out of sight clf land." One of these floated undisturbed in the
8ight of an allied .hip.
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At Odessa no aigr18 of a blockade were visible.
thera, and IBan7

IDOl'.

Some ve •••la were loading

Were ezpected to arrive .inoe the 13rl tish em'bass,. at

Ooneta-"'Itinople had ywred the masters of

tra41n~.h1p.

that the,. might

visit any of the Ru.aian port. on the alack Sea or the Sea of Azot without
being moleated. 15
For the explanation of suoh strange actions Jrquhart looked to the socnomio motive. that Russia had for sta.rting the war.
reason t.hat

Russia invaded the Principalities and
1('

to stop the decline of her own trade."

the Russian grain trade was

bein~

As he saw it. the main
brou~ht

about. tbe war waa

Before the war he bad shown that

l'ep&ed by the ':'u:t'kish.

Tlut, he alec

realised that there was an increase in the ~u8eian t?ade after 1851.

The

eXj.)Ort of wheat from Odessa and the Black Sea in 1851 was 800.000 quartersl
in 1852, the trouble then beginning, 1,400,000 quarters, in 1853, the Ru ...
aian8 having

01'088

the Pruth, 3,160,507 quartera.

But the"e figure., atter

all, do not give a oomplete idea of the total inore. .e that occurred.

To

that nUllber lIIUst be addea 1,500,000 quart en of grain in the Prinoipalities
l'Whioh were l"eaq for shipment to England.

Even though this was only a po:r-

tion of the grain export, the Ruseian arrde. coneumeel that amount turing
their ocoupation.

~!\l1ile

this grain was preventea from reacb.i.ng England.

Ruuia had the opportunity of .elling England 2,300,000 quarters more than

lIhe had done in 1851.

The total amount oon8W1led by lae1" amies in the

'15.!J:u PnU!e, August 25. 1855. ~tlpplement, p. 2.
16
lW., p. 3. Inf'omation is in a Quoie from the Al!&E!!iIHi ;Zei tun"
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provinc •• amounted to approximately 2,500,000 which. made the 1n"f'&8ion quite

On the other hand the cost of this invas10n to Englan~

a profitable venture.

due to the rise 1n the price of bread waa about .. 25,000,000 whioh netted

Russia another'" 6,000,000.

The amount of lin•• ed. 011 exported from Ru.sia

actually" increased dur1n« the war'

during the financial year ending May

0·£ 18'.)3 it was 6,500 q,uartersJ during the year ending fay of 1854 1t was

10,906 qua.rtera, and durinR the year ending May of 1955 it wa$ 41,440 qual"tero. 17

Aotually, the total imports from Russia dUring the war far exceeded

the exports to her.

Il'be main signif1ca"1ce of the blookade then was in its

failure to restriot the trade of Ruesia.

In September of 1854 Urq,uhart saw Englishmen ooni"rcnted by 1;hr~e major
qu.stions'
Ru••ia?

was it necessary to send an expedl t10n to the Orimea to humble

would the taking of the Crimea humble Russia? and what was Russia's

obSect in lIalting England attack her in the Crimea?

It was unneoees&rJ't he

thought, to .end an e%pedl Uo.n to the Crimea to humble :au.llia, because she
had. alree.dT b.en humbled b7 Turke:r in the Principalities.
alon

In

tact, an inv...

waa not even worth disou.eion, becauB. England had not threatened

Ru••1a before ahe had. 11'2"adecl the Principalities, nor had she restated

Ruaa1a when aunia ocoupied tho.e province..

eve1!7 act that savored of war.
o~l'a.tion

To humhle Russia was indeed a very ailtple

for an English .intetar. beoauae Ruasia had b.en lIade b,. England

in the past two centuries.

l11'b!d •• PP. ), 4.
&~ith

In tact, England had avoided

If'

~~land

once withd:pp her Sllstruning hand

Urquhart 01 ted t.he oirculars of '\fessl's. Charles and
as his GOurces for this information.
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Russia would iaed1atel.;y orumble.

Urquhart thought that Daall7 .eana were at

the aispo . .l of an Inglish minister.

ikey

from the beginning.

!meree.

Among others he could have baoked

ae could have let war i tael£' 4••t1"07 Russian

Tur-

OOlD-

These IDeatmree, Urquhart maintained, had to be adopted by a govern-

iment really at war wi th Rue.!a.

And .inc.

th~

there was no intention of defeating Ru.ssia.

.ere not, he conoluded,

It the English govemaent was

not using its power to orush RuSSia, then it was

u8in~

it to protect Russia,

&nil an ezped1 tion to the Crimea could only have been lmderte.ken wi th the

view of humbling Turkey.

18

The state of militar,y preparednes9 at Sebastopol up to 1852 was nothing
for tbe allies to fea.r.
neglected.

The fortifioations were till that time generally

In 1852 in contemplation of the war the fortif."icatiofls were reo-

paired and extended.

t~uhart

realised that this would take many years to

oomplete, and it not oompleted the fortifications would be

utter~v

useless.

To prepare Sebastopol to withstand a siege would have required a line ot'

oomplicated fortifioations running along the heights surrou.nding the ba7
with detached forts tor the culminating point. beyond.

t!hi. would ha.... in-

volved great expend! tures, and an army of sorae twe hundred. tbmUlAnd .en fo"1f
an adequate defftse.

The truth

or

the matter was that the work wae not oom-

pleted, and that few defenders were there. 19
Laurenee Oliphant, Who reported in 1853 on the oondition of Sebastopol,
oorroborated Urquhart's View of the poor oondition of that fortress.
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Oliphant admitted that Sebastopol appeared formidable when Viewed from the
sea, and any fleet would have been commanded 'by its twelve hundred piece.
of artillery.

But these were not, however, formidahle obstacles to. or pro-

teotion for Seba.stopol, because upon ftrinp; the batteries 'the l'Ctten and
poorly constructed placements orumbled.

Oliphant was informed that the

rooms in whioh the guns were fired 'Were so na:rrcw and ill-vent.ilated that

the artillerymen would have inevitably l}een stifled had they a:ttempted. to
fire their pieces.

The BUB.iane were i"u:rthe:r7Jl()re orippled by the apparent1;y

wholesale oorruption that so unde:rmi.ned the navy.

The mortali ".;;:, rate of thE

Rus.sian army in the Cauoasus Oliph&nt, estimllted at twent,y thousand annually.

All of this led him to conolude that the Russian army was really moet 1neft1ci~lt

and aoarcely worthy ot that exaggerated estimate which the British

publio had tOl'llled of its capabtll Ues. 20

A Poliah offioer. a Captain IiodaseVitoh, who had deserted to the British, a1ao sheds 80me interesting light on the oonil tiona inside the fort-

reaa.

He statsd that Fort Severnaya was usele.s, and that Major-General

Pavlo'V1.lk;r, who had oharge of the fortifications of aebutopolt propo ••d to

d••tro~ Severn.,...

~he

Citadel of this north tcrt was in a state of negleo

and not a single gun was mounted.
no more than
The
foot

on~v

ei~t

In the whole of the north fort there weI'.

guns, and these W9re in a very dilapidated oondition.

remarkable thing about the for"!; was that it had a. fmu:-thousand-

subterraneanp&8sa~e

from the 01 tadol -t;o the Soukhaya 13a11:a.

He
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further stated that up to AUAUst 27 (probably 1854) some addt t10ns were made
to the fortifieationa of the town I

the full number of'

on the lower first tier of Port St.

~Uoholas,

glltlA

boo

been pla.oed

at every seoond., third, or

fourth embrasure on the aecond tier depending em 1;he dde, a..'"'1d on the third

third.

~ln

was fired for practice the whole fort sheek, stoner. fell, and em-

brasures were ruined.

Coneiderin,r;- that the walle were only facedwith stone,

21
and the space between them was filled with rubbish, th.1s wa.s qui ie ".la:tural.
Even if the tovln Was fortii! ed, what reaaon Was there, Urquha.rt thought
to a.ttack Sebastopol when it was the fleet, the contents of the harbor, that

Engla.'1d was oateneibly after.

No one, apparently, had observed that the

Russian. fleet waa not protected by Sebastopol.
wu no rea.aon to take the 01 ty.

To destroy th.e vessels there

All that was needed, he thO'l.gnt, to acC01I-

plish this mission was six mortars, or six Paixhana guna for horizontal
ahella and red-hot shot.

Onoe a position on one of the western hilla wall

8lOured, the ships oould be m1nk right in the harbor.
harbor the allied fleet could oatch them.
not eecape destruot1on.

!f they left the

The Russian fleet simply could

22

Contrary to prevalent opinion tho ihu!lsian fleet bad done

VS~

1n the Crimean We.r up to the time of the invae10n (\1' the Crimea.

H. ttle

lluBsia

wished Englishmen to believe that hal' fleet was important, and. because she
took pains to influence Enr;l1sh minds to +'hink so, lJrqubl1:rt felt. the opposit,

21Harrlet Urquhart, P.

79.

~tTrqtthart, SRaderl p. 22.
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~ae

true.

"!'be S1nep. affair had not been so

lishmen were disposed to belteve.
wlteu

~at

an erplott as many Eng'-

Hut Sine:pe hllla achieved it. intended re-

the entrance of the English squa.drons tntc the B1aok Sea. and Russia's

lentranoe into. the war. Jack in 1833 the Blaok Sea sQ.ll&dron fiJU,ddenly appeared
~:t

Constantinople with an &1"Ift7, bttt that, Urquhart tel t, waa only through

~olluaion

with an English minister.

o<meid.ered the death blow ot Turke,..

U~jiar

Skelles.i soon tollowe' and was

But out of the ashe. of that funeral

P7re, ant notwi thatanding the 4&111' menace of the Rua.1an fleet, Turk:q re.tored her a.2'1t7 and. her fleet.

She had

lie HOo•• red

her power that abe ",...

iOn twoooouiona able woc •• stul17 1k> d.ety a joint .enace (\f Auatria and
IPzoueaia, and at a. later period to compel Ru.aia to withdraw her torc •• fro.
the eaae Danubian Provinc •• whlch the3" ocolrp1ed in 1854.

30 it was not

true tha.t the Blaok Sea fleet menaced T1lrkeYt beoause for twenty years that
fleet had never been employed.

On the other hand it did

bri~g

about the

restoration of Turk!.h power by its ve1.7 pre ••?loet becau.e 1t di.turbed the
lethargy of the Turkish )mP1re. 23
llut what
~lrenc.

of the plqaical oondition of that supposed

bu~bear

of Turkey?

Oliphant deeoribed moat of the thirteen ship. of the line he aaw

anchored in the harbor u 1n poor conti 1 tion, beeause after ten ;,years their
t1Jaber.s of' iJaproper4' .easoned fir or pinewood were perfectly rotten.

also abound." in the •• wddy waters a worm that oonstantly'
lWood. oost ihe Rusaian government thou.sal'lda of

r;~':,:es,

d.ee~ed

!'here

the

and was one of tbe

moat serious ob8taol•• to the fol"lltation of an efficient na...,. em the Black
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tJea. 24

aesides, the RUssian na'Vy was plaguad by a.n elaborate system o£

pltmder of' its tunds, beoauae of the low pa.y.25

Mauy of the shipa were not

.,.awo r thy , and probably onJ.y two of all 'the ships ?lere in oond1 tion to
lndsrtake a strenuous voyage around 1;he Gape. 26
The ll.u.81a.n fle.t had. therefore long ceased to be a _&nO of overawing
r',rkey.

blows.27

Turke,. was alrea.cb' far be;ycmd th .. reach of RUl!uda' Ii ph3'sieal

But it also

W&8

well knOWTl when the

r~g118h fleet left the shores

Df' l'hgland aa wall aa when it oruised in the '8laek Sea that the nussian

!ships would take refuge in the harbor where they were protected from a .....
~&rd

attack.

U,4er the •• oil'Oumatanoes the displa;y o£ the allied fleet,

l,Jrquhart thought, was absolutely uselesa"

:10t only .....s the Rluudan fleet a

pretext to get the English fl •• t intc the Black Sea, but

also~

bring the

armies to the shore. of the Crimea. 28
It Bu •• ia had intended to use the .ne.t fer aggressive pt;;.rposes, it

would have been the fleet that ahe would have strengthened and not the fortifioations of Sebastopol.

oetween 1828 and 1853, however, not a single

line-of-battle ship was added to the squadron of Russia in the Black Sea.

It Constantinople wa.s the intended prey lOt a Russian expedition, then Russia
would have .%pen4ed her resources on new ves.els.

24 01i })h&1'lt, ,. 255.

25llUJ.t p. 256.
26:.!J.ljJ.. , p.
257.
27 trrquha:rt, ,5D'~lt. P. 24.
28ILarriet TJrq'lhart, p. 74.

But Ruaaia apparentq

ll~

had defenaive

tg~tics

in mind in preparing tor the defense of Sebastopol •

It certainly was not being protected against the Turks, for if Russia had
apprehended an attaok from Turkey she would have fortified Odessa.

If Bu.....

aia. feared a I'H.l attack tl"Oll England and Ii'ranoe, ahe also would have lort1-

tied that oi t7' but aince, as Urquhart

8&W

it, Russia knew that the7 would

not, she fortified Seba.stopol.29

The d8Oislon to invade the Crime.. oan be de8Or10e4 as an "atter'thought."

80

When

1kt

Twa announoed it on A.ugust 5, 1854., moat people did

industriousl)" indootrinated that Russia was invulnerable ar.d Sebastopol

tmpregna.ble, that
mountable.

~an7

considered the difficulties of the expedition

By these tIleans, Urquhart thought, the belief

W&8

in~lr-

gradually e ....

tablished that to invade the Crimea was to strike a. serious blow against
ntu.u~ia.

The nation finally acoepted the Crimean expedi tion

tar,r exploit, and

&8

evidenoe of ministerial

1nt.~1ty

0.8

e. grand mlli-

in the light of the

long friendship between the English and Russian governments.

The season in

IWhich the expedition was undertaken also supports the 1dea that the expedi-

tion waa an "after-thoupt. fI

It was ini tial17 proposed and dif!lOtuuled w1 th

the mil1t&r,1 authorities during the month of March, and then set a8ide on
the grounds that it was of no value

&8

a military operation. 30

summer it was decided to invade the Crimea.

During the

But the same negative condi-

tions and prospect. existed in August as well as in l4arch of

1854

to preyent

29 Dav1d Urquhart, !Millar WSW (London, 1855), pp. 294, 295.
3OUrquhart,

~RiA,r, P. 19.

the .:xpeM tion.

But why then was it decided upon in August?

The 01'117

19....

son that Urquhart aa.w ponible was that _me new IIOtlve or com:bination had
arillel"

So.ething had to b. don. to eatlaf;y 'the

the dltdut.tistaction of the Queen.

ann.v

of the public, and

There had to be a ct.e1aT to malte Europe

bel1eve that the Cri.ea really was the center of strength, and eo the alIi ••
oou14 tate the ne@OUations tel' peaoe out of the handa of the Turk •• 31
Urquhart believed that another fao'!; wh1eh proved the expMJ ticn an

"a.fte.... thought" was the government t s statement that 1 t was the original d....
sign r.4 the '\Vsr.

Bere Urquhart fomed the aovernment ts statements into

8.

law of pt"Ooed:uH for he say8 "It would be unworthy ot the post tlo» of' the
Go~rnment

hood. u32

to state what was true.

Its only object in speech is false-

To his readers ihis statement must have seem~d preposterous.

It

was one thln#r, to point out instances of' falee tl!:'Overnment statements or even

act. of oolll1s1cn, but such a oondemnation

W8J!I

apparently irrepc:maib1e.

Count Po.so di Borge33 ha.d pronhesied as early

a8

1828 that if England

and Ruanda were ever at war, &,.gland \vould direct her attaok against Sen a .....

topo1.l4
SM£:U

When an advanoe oOPY or Laurenoe Oliphant' s book,

St! .1U Blaok.!tl, was .ent to

Thl

'a"

.:!hI

RuI.ilD

offioe for review in 1S5l

31 1b14., p. 20.

l2}pj,d., p. 19.
33Count J>O$ZO 41 Borgo was a Corsioan who en'tered the Rna.tan diplomat.
io servioe, &nd was ambassador to Paris from 1814 to 1635.

34A• I. Dasent, J. T. DII.n, (1.0'1'1401'1, 19(8), I, 166. Daeent not••
Kinglake'. mention ot Posse 41 »ergo's prophe..,. It ia lftt.restin~ that
Seton-'i'lataon in ~!'!t1n JD. !Yl'9U on page 147 states tha.t Pos.o propheSied
with amazing accuraoy the events inll'ranoe riu:ring 1830.
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Delane W&8 80 struok wi th the book that he gaTe ita vef:7 favorable notice,
and even hired Oli.phant &8 a regular f'o:reign correspondent.

Thia book,

Da.aent atate., waa the fiNt to oall attention to the mill tar,y and. naval
strength of Sebaatopo1, .. name with wMch moat
1853.

En~liahmen

"'ere unfamiliar in

It a • • _ that he was the first Englishman to predict that it war

Mould come it was through that fort that
the heart of Russ1a. 35

~ng1a.nd

would haTe to strike at

His book was first published in October of' 1853, and

it became eo popular that by Ua:rch of 1854 a fourth eM tion was bl the booksnopa. 36

So it was through the writings of Oliphant, in accordance with

popular sentiment. 37 a.nd wi til the enooura.gemer!t of Lord Pa1merBton,3

8

that

Delaru» took the lead in advooating the immediate invasion ('If the Crimea. 39

Palmers ton was the first member of the oabinet to urge the conquest of
Sebastopol. 40

~..n

a.s m1nister of the Home Office he

800n

was producing

p!'oposals of' a Turkish 10&11, maps of the Crimea, a Prussian plan tor fortlf;yin.g Constantinople.

41

and all tn!S of 41p1011atic expedients tor Olaren-

35Ib1A ,
6
3 H• W. Schneider, and G. Lawton, A !!DRAI' IDA , Pilgrim (New York,
1942), p. 71.
37Dasent, I,

175.

)8Dlp12latl0 R,vi!!. February, 1866, pp. 16, 17.

39Da• ent , I, 175.

4Ol.la!.
41PalJDerston in vrri 1;1n~ to the 'I!:i.n1ster C'f\~r on June H;, 1854 said.
that there was no dang"llr of. a Russian attack t:m CCl'lstantinople. See A.~.
Ashley, Lif,s! P!4m.rston (London, 187G), 11,299.
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don'. guidanoe.

H. had been impressed in March with "the advantage ot a

great attaok on the Crimea:4a and by J'Wle he was an eager ad'YOOate ot sueh

an. expedi Uon.

In Ju17 he pre.sed hia colleague. to stiok to their purpo . .

and plan to I!P to the Criraea. 43

Probably without the ad:voo ao7 of Palaeraton

the Crimean expe4it1on never would have taken place.

even by

~hla

role waa approved

Mr. Gladatone, who thanked him for his work in helping direct the

stroke. nf ',"gland against "the heart and centre o.f the war at Sebutopol"~
Although Dasent. states that Oliphant's book was the fiHt to call at-

tenticn t.c the mill tary and ns.val atrenP:'1;h of the no....f8JIed Russian f'ortreuu
it ie apparent in

read1n~

his descriptions of the plaoe that it oertainly

waa not a oenter of' Russian power.

Bu.t Oliphant. althou.srh he minimized the

strength of the :fortress and the fleet, did. maintain that Russia, 1tself,
was a meaace.

B. Kingsley ?!ltal'tin in.1l1i TtlumLlh !lJ. l.o;d Palm!mto.n supportl

this evaluation of Oliphant. 45
It i8 impossible to understand. how the leaders of the go'V'ernllent and
Delane hillself', who had read and promoted the bock, oould have expressed tb1

attitudes whioh they did in the light ot the evidence that Oliphant pres.nted.

It was notorious that

rew

IngliBhtaen had been in the Crtmea, or

to

that matter in the Near East, oonsequent17 ff/IW knew &n7thing about the area
•

1

42PhillP Ouedalla,
II, 294-300.

P!I!!.r,tgn (lrencton, 1926), p. )62.

43 Ib1d •

44 Ilzid •
1'1'.

45:9. Kingsley Martin, '1.Ji..! Tr1um2h s!. ~ ,Ps\lmeraton (~ndon. 1924'.
188, 189.

From Oliphant

t.
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deacription 1 t oerta.1n17 . . obvious that Turite;r. Constan-

tinople, or England had 11ttle or nothing to tear

0'" to

tro~

essentially the same oonclusion as Urquha.rt:

Sebastopol.

that the Russ1an fleet

was incollpetent and deerepi t, and cerhd.nly not prepared to

troop. on an inv.aion of Turkey.

Ollphani

08.l'17

Sebastopol wu !"lot the center ot'

Ru.sian

nu••1an

power.
Perhaps

Palmerston agreed, but in expressing his thoughts on the

he placed bimself diametrically oppos1to UrqUhart.
ca.pture of Sebastopol and of the fleet would be a
vantage to England.

wbjec~

Palmerston felt that the
lastin,~

and important a.d-

He thought that it would be a more decisive place to

fight than in the Danube area.

I1clding the Crimea and Sebastopol, England

could dictate the condl tio1'18 of peace in regard to the na.val pes! t101'1 of
iuasia in the Black Sea. 46
Urquhart thought t.hat Pal.merston and Delane had combined to bring about
the invasion of the Cri••a.

Early 1n the war 1 t had been propoeed b7 the

government to s.nd al"ll1 •• in.to the Crimea, but the proposal failed to get

approval because of the re.istance ot the ml1it&r,J authOrities, though this
"as k.pt quite secret from the rest ot the nation.
at that t1•• Home S8Oret&l'1', sent tor Delane.

Lord PalM.raton, who w..

U. 1D'Uat have told hill, so

Urqtthart thousht, that Sebastopol was the oenter of Russian ~'()r and that

it al8t) was the source of' exped1 U.,ns

ar~in8t

Turke;r_ Per81a_ and India.

Since the nation did not believe these things and since bis
the oa.binet were stupId and

46 Ashle;"

II, 297.

headst'l'Cn~t

o~llea~tes

11'1

Palmers+,on leaked to Delane thl"Ougb

12~

I1!lI 'rW!

to tr:r to lJake the people tlnde1'1ltand the importanoe of Sebastopol.

Moreover, the government should be or! ticl.ed tor not recognizing this i ...
portanoe. 41
The more

1l!.!

Tim!, thundered in i t8 pages the more it rendered the

Crimean expedition practieal in the minds of the people.

Ita agitation on

this sub3ect was without parallel 1n the history of publio disouss1on.

It

stated that "Sebastopc'll is the centre of Russlanpower!,1t and until S.ba....
topel was destroyed there would he "ne safety tor Turkey. no sEJOtlri ty for
the world," and "no peace w1 th RuSSia. II

Rus.ia dragged the English
pertahed there.

~~e

a~1es

In this marmer, Urquhart belleyed.

to her shores.

Forty thousand Englishmen

deteats that Russia had suttered at the hands of the

alli.8, and the war that Rua.ia could not have won again.t
ah. now was able to continue with the a.:1d of the alIi...
trap in Sebastopol, Urquhart thought, and
into it.

1l1I Tin!

Turke1

Flu.,.

had decoyed

alone,

had .et a
the al11e.

48

Rven th•••thod ot arguMent that that journal employed was e'Videnc.
which attest.d tc her intentione.

baatcpol was what she said it

Her columna displayed no proof that S....

W9.8.

Only statements were made.

wrtte:ra were mialed, tJl"q.uhart thought, there Btill wae no

eXCUS8

Eyen it the
for the

47D1Plollt1c ~!v1", February, 186(', pp. 15-17. Daeent says that Palmarston was the first member of the Ca1:dnet to ut'.'re the conquest oJ' Seba.stopol (Delan" I, 175, 176). Delane's letters shaw us the degree to whioh
he was 1nvolyod in the jea.lousies and the 'bshirHl-the-scenes in1::r:1{!:UG in t.he
oonduct of the war (p. 223).

48Urquhart.

Wern,.

p. 299.

Pa.ge 299 i8 actua.lly numbered as 297 2 •
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legal and historical falsifications whioh they employed. 49
As Roebuok's co_itt.e of inQ.ui17 delved into the conduct

of the wart

it became apparent that it was impossible to extract a single u.irect answer
from the witnesses as to what was t.he source of the Crimean expe(l1tion. Not

only was this the oase, but 1. t even was impossible to

subject, expressed or entertained

lOo_ands.

'11}te

lnq\lir~rs

by the

could not even

P;!'8t

persons holding
~t

opinions on the
milit~

and naval

the uopi.nions" of' the poll tical

authorities, respecting the "opinions lt of the military a.uthorities, troll the

hilDe Mlnister hiuelf.

Most of the testimony, Mrs. Urquhart balieved. wall

evasive, ambiguous, or oontradiotory.
record given in

1D!

31!2lZ.2,;[ j y

tt'be utracts from the oommitte.'.

.$ W8re epeeimens of the incessant subter-

fuge and prevarioatlon that took place at the investigation.

It was well

known tbat the mili ta17 author! tie. we.... not conaul ted about the expecU tion.

The t ••timony of the Duke ot Newcastl. g,ave the impre.sion that no
opinions had eYer been tendered to the

~vernmsnt

.illta~

against the expedition,

and that if the cOJDlander-in-ohiet had remonstrated and it llad fail.d., he

.ould have resigned.

This proved fals., because the

cODl'lland~n.·.... in-(Jhiet

self, ViSCO'llnt Ha.rding, stated that he would not bave 1"e81'=;1"1IId.

But then

the oommittee fa.iled to a.sk Hardlnge if he had approved the ex:ped.it1on.

John

Bur~yne

hi....

S11'

who wae sent to the Crimea to examine and report on prevalent

oonditions Vie.e not even oonsulted. before the deoislon wae made.

Lord Aber-

deen was not ever'! able to give the committee a. direct answer to the slmple
question of whether ttin hie opinion, so muoh informa+.ion

W1;t.S

obtained a.s was
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necessary to justify the expedition.

,,50

'But on the other hand the Duke of ifewcastle. the Minister of ivaI', rel t
at the beginning of the war that he should make ever,y pos8ible inquir.y into

the oondition of Sebastopol.
obtain thie information.

He testified that Lord Raglan was unable to

The best inforaation, however, that the Duk. re-

eel ved was from a Colonel Du Plat, nOlI ha saw dq after ·dq, and who ae-

eiated him in investigating all the other intonaation he had gathered.

In

large part, therefore, the man who bears the re.ponsibilit7 for the expedition was Colonel Du Plat.
consulship at
for Russia.

~~iarsaw,

This Colonel had been previously appointed to tnt

a.nd Urquhart apParently considered him to be working

The Crimean expeci ti('ln was undertaken against the advioe of

Lord. Raglan and other important people. 51

Admiral Dundas had made
Crimea.

~eat

exertions to get information about the

During 1853 he obtained ver,y little

~r

the information he thought

necessary to accomplish his mission, and none about Sebastopel and the Ruesian fleet.

He admitted that he was hindered from obtaining it

ness of &oma of the English authon ties.
but that they were exceedingly slow.

b~

backward-

It was not that he was impeded,

He was hindered from obtaining infor-

mation by the &etion ot Lord Stratford, who was responsible for not sending

his interpreter

ahea~

to Odessa and Sebastopol.

Tbe. diffioulty.

80

Captain

DrUlDIlondthought, Viae due to hie pa.ssport, and 80 Admiral DtlT.daa' potential
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source of infoI'lU.i1on was sent ba.ck to Besika. 52

Admiral Dundas attributed

hie inability to obtain information while he was in Constantinople during
November and December of 1853 to the

"~8tem&tio

vigilance and precaution

of the Russian governaent and the hostility of the Greeks. H53

The inabll1tl

ot responsible government offiCials to 81ve olear an ...r. to the oommittee'e
que.tiona. oouvled with the evidenoe oonoerning the .teps taken_by the
politioal authorities to prevent the m1l1tar,y and naval authoritiee from
obtaining inforaation respecting the amount and disposition of the Ru •• ian
forces in the Crilleat lett no doubt in ?In. Urquhart's mind that the CrimeaJ
.%pad! tion was launohed in obedienoe to the Emperor of Russia. 54

tt'he Crimean expedi tion was ordered

oj"

the governments of F'ranoe and

F,ngland. and not by any of the oommanders in Ute 'Black Sea. 55

rjewoastle sent a despatoh to Lord

Ra~lan56 dated April

The Duke of

10. 1854. tellin,g

him that he wa.s not precluded from exercising his diAoretion, but also told

him that there wac nothing else for hIm to do exoept begin the Siege of

S.0&8topo1.

Here, aa before, when he was expressly forbidden to dislodge

tbe Rusaian aNy trom the Principalities even after the Turks had defeated
them as Sili.tria, the opportunity to exerois. diaoret1on wae not afforded

5~., pp. 4)-46. Captain Druaaond was 1n t'he _ploy of Admiral

~lnda.

at Constantinople.

5):.!.!aj. ,

p. 45

54 1h14., p. 55.
55.!lUJ.. t

p.

54.

5f)
'Lord Raglan was commander-in-ohiei of the English torcss.
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l~ow

him.

when the troO?S had ecaI>cely arrived in r£Urkey he waG directed to

attack Sebastopol, and t,hia at the very MOment when Lord Cla'rtlndon was s",-

ing that the DlOst the government expeoted i teelf tc do was to re80ue Constantinople.

This despatch ended. b7 declaring that "before the siege of a

fortress reported. to be so strong oan be attempted, it 1s neoessary that
infol"lllation that oan be relied upon ahall be obtained ... 57

answer to the Duke of

~jewcaBtle

I..oJ'ti Raglan t s

was dated August 19, 1854 from Varna.

a.

told the duke that he had not been able to obtain any of the information
whioh was required in that d.spatoh.

Lord Raglan furthermore protested

against the winter1np,:- of the al'lDY in Crimea. because 1 t was ill provided
tOl:

slloh an

ocoup~tiont

and it would decidedly proyefatal.

The contents

cf' Raglan'8 answer elimina.tes the posafbility of hie having und,ertkan tbe

expedition in ccmformitywith his own jllugment, and there.fore he undertook

.

it in eonlgequenoe of orders."

8

On September 14, 18 54 the allied forces landed in the Crimea. Marshall
St. Arnaud at Varna. on the 26th of August h1!i.1led this by eta-tin,g' that til t

was sho (Providenoe) also who calle us to the Crimea, a countr,y salubrious
as our

O'Wn,

and to Sevaatopol, sea.t of the Ruasian power, wi thin vthose wall

'we shall seek the pledge of peace and of our return to our native shore.:,59

But, UrqUhart thought, it was this providenoe that prevented there being
coal for the steamera, hay for the horses, huts for the .en, oOJDlllunicatio!'ls
11

51Hvriet Urquhart. p. 40.

;8Io1A.,

PP. 39, 40.

59IbJ.d., p. ;5.
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~or supplies, medicines for the sick, and clothing and food for all.

This

~roY1dence deprived the 801dierlll of abundant supplies whicb were 100ated

within a few mi1ea of the oamps.

H led the allies to the least vulnerable

IOf Russian fortifioations, and spared the liu••ians where they were most 'VUl~er&ble and where &ttack would have been

most destruotive.

Thie providenoe

saw f'i t to spare the al11es in the Prinoipal1 ties where they oould have d....
If.ated the RUSSians, and oalled them to t.be Gr1mea.

That oall Was, however,

delSTed 80 as to give the RUBsian troOPB from the Principalitie. time to
Ireach the Crimea, andror the allied
iCa.u.~t

~O

by the winter. ,-

60~.t PP. 55-57.

t1"OOpS

to a.rrive

j'tIBt

in tim.e to be

CHAPTER VIII
THE PEAC'E AND DIOLARATIOH OF PARIS
In August of l854,with the diplomatio support of Austria, the all18s
drew up proposals of peace which oame t.o be known a8 the Four Points.

'I'hey

proVid.ed for a oollecUve European p.:uarantee cf the Prinoipali ties instead

of a Rnssian protectorate, the improvement. ('1f cond.l tiona of navigation on
the Danube; a. revision of the 81;l"a1 ts Convention of 18.41 whioh would limit
Russian naval poW8'r in

~;he

Bla.ck

~ea,

a.nd the abandonment by Russia of her

claims as the of:f'icilll protector of the Chril!!tian subjects of the Rultan.

After the battle of ! 'lk.e!'!!lan !Heholae accepted the FeuI' Pointe 1n principle
but refused to 11mi t the siZe of his Black Sea fleet, or t.o surrender terri-

tory between the Danube and the Fruth.
t1oular~

Opinicn in western mtlrope, and pal"-

1n Great Britain, which rega.rded the war as directed against the

policy of Nicholas, hoped for a change under Alexander II after taohel.s

d1ed on larch 2, 1855.

But sinoe the allies had not wen anT striking mi1i-

tar,y auooe.s, Alexander II was not strong enough to resist Russian patriotic feeling.

So when the Powers again met at Vienna on March 15, they

agreed on the firat two pointa, but negotiations broke down on the third.
point.

Discussion had

ra~ged

between the two alternatives of restrioting

Russian naval foroes on the Black Sea, cr maintaining their allied
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e~uiva-
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lent, nei ther of ."hi ch, however, was acceptable to tbe other.

1

An AU8trian

compromise solution was re3eoted by England. and f.'ranee, and the war con tinned.

2
Urquhart saw 11 ttl. differenoe between the peace proposals in the Foul'

Pointe and the Vienna Note.

From the vantage point of the Vienna Note the

Meneobikoff dema.nds were milder and the Four Pointe worse.

The only differ-

ence be saw between the Vienna Note and the Four Points was that the foraer

tra.yud'erred Turkish sovereignt;r to Russia. alone, and the petACe proposa.ls
transf'el"red Turkish sovereignty tC' RUBsia and the allies. 3
The object of' the Crimean

oampal~

then, as the world. saw it, wae to

secure RUBsia' s a.ccepta.nce of the essentials of the?our Points.

There was

to be no indemnity and no alteration of frontiers required, the all1es de-

clued themselves not enemies or. Russia, but only defenders

ot Turk.,.

But

!Jrquhart thought that the great attack at the Itcentre of Russian powertf was
not to foroe the submission of Russia. but to enforce the sumaiasion of
T1lrkey. 4

Vlhen the Vienna conferenoe ruptured on April a8. 1855 Urqlibart felt
that Ruesia had only used the OOHi'ere
gained thereby three months.
the grounds that

~l.sia

to stall for time, and had actuall),

The ccnferenoe, ..s he saw it, was opened on

7181ded to

ev.~thlng

l R• W. Seton-Watson, Brat,in .in

P. 336.

2E. L. Woodward,The!i.t

:LH~

s.t

which 10gioal17 should have

~u:sJlI' 1789=1214

(Cambridge, 1955),

Refem, 1815:1870 (Oxford, 1938), p. 279.

3Da.Vid Urquhart, SRids;:.w. ~ ~ (London, 1855), 1'. 15.
4~., p. 16.

l3~

made the discu88ions superfluous.

But then the conference olosed. oa t ens1blJ

on the third point without Russia making a oounte:r-propoaal.

Ueapparent17

thought that this was planned, and that the allies needed more time to brin.
mrke7 into suomis.ion.'
The rupture of the Vienna. oonference on the third point ha.d the etfect

U1"Q.uhart thought, of making RtlBtda appear l1nsubdued.

"Aut the truth of the

matter, a8 he conoeived it, was that Turkey remained unsubdued.

To most

readere of the protocols, the oonf'ereno0e at Vienna appeared. as a. verbal
oontest between Buss1a

ana

the allies..

This Was

So

(lelusion whioh oould not

have been p..rolcltlged, he felt. if the fourth point ha.d been d1 SQl.lsee(l.

Urqu-

hart thought tha.t the net result of the Sultan's aoceptance of the first
point wa.s the surrender of the De.nubia.Jl Prinei~~li ties.
prepared to sacrifice.

Handing them over to Eu.rope bere at least the appea~

ance of' taking them away from Russia.

point.

This t.he SuI tan wa II

But 1 t was otherwise w1 th the fourth

The Sultan was not about to agree to stipulations rega.r4ing hie con,,"

duct toward his Ch.ristian 8ub.1ects, which, as Urquhart saw 1 t, would baTe

bad the effect of surrendering his sov.reign~ and therefore the empire ..
The conferences at Vienna therefore ceased.

Later the al11es presented in

oonference at Constantinople plans for Turkish reform.

~~en at la.t an

agreement Vias reached with the Turks the 11.1t;11 RtpvoWft was publi8hed. Ther
the oonterences with Russia were resumed at Paria, from whioh the treaty
emanated.

PubliC attention was focused. on this,

8..Vld

the papers rep,ard.ing

the 1l91llt'Otiations wi tll Turkey were published unnotioed und~r the ti tle

1)3

"Oorre8pcmdenoe

a••pecting

Chri.tian PrlT11ege. in 'Turkey ... 6

The Vienna ditlOuss1ona continued throughout April, 1855.

As kuatria

was oppo.ed to the complete neutralisation of the Black Sea, the alli••

vooated & limitation of the naval forces of the riverine atatee.

.a-

But Prince

Oorohakov rejected thi., ~~d suggested that the Straits Convention of 1841
should be abolished and tree passage aS8ured to the ships of all nations at
peace with the Porte.

~ut

France and Bngland refused to acoept this propos-

al as it would have accorded to Bussta free acoees to the ¥editerranean. 7
The fall of Sebastopol, however, soon o han ged. the 81 tuatlon.

8

Na.poleon

due to preaaures at home desired to end the war through Austrian mediation,
to reduee 1 t to a blookade of Ruasia, or to enlarge it by an appeal to
natio.nal sentiment in Poland, Italy, and Hungary.

Palmeraton reluctantly

had. w give wrq, and. on Januar.r 16, 1856, after an ul t1matum fro. Auat1'1a,

au ..ia

acoepted the tour point. whioh included the surrender of territor"

at the JIlOuth ot the Danube and the neutrall ..ation of the 'Black 3... 9

.But

Ruaaia, in the ey•• of \JrQ,uhart. wa. merely aooepting the old tem. and reojeoting the new.

She now agreed to the neutralization of the Black Sea,

but then not to that of the Aland I.lands.

She wall willing to reetore Karat

but certain17 not to 08de anY' part of Beasarabia.

Just three day. atter

Russia'. acoeptance of the Weur Point., Urquhart d8I!Jcribed thts continual

6D1Rl9RltiC

~t!iJ!, September 4, 1867. p. 138.

7Seten-~atsont p. 338.
8"'1nOOUWa.nl,p.
~ -.I
""'9
c, •
9:.!h&.!l. , p. 280 •
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diplomatio

f.no1n~

aa nothing more than a game, and felt that conditiona

were ripe for revolution in many parts of mtU'ope.

The

Con~e88

more t.han a month.

10

of Paris oonvened on ~ebruary 25, 1856, and lasted little
Tbe problems of 1'urkish integrity. Turkish rel'om,

na.val power 1n the 'Black Sea and the Stra1 tSt and the status of the Prin01-

1'0.11 ties had. to be resolved.
Congress did not last long.

Compared. to the negotiations at Vienna. the
~

A1l oonquered terri tcry was to

March 30. the
be

~reaty

of Paris was signed.

l'estored with the exception of the reoti-

fioaticn of the frontiers of Be8sarabia.

Turkey was now to be inoluded in

the Concert of Europe with ita independenoe and terri torial 1ntegri ty in8U~

Th. Straits Convention of 1841 was revised in that the Sultan had

to proh1bi t the entr.y of war ve ••ela into the Dardanelles and the

:ao.phoru.~

The Black: Se.. waa neutralise4, aHoal. were prohibited. on it• •0I"e., and.
freedom or trade waa eatablished in 1 ta waters.

oont'1"Ol the naVigation of' the Dann'h..,.

Two co_i.,aione were to

:aue.ia'a anCient proectorate OYer

Wallachia. Molda:rla.. and Serbia was abolished, and a collective guarant ••
by the great power. waa eubet1tutod for the pJ'Oteotion of theee state., no

one or whom oould intel"Tene without previously consulting the others.
oonvention waR la.ter to be drawn up conoerning the 'Roumanian s1 tuation.

A
11

If' the Crimean ',far had been collueive, then Urquhart was quite logica.l
when he conclud.ed. that the peaoe treaty and the

had also been collUSive.

ne~t1aticn9

preceding' 1. t

As he pondered the interminable diplomatic

lOlXll Ptll!. January 19, 1856, P. 3.
11Setoo-Wataon. PP. 351, 352.
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haggling he must bave reI t that his view at the intent of the war was pro .....
tug itself' correct.

He later Waa to S8\Y that the Congress of Paris .erely

possetluted the show of a legal transaction, and was just a oloak tor oth.er

operations.

lIe thought it quite strange that the meeting was not merely one

between the belligerent powers, but also ineluded non-bel1ir:-erente sueh

Prussia. and Austria..

a..

Th. treaty that reaul tad wa .. not one of concessions

01

the granting of privileges, but almost exclusively conoerned itself with tht
internal conditions of one ot the allle8, namely, Turkey.

And this happenee

to b. the power tor who.e "independence" and "integrity" th. war had been

tought.

Obviousl1, no side was beaten, and no .1de was wrong.

ingl;r enough, the honor ot both side. was F ••e"ed.

Interest-

TheN waa no ind.ani ~

no renunoiations, and ful"thel'lllore, no • .curl tie. were taken.

It was obviotd

to Urquhart that from the •• stipUlations and oondition. that the only thing

the treatl' pttrporte4 to do ..as to regulate how Turkel". alli •• and her

e~

would 1.ntertere in her internal affairs. 12

The treaty had neutrali.ed the Blnok Sea, anA ita watera were thrown
open to the .erchant. of ever:r nation with o"ly tlanita.!'y and custom. regulation. that "ere ta'VOrable to oommerce. 13

"Beth Itus.,da and Turkey were

qulred to retain only a stipulated number of shipe on the Black Sea.
this was hardly acoepted before the

~18eians

violated it.

13J..2.14., Ootober 5. 1864. p. 82.

l4DiI12!Al&Q R,v1i~'

September

4,

1867, p. 138.

nut

Whereas Russia

armed her mel'Ohantmen, Turke,. striotly obeerved the treaty.14

12ll3! Prll.. Janu&r.1 4, 1860, p. 4.

1"8-

nuesia
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Violated it both in spirit and letter b1 re.trioting all coa4ereial interoour•• w1 th the CircaallJlana to Runiall ports.
and oonnived at b1 the 'British 8Overnraent,

IIJO

Tb,la nolation wa. reoosnlzec:
that all attfllR»t. _de 01

Urquhart and others to induce 13r! tiah . .!'Ohant. to open a trade with Oi1'casela were inerteotual. 15

n.tore the Oengres8 adjourned!l'rance propoa.d pema.n.ently to ohange tll ~
rip,bt of search.

Thus the ensting law of the Ilea W88 reviMd. on April 16,

1856 by the "Declaration of Paris. II

Pri.vateering was abolIshed.

With the

exception of oontraband a. neutral flag would now oover an enf!l!ll,y' II goode.
A~in

with the exception of

oontrabar~d

to capture under an en • .,. '. flag.

they could 08 binding. 16
con tinue in the wa.s

power.

80

a nentl"al' 8 good. were not liable

And blookades had to be eff.eotive batore

lJrctuh&rt thought that Russia had. been allowed to

that she could appear at the Congres$ as a conquered

Thie was neo8ssar.r. In his esttmation, so that ahe could nbring

a.bout the effeee.ent of maritime power."
had ahe appeared a8 a conQueror.17

This would not have been poaa1ble

The third and fourth propositions of the

Declaration of Paris w.re not new, aa Were the first and .eooncl.

All that

t!:Ut7 .ere intended to aoooapliah, or 80 he thought, waa to .U'-SUi •• the

innovation

or

the first two.

But then Urquhart stat •• that the !u••ian

plenipotentiaries were entirelJ unprepared in treating of the •• points, and
ao lad to refer 10•• for inatmctuiol'Ul.

Apparently, only the li'hlglish and

15.!w !J:!II, October 4, 1864, p. 82.
16Seton-Watson, P. 335.
17Da:rid Urquhart, Nav"

(London, 1874), p. 6.

Psm'l" ~liBtlUd .l?x .lb.I kv~i.

Siat••
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Frenoh representatives w'ere wi11inp.to SO beyond their instruotlona to make
a peace treaty.

Nevertheless, 1 t, is not ('Ileal" whether Urquhart thought the

Russian action wa.s simple unprepn,redness, or a.n attempt to ce.mottfle.ge their
real intentions.

The French minister in any event was the one who proposed

the declaration, and, Lord Clarendon ha.iled it as

!l

a triumph of civilizat.ion

and. humani 1;y ... 18

But the atagefor tht tl dramatio surrender of England's most destructivE
maritime weapon bad long been under oonstruction.

The nDeclaration of

Par1. tI made p.raanent the waiver of' the right of .earch which had. been decl.red in March of 1854.
00l811;t •••

During the war Urquhart and the foreign affaire

oampaigned again.t the waiver which theY' aaw as most d.trimental

to England'. defens..

For decade. two maxima had reigned with unquestioned

authoritY' in the IIlinds of'8ritish atatesmenl

the one, the inviolability of

fuH.8!a in her own terri tory to the foroes of England J the other, the absolute contrel which England po.sessed OVer Russian trade.

19

If England would

therefore have attacked Russian tra.de, it aou1d have bloodlessly and ine»pensivel:r defeated her.

It was, Urquhart thought, Enr,land' 9 aooeptance of

the pri.noiple, ttfree bott;('It!ls, free goods, n by which she a.oted in the inter-

beaten by England despite the despatches and private letters ('If the

~1rat

Lord. of the Admiral t;r, the Secretary of lia.r, the fi'oreign Secretary, and the

18~ Ptll', M~ 2, 1860,

p. 42.

19Urquhart'" source for these was Sir John :Me' :1.111' 8,

Ft.Ral FOB t~<m.9i. Rt\Ie1a J.n JJl! Jul.

P~U81..f!HlS!
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Prime l«iniater.

Unless Rusaia had poesened the 1'OOat abaolute and oertain

eer$, he felt that ahe could not have vE!!l1tured even into e simulated a1;rug ..

gle.

marlti~e

It was, then, Russiats objeot to see that the

were superseded, just

I!tS

laws of England

it wa.s her obj(+ot to dt"al'f the forees of 11!ul"f}pe to

her B01l, and all in order to transform a potentlttl defeat by Turkey into a.
victory ('lver Europe. 20

It was the right

or

seizure and

oon.,~8cation

that came into question

during the Crimean 1tfar, and not the rigtlt of search which meant no more thaI

the practice of visiting vessels.

Tbe right of seizure, ITrqlUlart was con-

vinced, wa. a right inherent in sovereignty, and as old as war '1 t ••lf.
this respect it wa.. antecedent to all enactments
oould not be waived.

8..l'lti

all written law, and

2l

The day that war was declared against Russia the English
ls.ted an Order-in-Couneil waiving the right of
the war.

In

8el~lre

gove~ment

tor the duration of

The order was dated the twenty-eighth of 'Ma.rch, 1854. and stated

that l"4'lgland had relinquished the right. of
neutral veaeels.

2O"t,. Pr'!Uh

8elflin~

an enerrt;1'e goods on boar<

It wae, UrQUhart thollght, quite difterent from former

September 6, 1851;, 'Pl'. 26, '-7.

21 Ibid., August 25, 1855. Supplement, P. 1.

Urquhart eta.ted, nThe
right of seizure consti tutes the state of wa:l". War is t:l judicial sentence
against an enemy, to be exeouted by a oompulsion whioh applies to hie pel"son and his goods. The poode are a,lwl?,ys dietrained hetore tho person; and
therefore the rigb.t of' aeiz1n~ the enemyts<'!\'Oods 1s eonteil1ed within the
right of' killing hie person, which is t.he :practice of <ar." TIe concluded
that to qu •• tion the right of its exercise, and net the justice of the
grounds upon which 1 t wae to be used, wn,.s to weaken the Mlvereignty {"\f the
state.
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treati •• or relaEationa of treaties.

Vmen tormer relaxations took place it

twas not in fa.vor of an enemy, but as a. ooncession to a friend.

These uBual-

l.y Were made in a formal manner, and were entered into. wi th smaller powers.

England had defend.ed that right against the whole world, and
of her very existenoe.

en~,

the hazard

And 11; was by this means that she was able ttl break

than seeing England go off' to war wi thaut the
against her

a~;

ri,(~t

of search as a Vleapon

and espeoially in respect to Russia, 8.eainst whioh it was

her only real means of coercion.

22

In order to prevent the seizure of ftuBsia's commerce under a neutral.

flag a solemn act drawn up by the Privy Council sitting in the presence of
the Queen was needed, and not .erely a decision ot the oabinet.

Beoauae

Lord Palmer.ton was unable to procure suoh a eolemn sot, he acted without
it.

Urquhart explained that a document appeared in the Qaa!ttl which re-

sembled an Order-in-Council, but the name of the Queen wa.s not at "he head

She did not sign 1 t, but her name waa used in the text as it •• h&cl

of it.

sanctioned it.

The dooument could only have emanated from the Oabinet Coun-

cil, because there had not been 8Jl3T s1 tUng of the Privy Couno1.1 "sinoe the
9th offtlru-ch previous, tt and the supposed ord.e:r bore the de.. te of' the twentyeighth of March, a day on whioh there had only been a meeting of the
Council at the Foreign o-trice.

The deoision had therefore been t.a.ken in the

Ca.binet. Counoil, and not in the Privy

COUfUli1..

But a. deoisiol"l of tbe Ca1>i-

net Council had no legal or jud.icial vah:t.e, since that, body

22

]W., p. 2.

C~binet

WCi.S

not reeog-
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nised by law.

Arid it was nothing lass if! his eyes than "a usttrpation of tbt

powere of' the Privy Council. ,~23
As late as the twenty-fifth

~f ~roh,

the "f"l'audulent ll Ordet-in-Counc1l was

as little an three days before

ig~:med,

had not yet been confided to Lord Clarendon.

it is evident that the secret

A F'rench

on the tWenty-eighth the whele cabinet \'las ig'norant

or

Cowley on the morning af tha.t d.,BY had announced t('l the

SOUTee

thcught that

the Order, for Lord
}<'1

Teno h government

that the English cabinet had arrived at the unanimotls and definitive decision "to maintain the prohibition of' neutral oommerce between ports belonging to the en4lllllY.

...

Urquhart had predioted that as a result of the waiver Runian trade
would not 'be bapaired, and that England·s mariti•• power would not be of
any

importanoe in the war.

Russia. furthomore, he thought, would make a

detemined eftort to obtain the permanency of that waiver.

tiona were realized.

'I'hese predio-

Tra.de between Ru_ia and England never eM_d.

the admiralty advertised for and bought tallow from
was finally driven into a. oomer by' ma'lii'

1nd:1~ant

~188ia.

»Van

The government

olasses of the c01l!mln1'tJJ

and tried to excuse :1ts aotions by pretending that. it ha.d acted in the

in-

terests efEnglieh tl'ade. 25
The Congress at Paris in 1856 had ,10t. assembled

i:'C!'r

the pnrpose

making the waiver pemanent., but for oonoluding a peace 1;reaty.

of

The declar-

&t:l.on wa.s not slipped. into the treaty, and as Urquha:rt sa.w it, it was an

23Urquhart, Ntval Power, pp. 10, 11.

2~., pp. 11, 12.
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ttabnoftlal aot OS whioh wae '!l9r81y a.nnexed to the t,reaty.N'one of th.e plenipotentiRries had been furnished with the a;utncri ty i(') rUseu88 the questlf.'!n.
The persons who signerl it did "lot have the right to de so, and their

8pective 8(')vereigns IUd not rat! fy It. 27

the Birmingham Foreign Affairs Committee
illegal, because it was contrary to the

26

l"e-

As f;'l.r 118 'mngla.nd was concerned,
thou~ht

COIaOn

that the declaration was

law of England.

Even it the

Crown 8upported it, the declaration could not have the fONe of law without
the autheri V of ParU ....nt.

28 And Lord Clarendon

_dlai tte4 in the Hou •• at

Lor48 on .1&7 22, 1856 that if the declaration would have been snbm1 tted to
Parl1&1D4mt with the

8icned. 29

~'J'.aty,

tile Treat)" would 180st p1'Obably not have b •• n

The resolutions of the declaration not only went oounter to the

la•• of England, but also the

jnd~nt.

ot English court.

and the spirit o~

re.i.tance that 'ElIKla'11d bad tradl tionally .apreased ttwlard. tlle prino!,l ••
30
inoorporated in the deolaration.·

In fact, neyer before in recent U ••a,

in the opinion 01 Urquhart, had auch pro po si tion8 'been lIubmi tted to. a d.elib\lrativ. assembly.

The d.ei Bion to ehan~ s r i time lltw came a.bout !lui till

sud.denly, and i te suooess was ('lbvioualy due +'0 the abllle Int e eool"ecy with
which it had been $lA:rded.

31

tl('lth Urquhart, !'ind the

26 Urquhart , IZ"v!1 Pe,w,r, p. 5 ..

27"0' PiIM, ~ 2. 1860, p. 44.
28Jb1tl ., December 2:7, 1856, p. 150.

29l1:rquhart-, ...~a\rlio:
rvw~!',
. . . • • ...,;.:..

n.

¥

5.

30ll:!! Pr!!8, December 27, 1856,p. 150.
31Urquhart, Nayal Pgw,er, p.

5.

131~ninf!{bl'lm

Foreipn
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qui t6 il1e~1.

Art~r ~1.11 Clarendon had no autl:1(;T'i +.y to chan~e the law cf

England, a.nd aince he declared that he had done

fended the Crown, a."l
Viennese .Paper,

1:!

Be tiC'Jl'l

S(I,

tel" whioh he could be

he had grievou81y clf-

b~ught

to trit\1.32

The

Pre,se, Urquhart quoted as having stated on December 25,

1861 that "Lord Clarendon, in signing at the Congress of Paria the extinctlon of'England

t.

mar! time right., acted 'Wi thoui the knowledge of the Queen

or the mandate of t.he Crown.

Ria powers emana.ted from a private letter

ot

Lord Pal.eraton. ,,33
The abandonment of the right of' search was in Urquhart' 8 ey.s the

equivalent of allowing h.lli~rentR the right to trad.• in

l'l811t:r&1

vessels,

and could have no other effect than elttin~1.b1ng tb. F.l'lg1ish ca.r17i ng tradE
durin~

wartime.

Re felt that C~bden agreed wit.h him on this pnint, and

quoted him as havi1"lfr, wl':i.tten th.at tfl1"he practical ~ff.'eot then, of the a.lters-

ther, would be, in case of 'ltar w'1 t,h

?!.

naval PCWf'!ll', t<o transfer t.he carrying

trade, even of ('J'ur ('wn ports, tc nentral bcttcms. !t34

32~ Pr,!s, n~~embe:r 27, 1856, pp. 15f, 157.
33UrqUhart, !~avil Power, p.

5.

~ Pr,se, December 1), 1856,

p.

139.

cmmLusrcm
Urquhart can be more rea.dily understood in the context of hie times if

"'e view him as a. oontempora.ry observer who saw the continual expansion ot
Rusa1a as an historical tact; and who observed England's fumbling actions
toward the Turkish Fapire by members of the aristocraoy who probably more
otten than not obtained their posi tiona in government by birth and wealth
rather than by oharaoter, intel11gence, statesman.hip, and a good knowledge
of' aftairs in the

~Jearlf'.ast.

:Bven though Urquhart'. oharges of collusion

may be proven erroneou. 1 t !Bust be a&Ai t ted. that the ~vernmen t 's in epti tude

in proseonting the war make .. It qni te understanda.ble for him to have oOllle to
such oonclusions.

Ris post tion mueul sense in the light of the pl'inoiplee

whioh he thought should permeate Roctety

an~

inter.natiC'nal a.rrairs.

His

knowledge of the history of RUBsia. s.nd his acce'Pta.nce of the "P(?l:1ticnl
'T'estament of Peter the Greatl l gave a f'irm f'c'und!':l.tiol1 to .t;he struoture of' his
View tbat Russia intended. to

t~in

hegemony over Europe.

the East c·onfirlDed in his mind that

Turk~y

THe experiences in

wse 'l'}ot in need. of

and that 1 t would just prevent her from defeating RU8Sia..

~'lestern

help,

His distrust of

Lord Pal.eraton was substantiated. by the w83 he thought Palmp1"ston had handled foreign affairs for the two decades pdor to the war. And public opinion whioh Palmeraton made

80

Muoh of, he knew was only the re:i'lection of the
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1

persona and partisan groups which owned the newspapers.
Matthew Arnold"

a contentporar,y of U!'Q.uhart"

into the rea80ns why Urquhart

WIlS

~ivea U8 tIJ~

[.\!Oed

lnsl~ta

so poorly- aocepted by hi f!I oontflllpora.l"iee.

I,. the f1rst of hi. essays on critioism Arnold oonveys the impl"ees1cm that

anyone who attelllpted. to cr1 tiCl ze the I!:ngl1 sh oonsti tll tion, gcvernment, or
popular opinion could not help but be misunderstood.

For oritic!" was at

that tt. . 1n England too immereed 1n tactional strife whether political,
religious or ac01al.

Arnold also thOtlgbt that an Englishman valued What was

politioal and practioal so UlUoh

80

that he e.eily oame ,ttl' di.like 14e.s and

thinkeH, beoause they 1Il8d41e4 in pracUeal poll tica.
hie oont ..porar1e. saw Urquhart 1n this

li~t

JIo.t prcbably any of

and their view ot h1m • . , not

be ac muoh a reflection of what ba waat •• what they were.
!ut

Ur~uhart

oan be critl01zed for over-intellectualizing history.

J'80qU•• Bar.un attribute. to Marx on page 155 in the Houe,.9! Int,11!2t,

twa int.llectualist errors whioh also

aptl~

deBCribe thoee of Urquhart.

Both u ••d their mind. to bring order to Ide.s, and then having done
11 • .,." that the order was d.isct.)Yeret'i in the facts themeel.,.elil.

80

be-

Urquhart I'>"oe

having discovered this order, tbis plan (If Ftueei8.n oonquest, he made it iMperati'Ve truth for hi. followers.
Clonspiracy thee'!"',. of history.
to

~in

Both Marx and. iJrquhart also shared the

for :;q,rx 1 t is 1:he 'lJourp,eoi aie that conapi re

their en".s and fer Urqubart it 10 Russia ,'Which does

eo,

both making

oontemporary e.,.ents mask the real but hidden moV'ements of life.
It 18 no simple task to evaluate the valid! ty ot Urquhart's vitwl8.
There 1. great dIfficulty 1n aooepting in ita entirety his a ••ertion that

there wall collusion between the British ministers and the Czar.

Although
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the actions of the ministers were otten pro-llils8ian, it ia possible that
they were done inadvertently or as a result of a misllnderstandi>\g of the

si tuation.

This seems t.o be t.he '!lore reason.able a.nd

planation.

If' collusion is ecnsidered

~.nl:po$8ibl~,

as a qui te il'lcaneed an.:! raving ra11cal fool.

ea8~.ly

acoeptable e1'-

the tJrqJlbart; will be seen

Hi S o()l'lclue'i.ons are not,. how-

ever, 80 ha.rd tc belisvct iZ' 0011usion is c~nsid6red poasi hIe.

Much ot Urqu-

hart's evidenoe (the author pre~mes and cannot Rut,hor! tatively say) 1s

ditficult tn evaluate, because it ll'lvolves those thoughts and a.otions that
would not be recorded in the diaries or papers of those involved, or 1n
atate papers.

We have

110

.iout.a of cabinet lIleetings, and as a pel"llanent

and legal inst1tution in the goyern~ntal maohine~ 1t was quite new.

Urqu-

hart could have been juetified in ee.ing 1 t as an illegal u8Urpe.tion by the

aristocracy of the powers of the Crown and Privy Counoil.

All thes. thinga

being true it 1. diffioult to aq that the truth w111 ever b. known.

view. the te.tiMOnT before Roebuok·. oommitte. aa

If one

by intention not probing

too aeeply into the poor conduot of the war, one can only suspect that the
witn.s.es were also tr,ring to cover up the governmentts incompetence. or aa
t1rq1.lhart thought. oollusion.

ploys a maas of evidence.

His caae 18 most often well ar'sued, a"ld he __

To evaluate his position it

mu~t fi~8t

be

dete~

!.lined it theae facts are accura.te. and 'i.hen U' his logioal analysiS (',f them
18 in acoordance with the events as they h.a.ppened.

Eut again we are back to

the ori,ginal dlffioult;y cf wh:1eh wltneases t(' the events ean be truAted.
And the truth of' t.hings 1s

of~en n~t

and deeds ot which we have no reoord.

in whst is written, but in these words
This 1s essentially the djlemma.
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